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Who Governs the 'Ungovernable'?
Examining Governing Relations in Urban Informality

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Abstract

For several decades now, Metro Manila's Baclaran district has been home to thousands of street vendors who have capitalised on its functions as a commercial centre, a transport node, and a Filipino Catholic devotional site. This presence of informal hawkers, which some government officials consider as an urban blight, has generated a range of policies that seek to manage, if not eradicate, the informal hawkers. Years of street occupancy, however, have enabled the tenacious vendors to enforce grassroots mechanisms to appropriate streetscapes. I refer to this interplay of state interventions and grassroots practices as the formal-informal interface. Seen from an urban planning perspective, the Baclaran context offers an opportunity for scholarly inquiry into how the complex spatio-political ordering and socio-economic realities unsettle the essentialist formal-versus-informal categories of work and state interventions.

Indeed, as many global South cities face poverty and unemployment, poor people continuously engage in informal economy. Over 50% of urban labour force in developing countries is informal and street vending is seen as the most visible informal livelihood. Despite the growing recognition of informality, it has often been linked to ungovernable practices. Ungovernability, however, is never devoid of state intervention. The literature shows how state institutions use formal and informal approaches to manage livelihoods like street vending. Yet, there is limited empirical research that investigates the formal-informal interface in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces.

My thesis addresses this gap. Building on a combination of theories from planning, sociology, and political science, I problematize the question '*How can the interface of formal systems and informal mechanisms to govern and appropriate contested vending spaces be explained?'* Employing documentary review, observation, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and life-history accounts in gathering data, this qualitative research focuses on street vending in Baclaran, one of the Philippines' largest informal hawking districts.

In this thesis I argue, first, that understanding the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces requires situating the location of informal vending in the broader historical, spatial, political and economic trajectories of the surrounding environment. Second, problematizing the formal-informal interface demands what I call a post-dualist lens. Post-dualist lens contends that structural factors and agency expressions underpin the formal

and informal economic practices. It seeks to interrogate the factors, forces, and frictions (relations) involved in the formal-informal interface. Third, examining the formal-informal interface entails unpacking five governance dimensions: a) players, b) policies, c) practices, d) governing relations, and e) planning implications. The analysis of these dimensions shows how the co-optation and contestation in state policies and informal arrangements are rooted in multi-layered and unequal socio-spatial relations. Thus, rather than merely documenting the growing 'informalization', these empirical results call for a rearticulation of how, and to what extent, state interventions and/or institutional neglect deepen the precarious conditions of informal workers like street vendors.

In sum, these findings reveal how understanding the formal-informal interface contributes to the evolving conceptual and empirical conversations on worlding cities. The Baclaran case shows how worlding practices arise from the interplay of global North-oriented planning ideals and policy approaches, the unequal socio-spatial relations, and the continuing struggle of marginalized street vendors in the global South. These issues require rethinking of policy direction and planning trajectory.

Declaration by author

This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly stated the contribution by others to jointly-authored works that I have included in my thesis.

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Research Involving Human or Animal Subjects

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract i

Acknowledgements viii

LIST OF FIGURES xv

LIST OF TABLES xvi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE THESIS xvii

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1

1.1. "We are *APECtado too*": Research Context and Background 1

1.2. Research Questions and Significance 5

1.3. Description of the Succeeding Sections 10

CHAPTER 2. REVISITING INFORMALITY DISCOURSES 15

2.1. Introduction 15

2.2. Informality Discourses 16

2.2.1. Applying Social Theories to Understand Informality 16

2.2.2. Informal Sector: Roots and Trajectories 17

2.3. Policy Epistemologies on Informality 21

2.3.1. The Hostile Orientation 22

2.3.2. The Tolerant Atmosphere 26

2.3.3. The Accommodating Environment 28

2.4. The Post-Dualist Lens: Conceptual and Empirical Implications 32

2.5. Conclusion 36

CHAPTER 3. INFORMALITY, PLANNING AND GOVERNANCE: BUILDING THE LINKS AND THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 38

3.1. Introduction 38

3.2. Informality and Planning 38

3.2.1. Planning and Governance 40

3.2.2. The Importance of Power 41

3.2.3. Discourses on Urban Governance 46

3.3. Grassroots Collective Action and Agency: Concepts and Experiences 50

3.3.1. Collective Action and Agency 50

3.3.2. Informal Vendors 52

3.3.3. Street Vendors: Their Conditions and Engagement with the State 54

3.3.3.1. Asian Region 55

3.3.3.2. Latin American Region 55

3.3.3.3. African Region *56*
3.4. Tackling the Formal-Informal Interface: Key Ideas in the Literature and the Conceptual Framework 58
3.5. Conclusion 63
CHAPTER 4. RESEARCHING INFORMALITY: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 64
4.1. Introduction 64
4.2. Ontology and Epistemology 64
4.3. Research Design 67
4.3.1. Research Strategy 67
4.3.2. Case Study Selection Criteria 68
4.3.3. Collected Data 70
4.3.4. Data Gathering Methods and Sampling Techniques 71
4.3.4.1. Document Review *71*
4.3.4.2. Interviews *71*
4.3.4.3. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) *74*
4.3.4.4. Observation *76*
4.3.4.5. Life-history *77*
4.3.5. Strategies for Contacting the Participants 78
4.3.6. Data Analysis 80
4.4. Conclusion 83
CHAPTER 5. BACLARAN'S BROADER CONTEXTS AND SOCIO-SPATIAL FUNCTIONS 84
5.1. Introduction 84
5.2. The Philippine Political Economy and Urbanization Patterns: A Historical Gaze 84
5.2.1. Colonial Urbanization Patterns and Socio-Spatial Relations 85
5.2.2. Confronting the Continuing Problems: Post-War to Present-day Metro Manila 87
5.3. From Colonial to Global Era: Baclaran through the Years 91
5.4. Baclaran's Socio-Spatial Functions 94
5.5. Structural Issues and the Baclaran Context: Lessons and Implications 100
5.5.1. The Philippine economy's link to international trade 101
5.5.2. Manila's prominence as urban centre 102
5.5.3. The unabated urban migration 102
5.5.4. The unequal and elite-dominated political economy 103
5.5.5. Varied forms of agency and resistance 104
5.6. Conclusion 104
CHAPTER 6. PLAYERS IN INFORMALITY: ROLES AND RELATIONS 106

6.1. Introduction 106
6.2. National Government Agencies (NGAs) 106
6.2.1. Limited Engagement with Grassroots Players 107
6.2.2. Institutional Fragmentation 109
6.2.3. The Unresponsive Tools and Processes 110
6.2.4. The Dualist and Developmentalist Approach to Informality 111
6.2.5. Complex Local Political Dynamics 112
6.3. Local Government Units (LGUs) 114
6.3.1. Discretionary Power of the Local Executives 114
6.3.2. Barangays and the Spatial Hierarchy in Policy Enforcement 117
6.3.3. Depoliticized Planning Approach to Informality 119
6.4. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and the Private Sector 121
6.4.1. Economic and Cultural Capital: Capacities and Constraints 122
6.4.2. Collaborative and Conflictive Arrangements in Contested Spaces 124
6.5. Grassroots Players 127
6.5.1. Street Vendors: Their Precarious Conditions and Tenuous Ties 127
6.5.2. Grassroots Intermediaries: Barriers to and Bridges of Change 133
6.5.2.1. Local Political Leaders 133
6.5.2.2. Vendor Organizers 135
6.6. Conclusion 136

CHAPTER 7. APPROPRIATING CONTESTED VENDING SPACES: STATE RULES AND STREET NORMS 139
7.1. Introduction 139
7.2. State Rules Governing Street Use and Informal Vending 139
7.2.1. The Hostile Legal Orientation 140
7.2.2. The Tolerant Political Arrangements 143
7.2.3. The Accommodating Policy Environment: Contexts and Constraints 145
7.3. Street Norms in Appropriating Contested Vending Spaces 151
7.3.1. The *Haging* Occupancy 151
7.3.2. Engagement with Evictionist Regulatory Regime 155
7.3.3. The Bermonths Routine: A Socio-Spatio-Temporal Nexus of Informality 161
7.3.4. Multiple Finance-generating Mechanisms 165
7.4. Conclusion 169

CHAPTER 8. UNPACKING THE FORMAL-INFORMAL INTERFACE: GOVERNING RELATIONS AND PLANNING IMPLICATIONS 172
8.1. Introduction 172

8.2. Governing Relations in Contested Vending Spaces 172
8.2.1. Disjunctive Urban Governance 172
8.2.2. Strong Kinship Ties 177
8.2.3. Clientelist Political Relations 179
8.2.4. Grassroots Democratic Entanglements 183
8.2.4.1. Vendors' Responses to Structural Conditions and Socio-spatial Relations . 183
8.2.4.2. The Uncertainty of Outcome from Democratic Processes 185
8.2.4.3. Grassroots Fragmentation..... 186
8.2.4.4. The Unsustained NGO Assistance for Transformative Political Organizing. 186
8.3. The Implications of the Formal-Informal Interface for Urban Planning 188
8.3.1. Planning and the Post-Dualist Approach to Informality..... 188
8.3.2. The Agglomeration of Land Uses 190
8.3.3. Gentrification, Informality, and Globalization 191
8.3.4. The Need for Inclusive Urban Governance..... 193
8.4. Conclusion 195

CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION..... 197
9.1. Key Findings and their Implications for Theorizing and Policy-making..... 197
9.2. Policy Recommendations..... 203
9.3. Research Limitations, Topics for Future Studies, and Reflective Insights 205

BIBLIOGRAPHY..... 208

APPENDICES 233
A. Guide Questions for Interviews with Government Officials..... 233
B. Guide Questions for Interviews with Leaders of Vendor Organizations..... 234
C. Guide Questions for FGDs with Vendors..... 236
D. Research Participants..... 238
E. Ethics Approval Letter..... 244

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1 A Baclaran Scene before (left) and during (right) the 2015 APEC Meeting 2
Figure 3-1: Tackling the Formal-Informal Interface: A Conceptual Framework 61
Figure 4-1: Respondent Selection Flowchart 78
Figure 4-2: Data Gathering Process and Analysis 81
Figure 5-1: Location of Baclaran (The Case Study Area) 92
Figure 5-2: Baclaran Area as Identified in Pasay's Land Use Map 95
Figure 5-3: Baclaran Area as Identified in Parañaque's Land Use Map 96
Figure 5-4: Baclaran as a Strategic Space for Multiple Activities 98
Figure 5-5: Baclaran Area and its Relationship to Metro Manila Road Networks 99
Figure 6-1: CMHR Facebook Post - 'Clean up Baclaran, Keep it Sacred' 124
Figure 6-2: Vendors with semi-fixed stalls in front of shopping malls 128
Figure 6-3: Baclaran Street Products 129
Figure 6-4: Ambulant hawkers in Baclaran 130
Figure 6-5: Vendors under the LRT1 Rail Track 130
Figure 7-1: Vendors fix up their wares to ensure they are within the designated line 159
Figure 7-2 Busy Bermonths - Baclaran Vendors Interacting with Customers 163
Figure 8-1: One family holds four government positions in Parañaque 176

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Forms and Spaces of Power 45
Table 4.1: Sampling Grid 72
Table 4.2: Summary of Sectoral and Gender Profile of the Interviewees 74
Table 7.1: Vendors' Responsibilities in Managing Spaces 153
Table 7.2: Eviction Episodes in Baclaran 156
Table 7.3: Volumes of Vendors across Different Periods 162

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE THESIS

APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
BRW	Bureau of Rural Workers
BVDC	Baclaran Vendors Development Cooperative
BWSC	Bureau of Workers with Special Concerns
CLEP	Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor
CLUP	Comprehensive Land Use Plan
CMHR	Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer
CPDO	City Planning and Development Office
DILEEP	DOLE Integrated Livelihood and Emergency Employment Program
DOLE	Department of Labor and Employment
DOTC	Department of Transportation and Communication
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
EDSA	Epifanio De Los Santos Avenue
EO	Executive Order
ESCR-Asia	Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights-Asia
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
ILO	International Labour Office
LEP	Legal Empowerment of the Poor
LGC	Local Government Code
LGUs	Local Government Units
LRT	Light Rail Transit
MMDA	Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
MOA	Mall of Asia
MRT	Metro Rail Transit
NAIA	Ninoy Aquino International Airport
NAPC	National Anti-Poverty Commission
NEDA	National Economic Development Authority
NGAs	National Government Agencies
NGOs	Non-government Organizations
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCUP	Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor
PRA	Philippine Reclamation Authority
RA	Republic Act
SC	Supreme Court

SEC	Securities and Exchange Commission
TESDC	Technical Education Skills Development Council
UN Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN-ESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
WB	World Bank
WISC	Workers in the Informal Sector Council

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. "We are *APECtado too*": Research Context and Background

In November 2015, the Philippine government hosted the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)[1] Leaders' Meeting. Days before the November 18-19 gathering, local television news reported how different sectors complained about the traffic jam caused by the closure of key road networks in Metro Manila. Many commuters took to online social media their sentiments about the event's impacts using the hashtag #APECtado (affected). Besides the irritated commuters, the news featured the eviction of vendors in Baclaran, one of the Philippines' largest informal hawking districts and the case study area for this thesis. To monitor the situation as part of my data collection, I visited Baclaran three times throughout what was dubbed as APEC week – November 12 to 19.

Although Baclaran streets were not totally vendor-free as few ambulant hawkers were still roaming around the area, the improvised stalls disappeared - see Figure 1-1, on page 2. In brief conversations with some itinerant vendors, they echoed the netizens' sentiment: "We are APECtado too". As I walked down the then expansive but usually crowded Taft Avenue Extension, old vendor, Hannah[2], whom I had previously interviewed for this research, approached me. "Look, we are APECtado as well. We've been unable to sell for almost a week now... We were told the streets have to be clear until November 20 when this APEC event is over. We have lost PhP200 (US$ 4) of our daily income," she shared.

I have heard Hannah's account about their precarious street life a number of times. In our past talks, she recounted how the government drove them away when Barrack Obama and Pope Francis visited the country in 2014 and 2015, respectively. State officials often tell them they need to abandon the streets because they aggravate congestion or they might pose security and terrorism threats during special events. Whatever the government reasons might be, Hannah's and her fellow Baclaran vendors' plea - *We are APECtado too* - is an appeal for attention to their highly insecure condition. Ironically, as the APEC leaders talked about the

[1] The APEC is a regional economic forum of 21 member countries. Formed in 1989, it aims to generate "prosperity for the people of the region by promoting balanced, inclusive, sustainable, innovative and secure growth and by accelerating regional economic integration" (www.apec.org).

[2] I follow the standard anonymization practice for qualitative research. All the names that appear in this thesis, except for some elected public officials, are pseudonyms I use to protect the identity of the research participants.

Meeting's theme 'Building Inclusive Economies', informal economic workers like Hannah had to vacate their livelihood spaces so the state could project a secure and orderly image of the metropolis. This paradox highlights the need to examine the links between the government's responses to informal livelihoods and the grassroots self-help mechanisms often perceived to be beyond state control. Such entwined relations are the key problematic that I tackle in this thesis.

Figure[3] 1-1 A Baclaran Scene before (left) and during (right) the 2015 APEC Meeting

Interrogating such relations sheds light on how Hannah's situation, a common plight among those who rely on uncertain informal employment, is rooted in what I refer to as the formal-informal interface. By formal-informal interface, I adopt Hansen and Vaa's (2004) idea of interface as the "encounters between entities or processes that are governed by different rules; the outcomes may be neutral, implying non-recognition or accommodation, or they may entail conflict or cooperation" (Hansen & Vaa, 2004, p. 9). The literature reveals how the formal-informal interface occurs in global South cities where many urban poor engage in informal economy to grapple with acute poverty. The employment in the informal economy reaches 58–70% of non-agricultural employment[4] at regional level (Charmes, 2012). In developing Asian

[3] Unless stated otherwise, I have copyright ownership over the pictures in this thesis.
[4] An earlier estimate indicates that over 70 per cent of the workforce in developing countries and around 4.3 billion persons worldwide rely on the informal economy to survive (CLEP & UNDP, 2008).

countries, over 50% of urban labour force is informal – from 82% in South Asia to 65% in East and Southeast Asia (Vanek, Chen, Carré, Heintz, & Hussmanns, 2014). In the Philippines, where the case study area for this thesis is located, informal workers constitute around 75% of total employment (World Bank, 2013b). With the increasing magnitude of informality, scholars have linked informal work to formal economy and globalization (Bacchetta, Ernst, & Bustamante, 2009; Biles, 2009; Roy, 2005, 2009), which has marked the rise of emerging economies and their integration into the global economy.

Despite its prevalence in the global South, informality has often been associated with dismissive metonyms such as creative chaos (UN Habitat, 2016) and ungovernable practices (Gandy, 2005; Heymans, 1993; Kapsali & Tsavdaroglou, 2014). By ungovernable, some authors have viewed informality as "the uncontrollable dark aspect of the cities" (Kapsali & Tsavdaroglou, 2014, p. 3) and "a wild zone of the urban imagination… beyond the reach of human agency or any realistic prospects of improvement" (Gandy, 2005, p. 38). Such a dystopian framing masks the state role in informal economy and entrenches the dominant dualist paradigm (Geertz, 1963; Hanser, 2016; Rukmana, 2011; Santos, 1979; Sethuraman, 1981), which has long promoted a dichotomous view of the formal and informal processes.

Some planning scholars challenge this dystopian and dualist perspective by looking into the formal-informal nexus in relation to planning and policy-making (Dovey, 2012; Friedmann, 2005; Hackenbroch, 2011; Marx, 2009; McFarlane, 2012; Miraftab, 2009; Porter, 2011; Roy, 2009; Yiftachel, 2006). In the Asia-Pacific region, for instance, the United Nations has recognized how workers and enterprises move along the formal-informal continuum (UN Habitat & UN ESCAP, 2015). Even governments in some countries have resorted to formal and informal approaches in dealing with livelihoods like street vending (Batréau & Bonnet, 2016; Etemadi, 2004; Hlela, 2003; Peña, 1999; Recio & Gomez, 2013; Shuaib, 2007). In the face of persistent apocalyptic view of informality and the increasing attention to the formal-informal links, it is crucial to ask, who governs the seemingly 'ungovernable' practices in urban informality? This amplifies the need to analyse the formal-informal interface as an urban planning challenge.

But, why focus on street vending? Among urban informal employment, street vending is seen as the most visible livelihood (Brown & Mackie, 2017; Chen, Roever, & Skinner, 2016) and a major planning concern because hawking often occurs on public spaces (Pratt, 2006). Street vending[5] involves people who offer goods or services for sale from public spaces like streets and pavements (McGee, 1970). The vendors may be stationary or mobile as they move from place to place by carrying their wares on push carts or in baskets (Bhowmik, 2005). The heavy presence of street vendors is critical in developing countries where various stakeholders share and/or compete for limited spaces. Tensions arising from the informal nature of vending spaces have led to congested public spaces, forced evictions, riots, and loss of lives and livelihoods (Hlela, 2003; Okello, 2017; Peña, 1999; Recio, 2010).

In addition, although many studies have focused separately on formal rules governing street vending and on how informal vendor groups have engaged with state agencies (Etemadi, 2004; Hlela, 2003; Recio & Gomez, 2013; Roever, 2006), there is a gap in problematizing how the formal-informal interface operates in contested vending spaces[6]. For instance, street vendor associations engage with government agencies and simultaneously develop informal mechanisms to govern public spaces (Etemadi, 2004; Hlela, 2003; Peña, 1999; Recio & Gomez, 2013; Shuaib, 2007). Yet, there is a dearth of empirical research that investigates the formal-informal interface, particularly in the context of governing and appropriating contested vending spaces[7]. I address this gap in the literature and contribute to knowledge by examining the formal-informal interface in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces in the Philippines. Although the findings are rooted in Metro Manila, similar issues may take place in other global South metropolises.

[5] In this thesis, I use 'vending' and 'hawking' interchangeably to refer to the same concept. I recognize how some authors use local terms to explain the nature of street vending activities in different contexts. For instance, Yatmo (2008) classifies informal vendors in Indonesian cities based on the level of mobility and flexibility.

[6] While Hackenbroch's (2011) notion of negotiated space reveals the co-existence and link between statutory (formal) and informal spaces, it has not been applied to governing relations in contested vending spaces.

[7] A recent volume on street trading – Rebel Streets and the Informal Economy (Brown, 2017d) - is an important contribution that provides insights into the dynamics of legality and informality in street vending. I refer to relevant arguments in that book in examining my own findings in this research. In addition, some authors such as Roy (2005) and Hansen & Vaa (2004) discuss the relations of formal rules and informal arrangements but with specific reference to informal housing and settlements. Shuaib (2007) also emphasizes the need to investigate the links between formal sector and urban informal sector. He mentions the 'complementary' as well as 'conflicting' characteristics of formal and informal rules affecting street vendors in Colombo, Sri Lanka. Yet, he does not dwell on the causes and consequences of these issues and how they impact on planning. Lastly, Batreau & Bonnet (2016) provide a good work on what they call 'managed informality' where local district administrators implement a set of informal rules, which runs parallel with the formal policies. But there is inadequate discussion on how the legal environment shapes and/or is affected by the informal arrangements.

1.2. Research Questions and Significance

As the statistics in the previous section indicate, street vending provides employment to many urban poor in the global South. Despite this role, the common policy environment prohibits street vending in cities. In many cases, however, state authorities have different governing arrangements with informal vendors who have devised grassroots mechanisms to use the streets. I refer to this interplay of state interventions and grassroots mechanisms as the formal-informal interface. I problematize this interface by answering the question 'How can the interface of formal systems and informal mechanisms to govern and appropriate contested vending spaces be explained?' Addressing this question illuminates how the complex interaction of formal systems and informal mechanisms in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces affects and is influenced by urban planning processes. To analyse this interface, I tackle five sub-questions below, which serve as key components of the main inquiry.

1. Who are the key players that drive formal systems and informal mechanisms, as well as their interface, in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces?
2. Under what government rules do these players use streets and assert their claims?
3. What practices and norms do street vendors observe in relation to street use and informal hawking?
4. What relational logics and entrenched arrangements influence the governing processes and interactions of the different players?
5. What are the implications of the formal-informal interface for urban planning processes, particularly in the context of governing and appropriating contested vending spaces?

In addressing sub-question 1, I identify the players and explain their roles in undertaking formal systems and informal mechanisms in governing and appropriating vending spaces. In this thesis, the formal systems refer to the government laws, policies, and programs on street use and informal vending. Informal mechanisms are the individual and collective action practices and arrangements initiated by organized and unorganized street vendors and other stakeholders (e.g. private sector, civil society groups) to govern and/or appropriate their vending spaces. These include organizational policies, programs, and agreements to occupy and control vending areas. The written and verbal agreements between vendors and other

stakeholders with state authorities – national, local and street level bureaucrats – are also part of the informal mechanisms. In describing 'contested vending spaces', I follow Brown's (2006b, p.10) notion of urban public space, which refers to "the physical space and social relations that determine the use of that space within the non-private realm of cities". Thus, I define contested vending spaces as those public spaces in cities where street hawking operates in conflict with other claims like the car owners' need for mobility channels and parking areas, the state's desire to impose order, and the formal businesses' demand for exclusive use of their stall façades, among others. These spaces include streets, roads, sidewalks, parking spaces, transport terminals, and squares.

In sub-question 2, I tackle how state policies affect street use and informal vending. Here, I examine the factors, issues and implications of government policies on informality and street vending. To answer sub-question 3, I problematize how practices and routines in contested vending spaces get normalized and institutionalized to the extent that they gain legitimacy and influence the formal-informal interface in governing and appropriating vending spaces. In addressing sub-question 4, I seek to understand the governing relations of different players as they employ formal systems and informal mechanisms to govern and appropriate the contested vending spaces. These pertain to broader systemic arrangements and micro socio-spatial modes of engagements that lie beneath the rules, interactions, norms, and actions in Baclaran vending spaces. Lastly, in sub-question 5, I analyse the implications of the formal-informal interface for urban planning processes. I also delve here into how planning contributes to the interlocking formal and informal arrangements. These are critical insights for urban planners and policy-makers who constantly need to engage with street vendors.

Admittedly, different stakeholders can problematize the causes, processes, and outcomes of the formal-informal interface using their own institutional mandates (for state players), conceptual prisms (for researchers and academics), and lived realities (for vendors and stallholders). Each player can construct and offer diverse explanations of the interface. This is consistent with the thesis' critical realist ontological stance, which recognizes "the possibility of alternative valid accounts of any phenomenon" (Maxwell, 2012, p. 5). Thus, this research, though mediated by my own interpretations, offers an account of the formal-informal interface by incorporating and examining the views of multiple stakeholders. As I will explain in Chapter

4 (Methodology), while this research is informed by my own conceptual and contextual perspectives, the way of seeing is also contingent on the social contexts of the stakeholders - government officials, street vendors and other players - who took part in the research as informants.

By addressing the main research question and its sub-questions, I offer a theoretically-informed and empirically-grounded understanding of the formal-informal interface. My notion of post-dualist analytical framework lends a conceptual underpinning that moves beyond the binary formal-versus-informal view of urban informality. The post-dualist lens builds on three strands of academic thought. First, it follows the enmeshed reading of informality issues, as evident in the work of McGee (1973), Roy (2005), and Dovey (2012), among others. In other words, I view informal economic activities as inherently linked to formal and state-regulated economic transactions (Recio, Mateo-Babiano, & Roitman, 2017). I thus treat the formal and informal dichotomy as a heuristic device. Second, the post-dualist lens builds on the discourses on structure-agency nexus, as can be gleaned from Giddens (1984), Bourdieu (1990), and Archer (1995). Among the ideas of these authors, I espouse Giddens' (1984) structuration theory which regards humans as reflexive agents who can produce and reproduce structures. Drawing on the structuration theory, I argue that structural factors and agency expressions underpin the formal and informal economic practices in urban spaces. This structure-agency nexus enables me to examine the complexity of informality issues, a departure from many studies that look at both dimensions separately. Third, the post-dualist framework links the first two concepts to planning by adhering to relational and institutionalist standpoint. Here, my view is grounded in how Healey (1997, 2007b) frames planning as a governance practice concerned with managing co-existence in shared spaces and relations in collective action.

Following Healey[8], I look at planning as relational in that it is situated within the evolving, complex, socio-spatial interactions in urban areas. By institutionalist[9], I see planning issues involving urban informal employment like street vending as embedded in contrasting interests,

[8] In developing her 'relational planning' perspective, Healey (2007b) builds on Amin's (2002, 2004) and Massey's (2005) work on relational geography. They both see the interactions that occur in specific social or nodal 'sites' as complex and embedded in past trajectories and wider contexts.

[9] I employ the sociological variant of institutionalism, which looks at "interests and preferences, transaction processes and costs as multi-faceted and interests and preferences, transaction processes and costs as multi-faceted and socially constructed…" (Healey, 2007a, p. 66).

transactions, costs, rules, norms and broader social contexts in an urban area. I argue that the trajectories of these processes are multi-faceted and socially constructed which may be questioned and challenged (Healey, 2007b). In Section 2.3.4, I discuss how these concepts are re-conceptualized and applied in the thesis.

I deploy the post-dualist lens in examining how three policy epistemologies - hostile, tolerant, and accommodating - have informed state approaches to street vending in the global South. I adopt the term policy epistemology from Roy (2005) who argues that policy approaches are not just techniques of implementation but also ways of knowing. In Chapter 2, I address how the varying policy epistemologies are embedded in structural issues and agency expressions. As I unpack the conceptual dimensions and practical implications of these policy epistemologies, they also serve as a take-off point in questioning the highly structuralist and/or reductionist views of informality.

In terms of relevance to policy-making, the thesis' empirical findings draw attention to the dilemmas that state officials, planners, and scholars face in dealing with informality. The dominant literature shows how international organizations and national governments promote formalization as a key approach to informal economy (ILO, 2014; Tucker, 2016). Yet, in examining the roles of national government agencies, I have unravelled the constraints in state policy framework and program processes, which are meant to respond to informality issues. The Philippine national government agencies are saddled with issues like institutional fragmentation, unresponsive tools and processes, dualist and developmentalist approach to informality (see Chapter 6). Formalization is therefore unlikely to work in this kind of institutional environment.

Further, the literature on urban governance emphasizes how various players like state institutions, business groups, non-government organizations and community associations collaborate and/or compete to pursue their respective interests (Minnery, 2007; Molotch, 1993; Porio, 2012; Stone, 1989). Decentralization also figures prominently in discourses that problematize urban governance and local empowerment (Capuno, 2007; McGranahan, Schensul, & Singh, 2016; Porio, 2012; 2016). In this context, creating participatory spaces where the marginalized groups can take part in shaping decisions that affect them is seen as

a crucial step (Etemadi, 2004; Recio, 2015; Roever, 2016). The analysis in this thesis, however, has revealed that decentralization agenda and participatory processes enshrined in legal instruments are insufficient to address the vendors' insecure conditions in the context of strong discretionary power of local executives, entrenched elite capture of local governments, and depoliticized planning approach.

Another strand of literature on urban governance has noted the key role that non-government organizations (NGOs) play in facilitating processes and championing the cause of vulnerable groups (Bornstein, 2005; de Souza, 2006; Etemadi, 2004; Shatkin, 2004). In examining the presence of NGOs in Baclaran, the findings point to their limited role due to a number of factors (see Chapter 6). Instead, the analytical insights affirm some arguments in the literature (Piliavsky, 2014; Routray, 2014) on how local intermediaries - political operators and vendor organizers - could either sustain or undermine informal vendors' collective action for democratic political organizing.

Also, while the diverse and multi-layered forms and spaces of power (Gaventa, 2011; Lukes, 2005) have somehow enabled vendors to persist in an exclusionary and unequal socio-spatial environment, those with political and economic power remain dominant in the scramble for contested spaces. These complex socio-spatial interactions manifest in how Baclaran vendors devise their own strategies to use streetscapes, engage the state, and cope with financial distress. I examine these practices using conceptual constructs such as *haging* occupancy, evictionist regulatory regime, Bermonths routine, and multiple financial schemes (see Chapter 7).

On a broader scale, some literatures that interrogate informality see informal economic actors as rational individuals who exit from the formal system after cost-benefit calculations (Rapley, 2002) and/or when they feel burdened by state regulation (Schneider & Enste, 2000). After examining the governing relations in Baclaran, I move beyond this neo-liberal explanation of informal economic transactions. Drawing on the Baclaran context, I argue that informal economic transactions are embedded in four enmeshed governing relations, namely: disjunctive urban governance, strong kinship ties, clientelist politics, and grassroots democratic entanglements (see Chapter 8). These relations tap into economic, socio-cultural and political

dimensions of informality. Understanding the different issues tied to each relation will therefore aid the players, particularly the state officials, planners, and street vendors, in determining how the various interests get legitimized, co-opted, contested, marginalized and embedded in their daily socio-spatial practices and interactions. In other words, I contend that these entangled relations are more than institutional or political affiliations operating in space; rather, they are involved in the production of space (Lefebvre, 1991; Oriard, 2015).

With respect to research methodology, I employed qualitative approach using case study strategy to examine "concrete, context-dependent knowledge" (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 221) of the formal-informal interface. Between 2015 and 2016, I conducted 11 months of fieldwork where I gathered documents, conducted interviews with over 80 respondents, and convened focus groups discussions with 20 participants. I also undertook series of people and site observations and documented life-histories of seven street vendors, some of whom welcomed me into their houses. I used the Nvivo software in coding and analysing the primary and secondary data derived from the chosen methods.

The case study focused on Baclaran vending district, located on the borders of two cities - Pasay and Parañaque - in Metropolitan Manila, Philippines. Three criteria guided the selection of Baclaran for this thesis: a) the magnitude of informal vending activity; b) the informal mechanisms employed to govern and/or use vending spaces; c) the vendors' engagement with state authorities. In Chapter 5, I provide a detailed description of the study area.

1.3. Description of the Succeeding Sections

This thesis is organized in nine chapters. After this introductory chapter, I critically review the relevant literatures in the next two chapters to theoretically ground the research problem and develop the thesis' conceptual framework. In Chapter 2, I revisit the evolution of informality discourses and explains how policy epistemologies (Roy, 2005) have informed state approaches to street vending in many global South cities. Besides framing the policy orientations, I explain in this chapter my notion of *post-dualist lens* as a counterpoint to the dualist paradigm (formal versus informal), which has dominated much of policy and scholarly framing of informality issues.

In Chapter 3, I explain the connections between informality, planning and governance. Here, I argue that informality is embedded in planning praxis as the latter inscribes and influences informal practices. I then situate planning as a governance dimension involved in managing co-existence in shared and contested spaces. Since appropriation of urban spaces entails relational issues, I discuss next the importance of discourses on power and grassroots collective action. I end with the thesis' conceptual framework where I expound on how the post-dualist lens links informality to planning and the identified governance dimensions.

In Chapter 4, I lay down the thesis' methodological framework. I first clarify why I espouse critical realist ontology and constructivist epistemology as reflexive vantage points from which I problematize the dynamics of the formal-informal interface. I then explain how the combined *retroductive* and *abductive* inferential approaches, which are common analytical tools in critical realist research, have enabled me to be flexible in employing and modifying conceptual constructs as I examine empirical findings that fall outside the initial theoretical frames. In the subsequent sections, I explain case study as the thesis' research inquiry strategy, the criteria for case study area selection, the research methods employed, who the research participants were, how they were chosen, the strategies for contacting them, and the data analysis approaches and software used.

To emphasize the importance of the broader contexts, which contribute to understanding the formal-informal interface, I explain in Chapter 5 the implications of historical issues in the Philippines and Metropolitan Manila for Baclaran as an urban informal vending area. Five key themes emerge: a) the Philippine economy's link to international trade, b) the unabated rural-to-urban migration, c) Manila's prominence as urban centre, d) the unequal and elite-dominated political economy, and e) the presence of varied forms of agency and resistance. These themes underscore how the current Baclaran's socio-spatial functions are situated within the larger structural dimensions (historical, geographical, and socio-political) and agency expressions of urban relations. On whole, this chapter serves as an important milieu in examining the issues presented in the succeeding chapters.

In Chapter 6, I tackle the thesis sub-question 1: Who are the key players that drive formal systems and informal mechanisms, as well as their interface, in governing and appropriating

contested vending spaces? To address this query, I delve into four groups of actors whose formal mandates (in the case of state institutions) and/or everyday actions are implicated in informality. The analysis shows how national government agencies face several institutional constraints in performing their mandates. One thread that runs through those issues is the importance of policy epistemology (Roy, 2005) and spatial positionality (Lemanski & Marx, 2015) of those charged with addressing informality. I also explain how the discretionary power of local executives has enabled the Mayors' personnel to dominate the appropriation of Baclaran streets through the formal and informal structures of power. This occurs as local planners resort to a depoliticized planning, which puts premium on gentrification as an approach to street vending. In the remainder of Chapter 6, I examine how local non-state actors – NGOs, private sector, street vendors, grassroots intermediaries – collaborate and compete against each other, as well as engage with local governments, to advance their interests in using Baclaran streets.

In Chapter 7, I address the sub-questions 2 and 3: Under what government rules do the players use streets and assert their claims? What practices and norms do informal vendors observe in relation to street use and informal hawking? In answering the sub-question 2, I use three policy epistemologies – hostile, tolerant, and accommodating - which adhere to the post-dualist lens laid out in Chapter 2. Here, I touch on how the hostile policies treat streets as a public property which should primarily function as a mobility channel for automobiles and pedestrians. With respect to tolerant political atmosphere, I illustrate how the interplay of economic issues (poverty and unemployment), cultural values (Christmas season appeal) and agency expressions (building political ties) underpin the lenient arrangements. When it comes to accommodating policies, the analysis has unveiled the constraints of the favourable laws when linked to the broader issues of neoliberal-oriented policies and decentralization agenda.

In response to the sub-question 3, I examine four practices – the *haging* occupancy, the engagement with evictionist regulatory regime, the Bermonths routine, and the multiple finance-generating mechanisms. The notion of *haging* occupancy captures the vendors' precarious and resilient access to hawking spaces. Vendors' engagement with the evictionist regulatory regime, meanwhile, shows how eviction has been a spatio-political tool normalized by the interplay of broader socio-economic problems, local political dynamics, contending state

policies, and the continuing grassroots agency. The discussion of Bermonths routine dwells on the socio-temporal dimension of informality along with issues attached to this season. In multiple finance-generating schemes, the analysis highlights the problems that constrain vendors as they initiate *paluwagan* (to ease) mutual-savings, borrow from local lenders, and sell/rent out their claimed vending spaces.

In Chapter 8, I stitch together the key arguments in the three previous chapters by tackling the sub-questions 4 and 5: What relational logics and/or entrenched arrangements influence the governing processes and interactions of the different players? What are the implications of the formal-informal interface for urban planning processes, particularly in the context of governing and appropriating contested vending spaces? In the first part of the chapter, I analyse four overlapping relations: a) disjunctive urban governance, b) strong kinship ties, c) clientelist political relations, and d) grassroots democratic entanglements. By explaining the causes and implications of each relation, I shed light on how institutional issues (disjunctive governance), socio-cultural and political ties (kinship bonds and clientelism), and grassroots agency (grassroots democratic entanglements) intersect and generate the complex formal-informal interface in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces. In the second part, I discuss the implications of the formal-informal interface for urban planning. Here, I rearticulate how and why the thesis' post-dualist lens is a sound analytical approach in examining the formal-informal interface from a planning perspective. I then explain how the socio-spatial patterns and their interactions (land use, informality) are linked to broader planning issues (globalization, gentrification). Lastly, I underscore why planners should deal with the complex formal-informal interface through inclusive urban governance.

In the final chapter (Chapter 9), I provide the concluding discussion and address the main research question. I argue that the formal-informal interface can be explained by unpacking the conceptual prisms that frame how formal systems and urban informality are understood and by examining the links between the structural dimensions of informality (e.g. state policies, socio-economic conditions) and the agency expressions of street vendors (e.g. grassroots responses to government regulation). I also summarise the thesis' key contributions and explain some policy recommendations arising from the findings. In the last part, I discuss the limitations of the thesis and identify relevant themes for future studies.

After presenting all the chapters, the remainder of the thesis includes the bibliography and the appendices. Five appendices are attached: a) Interview guide questions (government officials; b) Interview guide questions (vendor leaders); c) FGD guide questions (vendors); d) Anonymized list of research participants quoted in the thesis; and e) Ethics approval letter.

CHAPTER 2. REVISITING INFORMALITY DISCOURSES

2.1. Introduction

The informality literature has tackled two streams of thought on formal and informal economic activities. While the prevalent perspective highlights the contrasting features between formality and informality (Flock & Breitung, 2016; Geertz, 1963; Hanser, 2016; Rukmana, 2011; Santos, 1979; Sethuraman, 1981), the alternative view contends that these two constitute an interlocking system (Dovey, 2012; McGee, 1973; Portes, 1983; Roever, 2016; Stavenhagen, 1965). These divergent ideas affect, and are manifested in, policies on urban informality, particularly in the context of street hawking in the global South.

Street hawking refers to an activity where individuals offer "goods for sale to the public without having a permanent built-up structure from which to sell" (Bhowmik, 2005, p. 2256). While there have been studies on government policies and street hawking, the literature mainly focuses on the nature and purpose of the rules and how they impact on street vendors (Hlela, 2003; Illy, 1986; Peña, 1999; Setšabi & Leduka, 2008; Xue & Huang, 2015). Beyond the policy discourses, the question on how formal state rules on street vending relate to the notions of informality remains unexamined.

I address this puzzle in this first part of the literature review by dwelling on concepts, policy approaches, issues, and cases relevant to informality and street vending. These themes have helped me trace the evolution of informality discourses. I employed a critical approach in presenting the ideas in the literature[10]. This entails approaching the literature survey in a three-staged manner. I first summarised different thoughts and linked their relevance to the thesis. Then I assessed how certain concepts relate to some chosen theoretical constructs. This allowed me to situate the research gaps and develop the thesis' conceptual framework. In what

[10] In building up the scholarly references for this chapter as well as the next one (Chapter 3), I used desktop research and library work as the two strategies. I resorted to the iterative process of going through the list of references in the previous article/book and choosing those relevant to the research topic. The desktop review helped identify and explain journal articles and books that are significant to the thesis. Three online sites were particularly useful in this regard. These are sciencedirect website, scholar.google.com, and google.com. For instance, a sciencedirect search for the subject 'interface' and 'urban informality' yields over 4800 and 1200 results, respectively. Of these, I browsed through more than 200 articles and reviewed them according to the degree of relevance to the topic. I also read through over 100 books on urban planning, governance, informality, urbanization, agency, collective action and informal vendors to determine their contribution to the thesis.

follows, I examine how informality discourses have evolved. Then I present three policy epistemologies that have informed how various states have approached street vending in select global South cities.

2.2. Informality Discourses

Presenting the different conceptions of informality is important to this thesis as it unveils how conceptual ideas relate planning and policy approaches to informality. This is consistent with the thesis' critical realist position. As Jones (2004, p. 155) argues, "ideas matter because in informing practice ideas are casually efficacious, making a real difference to social outcomes". In this regard, I address in this section the question 'how do conceptual discourses and policy perspectives on informality relate to each other?' Investigating this query provides insights on the formal-informal interface and how it relates to discourses in each arrangement.

I employ three theoretical lenses in categorizing and framing the diverse conceptions of informality. These social theories are the structuralist approach, neo-liberalism paradigm, and the structuration theory. Each of these social and economic theories is briefly discussed below.

2.2.1. Applying Social Theories to Understand Informality

Structuralist approach puts premium on the "importance of social and economic relations in shaping political processes and policies" (Digaetano & Strom, 2003, p. 357). An analyst using this framework looks at "historically-rooted and materially-based processes of distribution, conflict, power, and domination, thought to drive social order and social change" (Lichbach, 1997, p. 248). One dominant structuralist approach to comparative urban politics is political economy. This perspective seeks to explain how the interaction of government power and private resources limits or conditions political decision making (Digaetano & Strom, 2003; Gottdiener & Feagin, 1988). Essentially, a structuralist standpoint emphasizes the need to dwell on macro-economic and political factors that influence how urban governance operates. This perspective frames informality as a product of economic, political, and cultural processes.

While some authors look at informality as an offshoot of social structures, some ideas indicate the importance of organizational and individual agency to understand informal practices. A related framework in this regard is neoliberalism. It builds on the economic principle that

individuals are rational and maximize their utility or benefits from a commodity. Neoliberals assume that individuals are allowed the utmost freedom to engage in the market and to receive the full rewards of this participation (Rapley, 2002). Neo-liberalism thus manifests in some mental images, which depict informality as driven by individuals' rational decisions. Although neo-liberalism captures some policy perspectives, I contend that this is a rather reductionist view on informality and governance. As will be discussed in Section 2.3, policy approaches and governance issues influencing informality stem from a complex interaction of structural forces and different agents. This underscores the need for a theoretical framework that considers both the structure and agency.

A useful paradigm in looking at the role of structure and human agency in informality is Giddens' (1984) structuration theory[11]. This theory emphasizes the value of both the social structures as well as the human agency. For Giddens (1998, p. 77), society "… only has form, and that form only has effects on people, in so far as structure is produced and reproduced in what people do". This interlinked view and equal recognition of the structure and agency is important in capturing how social structures and human actions are implicated in informal economic processes. In the next section, I revisit how informality discourses have evolved.

2.2.2. Informal Sector: Roots and Trajectories

Scholarly attention to the informal sector is attributed in literature to Keith Hart's studies in the 1970s. He described the informal as those urban poor who engaged in petty capitalism, as a substitute for the wage employment, to increase their incomes (Hart, 1973). However, informal economic players had already been present long before Hart coined the term as individuals lived on one's wits and survived even without jobs officially recorded by the state (Cooper, 1987). As a result, some authors have regarded the informal economy as an urban poor's survival technique involving economic activities that could not be strictly tagged as modern (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991).

[11] I recognize the complex debates surrounding Giddens' (1984) structuration theory. For instance, Archer (2003) argues that a consequent concern of Giddens' (1984) embedded view of structure and agency is the question on where the structure begins or ends and where the agency begins or ends. Since I never intend to resolve this conceptual issue in this thesis, it is enough to acknowledge that both Giddens and Archer hold that structure and agency are related – the structure constrains agency which produces it (Parker, 2000). In this sense, I treat the structure and agency as a heuristic device.

These early descriptions indicate the tendency to contrast informal initiatives against formal practices. This is apparent in Hart's allusion to urban poor initiatives as a substitute to wage employment (meaning formal) and in Cooper's assertion of people's ability to survive despite the absence of state-documented jobs. The International Labour Office's (ILO) explanation at that time also emphasized that the informal sector is outside the formal system with its small-scale operations and skills acquired outside the formal school system and unregulated and competitive markets (ILO, 1973). This framing represents a dualistic conception, which pervaded the scholarly thinking in the past[12].

In the last half of the 20th century, a number of scholars came up with labels that reflect a dichotomous picture of economic transactions. Concepts such as firm-centred and bazaar economies (Geertz, 1963), upper and lower circuits of urban economy (Santos, 1979), enumerated and un-enumerated sectors (Sethuraman, 1981) constitute contrasting categorizations. Arguably, these constructs represent the contemporary delineation between formal and informal economies. On the one hand, the firm-centred, upper circuit and enumerated sectors broadly fit in Daniels' (2004, p. 502) formal economy definition as "the employment of waged labour within a framework of rules and regulations, usually devised and implemented by the state". On the other hand, Portes' (1983) informal economy description captures key features of bazaar, lower circuit, and un-enumerated sector. He defines informal economy as the sum total of income-producing activities (e.g. production and exchange of goods by the self-employed) and the employment in unprotected waged labour.

The divergence in contemporary conceptions of formal and informal economic activities hinges on the role of state rules. While the formal economy is assumed to be within government regulations, the informal is placed outside the mantle of state policies. Yet, in developing countries, there is an increasing acceptance of informal institutions as legitimate (Jenkins, 2001). What is not acknowledged, Jenkins (2001) argues, is that this basis of mental models and institutions are embedded in the socio-economic and political conditions and are coping with the global North-oriented formal rule of law.

[12] This is seen even in the earlier works of Boeke (1953) and Lewis (1954) where dualistic approach influenced their ideas about economic development.

Jenkins' contention draws attention to the structural roots of the formal-informal divide. It hints at the co-existence of both practices as they are embedded in the socio-economic, cultural and political relations. Consequently, the dualistic labels appear to be subtle expressions of a complex web of structural relations. In fact, earlier writers also pointed out that the 'formal' and 'informal' sectors are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are intricately related (Stavenhagen, 1965) and interlaced (McGee, 1973) as the manufacture and flow of goods are generated in both sectors.

This view connects to a growing perspective that regards informality not as a separate sector but rather a series of transactions that link different economies, spaces, and relations to one another (Donovan, 2008; Dovey, 2012; Roy, 2005). Informality, Roy and AlSayyad (2004) claim, indicates an organizing logic, a system of norms that governs the process of urban transformation itself. This stance dovetails with the interlocking relations of formal-informal arrangements and actors as evident in the statement below.

> The perceived difference between the formal and informal economy is, in reality, artificial in nature. There exists only one national economy with formal and informal livelihood approaches. Those that are seen as formal economies are capital-intensive and growth based, while those that are seen as informal economies are labour-oriented and people-centred. However, the truth is that these basically interact with one another under a single economy. The perceived difference lies in the fact that there is a lack of awareness and/or understanding of the mutual dependency of these two aspects of the economy. (ESCR-Asia, 2002, para. 3)

Aside from challenging the formal-informal dualistic lens, the enmeshed perspective underscores how the structural factors intersect with collective and individual agents, which arguably generate the formal and informal schemes. Ideas that elaborate on structures and agents have been associated with Giddens (1984), Bourdieu (1990), and Archer (1995), among others. As stated in the previous section above, Giddens' (1984) structuration theory, in particular, offers a space for analysing the role of social structures and human agency in informality. His embedded view of structures and agency emphasises the capacity of humans as reflexive agents[13] to create and recreate social structures even if they are also shaped by the latter. Describing how the structuration framework operates, Stones (2005, p. 4) claims that

[13] While Giddens (1998) refers to agents as human individuals, he recognizes organizations as possible agents depending on the context. In this thesis, I view both individuals and organizations as actors with capacity to act as agents. Following Ling and Dale (2014, p. 4), I refer to agency as "an individual, an organization, networks or a community that can enact a process that drives change".

> "[s]ocial structures almost always either have agents within them and/or are the product of the past practices of agents. And agents, for their part, have social structures within them, not least in the guise of particular forms of phenomenological and hermeneutic inheritance. (p. 4)

This structure-agency nexus frames how social structures (e.g. economic policies) and human actions (e.g. resistance) shape the causes, consequences, practices and benefits of informal economic transactions. As the succeeding sections will illustrate, the policy approaches and issues influencing informality emanate from a complex interaction of structural forces with organizational and individual agents.

Several interpretations of informality relate to the structure-agency interaction. One is Cooper's (1987) assertion on the ability of informal economic activities to challenge state hegemony and develop social relationships outside the normative principles of commoditization and bureaucratization. This argument offers a vantage point where the informal-formal discourse is treated with attention to the capacity of agents to form arrangements that respond to and/or move beyond what is structurally given. Portes (1983) particularly zeroes in on this agent-structure link when he traces the origin of the informal sector. Noting that the formal versus informal distinction did not exist in the nineteenth-century capitalism, he contends that the "absence was not due to the fact that activities labelled today 'informal' did not exist then, but rather to the lack of a suitable point of contrast" (Portes, 1983, p. 159). The activities regarded today as informal were common during the period of classic capitalism in industrialized countries. The emergence of the formal sector, which has served as the contrasting point, originated from the state institutionalization of the working-class struggle to have regular and tenured work and non-wage benefits (Portes, 1983). What is new, therefore, is the rise of the formal sector and not the opposite (Portes, 1983). This contention captures the agent-structure interplay in the context of formal-informal dynamics - the working class (as agents) demanding better working conditions and the state institutionalization as part of the consequent structural elements.

Besides Cooper and Portes, Perry et. al. (2007) claim that informal players voluntarily exit from the formal system; they then choose the informal economy after cost-benefit rational calculation. This neo-liberal calculation recognizes the capacity of individual actors to predict the directions of government policies and adjust their behaviour accordingly (Rapley, 2002).

Seen in this lens, informality becomes a rational economic strategy for informal players and the individual decisions signify a form of agency, which interacts with structural forces such as state policies or market demands. In the case of street vending, hawkers embrace informality, out of rational calculations, to respond or adjust to macro-economic and formal regulatory systems (Lyons, 2013). In other words, understanding the formal-informal embeddedness requires examining the dynamic interaction between agents and social systems.

In street vending literature, agency[14] represents an array of spontaneous and planned encroachments of vendors on public spaces (Bayat, 1997, 2000; Hanser, 2016; Musoni, 2010), varied forms of resistance (Crossa, 2009; Flock & Breitung, 2016; Swider, 2015; Turner & Schoenberger, 2012), and engagement mechanisms with government units (Brown, Lyons, & Dankoco, 2010; Cross, 1998b; Peña, 1999; Swider, 2015). Meanwhile, social systems often refer to socio-economic conditions – poverty, unemployment, migration (Musoni, 2010; Xue & Huang, 2015) and state policies aimed at regulating, controlling or purging informal hawkers (Batréau & Bonnet, 2016; Hlela, 2003; Illy, 1986; Setšabi & Leduka, 2008). Indeed, this growing body of literature has alluded to the dynamic agent-social systems interaction, which is evident in how vendors respond to state policies and even in how the state acts as agent in inscribing what is illegal and informal. One argument even contends that informality is produced by the state (Roy, 2005) and "there is no pre-defined boundary between formal and informal practices" (Xue & Huang, 2015, p. 156). The next section builds on these streams of scholarly work and analyses state rules on informal hawking in relation to the preceding conceptual discussion.

2.3. Policy Epistemologies on Informality

Examining state rules is critical in understanding how the ideas presented above relate to policies and enforcement practices. As Williams (1977, p. 11) notes, the "meaning of ideas is forged in social practices". Apart from thematic consideration, the literature review ensured that relevant cases represent different geographical locations in the global South. While the chosen cases are far from exhaustive and the contexts are unarguably diverse, several recurrent issues echo the need to surface what Sanyal (2010) calls 'global social commons', which are critical to understand the rules, relations and interests in urban informality. The discussion below depicts how policy approaches resemble the mental images of informality. It reveals some

[14] In Section 3.3.2 (Chapter 3), I discuss in detail the informal vendors' collective action as a form of agency.

emerging patterns in the form of three policy epistemologies – the hostile orientation, the tolerant atmosphere, and the accommodating environment.

2.3.1. The Hostile Orientation

Numerous studies on urban informality, and street vending in particular, illustrate a spectrum of policy approaches across different contexts (Bromley, 2000; Gibbings, 2013; Roever, 2006; Rukmana, 2011; Yatmo, 2008). A common policy demonstrates a hostile handling of informality as an urban phenomenon. The cases below illustrate how different governments have enforced this policy orientation.

In Bogotá, Colombia, the government implemented the ‘recuperation’ policy, a relocation effort meant to spatially segregate the street vendors and orient them on market mentalities. This `recovery' of Bogotá's public space focused solely on regaining it from street vendors while ignoring the illegal invasion by cars and private formal businesses (Hunt, 2009). For Donovan (2008), the introduction of municipal elections in Bogotá, which produced mayors who were eager to impose the rule of law, and the weakening of street vendor unions, resulted in the series of relocations. In Mexico City, the *Programa de Rescate* (Rescue Program) sought to revitalize and beautify Mexico City's Historic Centre by improving the area's physical shape and image. One aspect of the program entailed removing certain activities, including street vending, which was perceived to be threatening the general vitality of the area (Crossa, 2009). In Belo Horizonte, Brazil, this type of urban revitalization locally called *Gestão de Cidades* (Management of Cities) enabled the government to build an indoor market for the relocation of street vendors (Carrieri & Murta, 2011). In the guise of reinvigorating the city centre, the vendor relocation actually aimed at maximizing profit through a neo-liberal kind of management (Carrieri & Murta, 2011).

In three African areas, the governments adopted the same approach. In Zimbabwe, a law prohibited any kind of cooking or selling of cooked food on the sidewalks close to Harare's main markets and favoured new equipment based on official restaurants controlled by the state (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991). In the process, the law ignored “the efficacy of the existing arrangement, which was quick, well adapted to the market, cheap for the consumer, and profitable for the producer” (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991, p. 72). More recently, the Zimbabwean

government launched in 2005 the Operation *Murambatsvina* or Operation Restore Order, a government strategy to regain control of the informal economy (Musoni, 2010). This Operation has led to evictions of informal settlements and loss of livelihood opportunities like street trading (Musoni, 2010). Another case is Johannesburg City's policy to reshape the inner-city appearance and transform power relationships. The policy seeks to remove traders from the streets and place them in government-provided markets with appropriate infrastructure and services. Relocating hawkers to state-regulated facilities aims to end the negative consequences of street hawking and attain a 'world-class' city image of Johannesburg by 2030 (Hlela, 2003). In Maseru, Lesotho, the government evicted street vendors under the guise of public health and urban aesthetics. Behind this façade, Setšabi and Leduka (2008) argue that the reason for eviction is the state's intent to protect the interests of formal businesses and to mask state failure to enforce inclusive and sustainable urban policies.

In some Asian countries, vendors in Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia constantly experience eviction and harassment from the government (Bhowmik, 2005). The authorities even burned down their stalls without providing alternative places to do vending. In Vietnam, the drive to develop Hanoi as a more 'civilized and modern city' has prompted the local government to ban street vendors from occupying 62 streets and 42 public spaces (Turner & Schoenberger, 2012). In the Philippines, while there has been some degree of political accommodation of street hawkers, there are national laws prohibiting vending activities in public spaces like streets and sidewalks (Etemadi, 2004; Recio, 2010). In China, the 'global city' and modern space aspirations of urban leaders have resulted in abusive policing-measures and violent encounters between street vendors and the *chengguan*, the enforcers of municipal policies (Hanser, 2016). In Chengdu, the city street appearance served as "an important indicator of the city's well-being" (Wang, 2003, p. 133) and police enforced policies on "hygiene, traffic and commercial activity on the street, including where and when street vendors could operate" (Hanser, 2016, p. 6). In Guangzhou, the government has shifted from a more sympathetic treatment of vendors to a hostile approach in line with its goal of promoting a competitive city and attaining economic growth. In the process, the state downplayed, if not totally neglected, the initially appreciated poverty-alleviation contribution of informal vending (Xue & Huang, 2015).

The foregoing cases reveal several crucial points. First, the hostile attitude towards informal activities is often coupled with a preference for formal or state-controlled arrangements (Flock & Breitung, 2016; Gibbings, 2013; Yatmo, 2008) to promote a ‘global city’ image (Donovan, 2008; Hanser, 2016; Xue & Huang, 2015). To a great extent, this policy reflects the dualistic framing discussed in the earlier section. In most cases, the bias for the formal set-up occurs in situations of poverty (Lyons, 2013; Musoni, 2010; Turner & Schoenberger, 2012), urban migration (Alva, 2014; Bose & Mishra, 2013; Swider, 2015) and inequality where the formal employment is unable to absorb a large number of workers. The usual context also demonstrates how poor people rely on informal economic activities such as street vending (Musoni, 2010; Xue & Huang, 2015) to earn a living.

Second, eviction and relocation appear to be a common recourse of the policies critical of informal vending (Donovan, 2008; Gibbings, 2013; Hanser, 2016; Yatmo, 2008). This has a spatial implication as the hawkers need to vacate their vending areas and move to designated places where the state could regulate them. In many instances, relocation has led to declining income levels with mixed working conditions (Carrieri & Murta, 2011; Donovan, 2008). In the long run, vendors abandon the formalised market spaces and then return to vending areas, as in the case of cities across Africa (Hansen, 2004), Asia (Smart, 1986) and Latin America (Carrieri & Murta, 2011; Cross, 1998a; Donovan, 2008; Middleton, 2003). In some cases, relocation has failed due to ill-conceived location, bureaucratic and costly regulations, and the lack of customer drawing power of the chosen spaces (Donovan, 2008; Weng & Kim, 2016). As Bromley (2000, p. 19) noted, “[w]hen customers fail to follow, the vendors have little choice but to return to the streets”. Amid these issues, the hostile policies prefer a governing norm that puts premium on legality, image building, efficiency, and order at the expense of economic needs and welfare of the affected populations.

Third, the habitual excuse for eviction and relocation emanates from the state's desire to enforce order, which the informal vendors purportedly disrupt (Donovan, 2008; Hanser, 2016; Musoni, 2010; Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013; Yatmo, 2008). This reasoning appeals to those who look at urban informality as the realm of irrationality and potential ground for crime activities. It relates to Kelling and Coles' (1996) “fixing broken windows” theory of law and order, which holds that “small, highly-visible forms of urban disorder quickly lead to breakdowns in community standards and to the rapid proliferation of blight, vandalism and crime” (Bromley,

2000, p. 12). Paradoxically, to attain this orderly condition, the state resorts to harassment and violent eviction.

With these patterns, the hostile orientation becomes a policy approach anchored on a modernist dualistic framing and neo-liberal agenda, which favours formal arrangements and embraces control and order. Informal vending is seen as a ‘blemish’ (Hanser, 2016), ‘eyesore’ (Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013), ‘out of place’ (Yatmo, 2008) and treated as part of the unruly practices. Alas, this policy model fails to identify and root out the causes of the ‘disruptive’ vending activities. It does not recognize how formal systems (e.g. economic policies) contribute to informal and ‘unorderly’ practices, which has been a subject of critical inquiry by authors such as Yiftachel (2006) and Roy (2005), among others.

The fixation with the idealized formal and orderly arrangement resonates with Holston's (1998) critique of the modernist planning ideology. He asserts that the utopian vision of planning never stems from its aim to disrupt taken-for-granted norms. Instead, “it is utopian because its notion of alternative futures is based on absent causes and its methods on a theory of total decontextualization” (Holston, 1998, p. 41). In a way, the hostile rules peddle a decontextualized city image and a narrative of order to be able to impose a certain type of urban experience. This creates a policy environment that exalts the modern and rational formal arrangements and marginalizes, if not obliterates, the flexible informal practices (Roy, 2009; Yiftachel, 2006). The hostile legal orientation, therefore, deepens the dualistic formal-informal framing, which ignores the structural roots of the formal-informal divide and the agency of various actors involved.

The decontextualized policy framing shows the tendency of state processes such as planning to be detached from social conditions and power relations that underpin how economic transactions operate. It poses a critical challenge for planners and policy-makers since “[t]he problems associated with vending reflect a conflict between the official vision of urban environment and the realities of urban life” (Yatmo, 2008, pp. 397-398). Even the mere presence of street vendors illustrates the limits and the contested nature of the government's top-down production of space (Flock & Breitung, 2016). In fact, amid the strict enforcement of the hostile policies, street vendors have shown a strong sense of agency as they exhibit different forms of resistance. Through verbal confrontation, protest actions (Gibbings, 2013),

feigned submission, adaptive resistance (Musoni, 2010), and the struggle for right to the city (Swider, 2015), hawkers demonstrate that resilience and resistance enable them to grapple with the hostile policy environment. In some cases, vendors' sustained resistance generates a sympathetic and tolerant attitude from the policy-makers. The section that follows examines the prospects and limits of this lenient orientation.

2.3.2. The Tolerant Atmosphere

Several authors have recognised how informality contributes to the transformation of cities and urban centres (McGee & Yeung, 1977; de Soto, 1988; Chakrabarty, 2001; Alcazaren, Ferrer, & Icamina, 2011). Because of its enduring presence and the palpable benefits amid poverty and unemployment issues, some local government officials take a liberal stance towards informal practices like street vending.

In Yogyakarta, Indonesia, street vendors gained tolerance to use spaces in the mid-1980s, a period when informal vending was considered illegal in the area (Timothy & Wall, 1997). Of late, hawkers who are not part of the government's 'formalization' obtain tacit approval by paying daily fees to city administration (Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013) and/or bribing local officials. In the Philippines, where the dominant national policy prohibits informal vending, some city officials have a tolerant attitude towards street hawking due in part to poverty issues and the conflicting national policies governing the activity (Recio & Gomez, 2013). In Cebu City, a metropolitan area in central Philippines, local authorities tolerate hawking, even if it violates certain national and local legislations, as a result of political leverage created by sustained organizing and lobbying efforts by vendors associations in the urban centre (Etemadi, 2004). In Caloocan, a component city of Metropolitan Manila, the local government allows street hawking during Christmas season (from November to January) out of humanitarian cause (Recio, 2010).

In Mexico City, Cross (1998b) identifies one category of street vendors as legally tolerated. This is composed of vendors in residential areas that provide the same services, *tiangge* or weekly rotating street markets, markets on wheels, and ambulant vendors with fixed or semi-fixed stalls. Peña (1999) also documents the tendency of government officials in Mexico City to tolerate informal vending when vendor associations bribe them.

In China, despite the episodic crackdowns and clearing operations, the everyday street encroachment of vendors has gained a degree of tolerance from the local authorities (Hanser, 2016). In 2010, for instance, the Guangzhou authorities resorted to 'soft approach' partly due to the recognition that vending enables street hawkers to cope with the economic crisis (Flock & Breitung, 2016). The tolerant approach led to a condition where local government officials designate prime spaces as zero-vendor zone and certain corners where hawkers can occasionally sell their goods (Flock & Breitung, 2016).

A scrutiny of these cases indicates that several factors contribute to a tolerant attitude towards street vending. The first factor has to do with the ability of vendors to engage in the 'politics of the streets' (Bayat, 1997, 2000; Hanser, 2016; Musoni, 2010) and/or build associations to employ engagement strategies – from bribery schemes to collective political pressure (Brown et al., 2010; Cross, 1998b; Peña, 1999; Recio & Gomez, 2013). In a number of cases, the everyday interactions, resistance and collective actions enable state engagement, which allows the hawkers to occupy certain spaces without the threat of eviction.

Another component that generates a tolerant atmosphere is the discretionary power of local officials and street level bureaucrats (Bromley, 2000; Hanser, 2016; Peña, 1999; Swider, 2015). Government officials who have direct contact with vendors allow the latter to continue their activities within certain bounds (Batréau & Bonnet, 2016; Etemadi, 2004; Recio, 2010; Turner & Schoenberger, 2012). The parameters are defined through dialogues and agreements between hawkers and government heads. However, it is important to recognize the limitations of this tolerant approach. Often, this is contingent on the orientation of heads of local government units or state agencies in-charge of policing street vendors. The sympathetic attitude sometimes comes from leaders who have developmental approach to policy-making and/or those who understand the complexity of informal economic activities in relation to poverty and unemployment. Yet, in the absence of a legal instrument that explicitly permits hawking, the temporary agreements between vendors and government officials may prove unsustainable in the long run. Worse, in some cases, the tolerant attitude of government officials engenders, if not entrenches the existing, clientelist or patronage relations and corrupt practices (Turner & Schoenberger, 2012) involving devious government officials.

These different contextual factors indicate that the strength of the tolerant atmosphere rests on the nature and extent of vendors' practices, which enable them to overcome the unfavourable policies. In addition, the vendor's individual manoeuvres and collective initiatives require government allies who can support their actions. Essentially, this points to the critical role of organizational and individual agents – vendor associations, government champions – in creating and sustaining a tolerant atmosphere. In exploring the contribution of agents, however, it is equally crucial to be conscious of the structural dimensions that influence the actors' interests and behaviour. This is important since a tolerant position is also tied to ambiguous national policies on informal vending (Itikawa, 2004; Recio, 2010) in the face of harsh economic conditions (Brown et al., 2010; Flock & Breitung, 2016; Roever, 2006; Turner & Schoenberger, 2012; Xue & Huang, 2015). The institutional ambivalence generated by complex policies renders some local government executives indecisive on how to approach street vending. When linked to economic circumstances that breed poverty and unemployment, this policy context impels some local governments to have a considerate position on informal hawking. In the Philippines, for example, some local government officials argue that poverty and the lack of economic opportunities compel them to be more lenient on enforcing laws critical of street vending (Recio, 2010).

Thus, while the tolerant atmosphere primarily results from the actions and discretion of organizations and individuals – vendors and government officials – certain structural conditions enable these agents to accept a relaxed treatment of informal vending. This reflects how a structure-agency interface links the tolerant atmosphere to formal-informal processes. Beyond this tolerant attitude, however, is there a prospect for a more strategic and responsive policy approach to street vending? The subsequent section confronts this question.

2.3.3. The Accommodating Environment

Contrary to the antagonistic view of urban informality, some institutions have approached it not as a problem for eradication, but as a phenomenon to be managed. For instance, the United Nations Development Program or UNDP (CLEP & UNDP, 2008) came up with the Legal Empowerment of the Poor (LEP) initiative, which builds on de Soto's (2000) assertion that poor informal players simply need assistance from the government to be able to unlock their

potentials and participate in socio-economic and political processes. While this tenet has gained criticisms (Brown & Mackie, 2017; Lyons, 2013; Roy, 2009) for its neo-liberal rhetoric and for failing to consider fundamental issues such as power relations and market limitations, the UNDP has used the LEP to advocate for recognition of informal workers' rights in countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, and Tanzania (Lyons, 2013; Recio, 2010), among others. In Tanzania, Lyons (2013) pointed out the importance of amending and repealing existing laws to address legal obstacles and realize LEP's goal of empowering small traders such as informal vendors. Yet, no study has so far determined whether the LEP has contributed to improving the lives of informal workers or if it has led to a more efficient institutional architecture for governing informality.

Prior to the UNDP's LEP paradigm, several countries had already acknowledged informal vending in their legislations. A good example is how the municipal government of Santiago de Chile a century ago recognized street vending as a legitimate economic undertaking. In 1915, the local authority developed the city's first planned street market, two decades after the creation of private markets (Salazar, 2003, cited in Roever, 2006). In 1938, street markets already gained formal institutional status with the formally recognized right to operate in public space (Aliaga, 2004, cited in Roever, 2006). By the mid-twentieth century, street vending in Santiago had earned recognition as a legitimate economic activity and peddlers had become a permanent fixture in the city (Salazar, 2003, cited in Roever, 2006).

In Lima, Perú, the local government provided a space for street vendor participation in designing an ordinance on street vending. As a result, the crafted ordinance contains the rights of leaders of vending organizations to represent hawkers. The ordinance has a structure, dubbed as Tripartite Consultation Commission, whose mandate is to develop plans and programs with vendors' democratic participation (Roever, 2016).

In Mozambique, the government recognizes the existence of illegal but legitimate practices and intends to align the legitimate, but informal, to conform to the legal position. This trend somehow mirrors the earlier situation in China, when the initial state recognition of the ‘individual economy’, as a support to the planned economy, opened the door to legitimate street vending (Salazar, 2003).

In Yogyakarta, Indonesia, while some vendors thrive on tolerance, others have become part of the state's formalization effort, which legally recognizes most street vendors. One way to ‘formalize’ is through an agreement with or fee payment to owners of buildings and vacant lots where vending activities take place (Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013). At the national level, the Indonesian policy paradigm shifted from a Suharto-era hostile legal framework, where local authorities had to evict street vendors, to a more sensitive approach. The post-Suharto Spatial Planning Law requires the inclusion of the informal sector in the local plans and mandates public participation in spatial planning (Rukmana, 2011).

The situations of street vendors in Thailand and Malaysia are similarly encouraging. They are officially recognized and provided vending spaces. Authorities in Bangkok (Thailand) have allocated 287 demarcated sites where vendors can operate. In Malaysia, the government established a department to ensure that the vendors never obstruct the pedestrian and keep their places clean. The assigned office also organizes training courses on food, personal hygiene and nutrition (Bhowmik, 2005).

Besides the aforementioned policy measures, the passage of the national street vending law in India epitomizes the accommodating environment that acknowledges the legitimacy of informal hawking as an economic activity. Enacted in 2014 after years of campaigning by street vendor associations (WIEGO, n.d.), the law has important provisions on space allocation, government structure, eviction and relocation procedures, taxation system, grievance and redress mechanisms, planning norms and processes, social audit, and vendor participation. While it is never devoid of criticisms (see Alva, 2014), this first national legal instrument is a critical step in recognizing the rights and roles of vendors in urban economy.

These exemplars offer several insights that can inform policy formulation and planning processes involving informal vendors. First, the official recognition stems from the increasing realization that informal economic activities have a great contribution to how the political and economic processes operate (Hanser, 2016; Jenkins, 2001). This is essentially an acceptance of the link between the formal and informal economic practices. In this sense, the accommodating environment arises from an enmeshed image of the formal-informal relation.

With the state recognition comes a license or permit as proof of legitimacy. This affirms the ideas mentioned above on the state role in legitimizing or making certain activities acceptable as an economic undertaking. Once legitimacy is accorded, the legal accommodation then entails provision of designated spaces that the vendors typically use to make a living (Aliaga, 2004; Bhowmik, 2005; Rukmana, 2011). This spatial allocation shows that government plans could actually accommodate informal activities such as street vending, often maligned as chaotic.

Additionally, the favourable legal environment underscores how policies can accommodate informal practices. That some of these friendly laws were crafted after long and arduous campaigns by vendor organizations highlights the structure-agency interaction, which the previous section tackled. What is unclear though is whether the vendors and their associations still employ informal mechanisms to govern the spaces and how these intersect with the formal rules. This remains a major gap even if the cases present a good starting point on legal recognition and secure vending areas.

At this point, the discussion on the three policy epistemologies – hostile, tolerant and accommodating – has illustrated how the two conceptions of informality (dualistic vs. enmeshed) are manifested in state rules on street vending. It has demonstrated the importance of unpacking the structural factors and agency expressions in creating, maintaining, contesting, and transforming state rules. Thus, it is crucial to emphasize that the policy epistemologies are not mutually exclusive, as they even co-exist in different cities of a country. They represent the overlapping governing norms by which local officials and street level bureaucrats deal with vendors by implementing or modifying the legal instruments on urban spaces (Cross, 1998; Bromley, 2000; Etemadi, 2004; Recio, 2010; Hanser, 2016).

A number of arrangements show how the appropriation of spaces is fluid and contingent on structural factors and agent interventions. This is seen in layered zones with corresponding enforcement mechanisms (Swider, 2015; Xue & Huang, 2015). Spaces are designated as off-limit-heavily-policed territories, areas of tolerance and zones of contestation (Swider, 2015). In Guangzhou, for instance, evictions concentrate on prime city spaces while the regulation is less

acute in the outlying districts. Local officials tolerate the street vendors in insignificant places within the central districts (Xue & Huang, 2015). This leniency also occurs in Bangkok and Yogyakarta, where local administrators tolerate the presence of unregistered hawkers despite the existence of a law that enables vendors to occupy legally some designated spaces (Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013; Batréau & Bonnet, 2016). The layered and calculated mechanisms indicate a spatial hierarchy in policy enforcement, which may arguably result in a condition where the more affluent hawkers, who are able to afford the high rent, occupy the best vending locations. It also depicts an uneven and fluctuating strength of state control over urban spaces (Xue & Huang, 2015). More importantly, the spatial hierarchy enables street vendors to subsist in an exclusionary space (Xue & Huang, 2015) through varied forms of manoeuvre (Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013) and resistance (Musoni, 2010; Turner & Schoenberger, 2012).

With these interlocking policy orientations, spatialized enforcement mechanisms, and varied agency expressions, it is no longer sufficient to analyse the practices and players in urban economic activities using a dichotomous lens. At a time when the artificial divide between the formal and informal continuously gets blurred by structural relations and adaptive human actions, it may be more conceptually and empirically useful to examine how social conditions shape and are transformed by the varying, if not competing, needs and interests of actors involved in the formal-informal interface. This is explored in the section that follows.

2.4. The Post-Dualist Lens: Conceptual and Empirical Implications

The preceding discussion has presented how each policy epistemology relates to a certain conception of informality and how it arises from the structure-agency interaction. For instance, the features of hostile policy orientation dovetail with the dualistic image of informality. They both underscore the capacity of the state to impose its will. While the hostile policy manifests in the government's ability to assert an orderly image of the city by eliminating those that deviate from the legal and institutional norms, the dualistic view reflects the state power to inscribe certain activities as legitimate while others are unacceptable. In both framing, there is inadequate discussion of the structural links of formal and informal mechanisms. There is no attention given to the role of individual and collective agents in shaping policies and/or legitimizing certain practices.

This is where an enmeshed image of formal-informal nexus becomes critical. It urges a post-dualist framing of activities, actors, relations and interests in urban informality. Post-dualist framing, as I propose here, refers to an approach that is conscious of the inherent relations between the formal and informal economic activities. It seeks to interrogate the factors, forces, and frictions (relations) involved in the formal-informal interface. While cognizant of the immense influence of the dualist (formal versus informal) paradigm, which has shaped much of scholarly and policy formulation, the post-dualist lens treats the dichotomy as a mere heuristic device and stresses the need to go beyond the constraints generated by its fixed categories.

In developing the post-dualist lens, I build on three strands of academic thought. First, I follow the enmeshed reading of informality issues - as evident in the work of McGee (1973), Roy (2005), and Dovey (2012), among others – which were presented in Section 2.2.2 above. In other words, post dualist lens sees informal economic activities as inherently linked to formal and state-regulated economic transactions (Recio et al., 2017). I thus treat the formal and informal dichotomy as a heuristic device. Second, I draw on the discourses on structure-agency nexus, as can be gleaned from Giddens (1984), Bourdieu (1990), and Archer (1995). Among the ideas of these authors, I espouse Giddens' (1984) structuration theory, which regards humans as reflexive agents who can produce and reproduce structures. Building on Giddens' structuration theory, the post-dualist lens contends that structural factors and agency expressions underpin the formal and informal economic practices in urban spaces. It problematizes the contours of structural elements (e.g. socio-economic conditions, political structures) and the forms of agency (e.g. resistance, collective action constraints) that drive the perceived duality and relations between formal and informal schemes. In this framing, post-dualist approach goes beyond a reductionist neo-liberal formulation that treats informal economic activities as an outcome of cost-benefit calculations of rational individual actors. It eschews the highly structuralist argument that informal economic schemes are primarily an offshoot of processes of social structures. Third, the post-dualist framework links the first two concepts to planning by adhering to relational and institutionalist[15] standpoint. Here, my view

[15] I employ the sociological variant of institutionalism, which looks at "interests and preferences, transaction processes and costs as multi-faceted and interests and preferences, transaction processes and costs as multi-faceted and socially constructed…" (Healey, 2007a, p. 66). This attention to multi-faceted issues resonates with the mixed embeddedness' (Kloosterman & Rath, 2001; Ram, Theodorakopoulos, & Jones, 2008; Trupp, 2015) argument on linking economic transactions to legal policies, and political relations in an urban environment.

is grounded in how Patsy Healey (1997, 2007b) frames planning as a governance practice concerned with managing co-existence in shared spaces and relations in collective action[16]. Following Healey, I look at planning as relational in that it is situated within the evolving, complex, socio-spatial interactions in urban areas. Although Healey (2007) builds on the work of Amin (2002, 2004) and Massey (2005) on relational geography[17] in developing her 'relational' planning perspective, she has also drawn on ideas of sociological institutionalism.

Emerging from the subfield of organization theory, sociological institutionalism provides a wider perspective about institutions. For sociological institutionalists[18], culture is seen "as a network of routines, symbols or scripts providing templates for behaviour" (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 947-948). Aside from moving beyond the traditional notions of institutions as rigid structures, this viewpoint opens up a window towards understanding how ordinary interactions and oft-overlooked routines affect institutions and actors.

Relating sociological institutionalism to planning praxis means looking at how the elements, activities, and encounters embedded in the planning process gain meanings and become norms. This is necessary as social processes, which filter experiences and systems of meanings, contribute to the construction of knowledge (Healey, 2007b). The assigned meanings are in turn shaped by existing social contexts, dominant power relations, and planning goals, among others. It is within practices such as that of strategic planning team where forms of knowledge interact, "are filtered, and arranged into arguments, justifications and concepts of cause and effect" (Healey, 2007b, p. 27). This approach follows Giddens' (1984) argument in his structuration theory on the power of active agents to influence structures and vice versa. Healey (1997) provides a good link between the sociological institutionalism, planning practice and Giddensian ideas.

> Giddens theory of structuration… emphasizes that individuals are neither fully autonomous nor automatons. Powerful forces are all around us, shaping our lives, and

[16] In Chapter 3, I expound on these ideas of Healey on relational planning and sociological institutionalism.
[17] Amin (2002; 2004) and Massey (2005) both see the interactions that occur in specific social or nodal 'sites' as complex and embedded in past trajectories and wider contexts.
[18] Healey (2007a) distinguishes sociological institutionalists from other theorists of 'new institutionalism' by explaining their epistemological differences. The latter adheres to "rationalist notions of individual actors, with interests and preferences, who operate in institutional contexts which provide opportunities for, or inhibit, their projects, and who engage in a variety of transactions with different kinds of costs to prosecute their interests (Healey, 2007a, p. 66). This framing uses tools of economics and game theory to examine and predict possible outcomes of various choice situations (Healey, 2007a).

> presenting both opportunity and constraint. But structure is not something outside us. It is not an 'action space' within which we operate... How we act in structured situations not only 'makes a difference'; our actions constitute (instantiate) the structural forces. We make structural forces as we are shaped by them. (Healey, 1997, p. 49)

In other words, the processes and corresponding relations derived from multiple interactions influence how institutional actors and structures produce meanings and practices relevant to planning and policy-making. By subscribing to institutionalist stance, the post-dualist lens then situates planning issues like urban informality as embedded in contrasting interests, transactions, costs, rules, norms and broader social contexts in an urban area. When tied to urban socio-spatial relations, the post-dualist lens argues that space is produced (Lefebvre, 1991; Massey, 2005), hierarchized (Lefebvre, 2006), relational (Healey, 2007b; Lemanski & Marx, 2015) and embodied in ideas (Kelly, 1997) of multiple players. My point of departure, therefore, moves beyond looking at the congested spaces occupied by informal vendors as mainly an outcome of locational utility (Janelle, 1969), spatial mismatch (Duffhues & Bertolini, 2016), and urban agglomeration or 'disfunctionalities' (Scott & Storper, 2015). Rather, I view them as part of multi-faceted and socially constructed trajectories and processes (Healey, 2007b), which may be questioned, challenged, and modified.

Concomitantly, the post-dualist framing calls into question the long-standing approach to informal economic activities. In particular, there is a need to turn a critical gaze on the order-oriented vision of the city, which promotes a neat and regimented physical environment without looking into the complex socio-spatial relations. The tolerant and accommodating policy epistemologies on street vending seem to tread this path of moving beyond approaches that perpetuate the dualistic framing of economic activities.

Aside from conceptual considerations, the post-dualist view captures the increasing institutional recognition that informality is normal (OECD, 2009; World Bank, 2013b) and here to stay (CLEP & UNDP, 2008; Lyons, 2013; Roever, 2016). This indicates a realization of how the formal-informal practices are engrained in different structural processes and agency expressions. In street vending literature, this appreciation becomes apparent in notions of 'adaptive resistance' (Musoni, 2010), 'managed informality' (Batréau & Bonnet, 2016) and 'informal governance' (Roever, 2016), where resistance and governing norms blur the formal-informal divide.

In terms of spatial dimension, the idea of 'transient space' (Flock & Breitung, 2016) represents a post-dualist position. Transient space refers to the openness and fluidity of spaces, where "[t]he dynamics between street vendors and state agents show how people, goods, rules, and regulation are in continuous change, incessantly constituting space anew" (Flock & Breitung, 2016, p. 166). Transient space signifies the spatial hierarchy in policy enforcement, as discussed in the previous section, which shows that spaces are layered, fluid and contingent on structural factors and human agency. When linked to urban planning, this entails going beyond the usual purpose and character of city zoning and land use plan, which typically maps out areas for settlement, commercial, transport and institutional use, among others. In this regard, it is crucial to explore what de Souza (2006) calls 'urban reform-oriented' planning. By urban reform, he refers to the Brazilian experience where

> "…professional planners utilize land use management tools for purposes such as identification and classification of specific spaces according to their social situation and public interest (for instance, zones corresponding to areas which need upgrading and tenure regularization, zones of special interest for environmental protection, and areas where land is kept vacant due to speculation)." (de Souza, 2006, p. 337)

In this framework, the participation of ordinary citizens is an integral dimension of the planning process. This contradicts the technocratic vista, which often looks at planning instruments as too technical to merit active citizen involvement. This planning approach is worth exploring in light of a post-dualist contention on the need to situate informal vending as embedded in economic structuring as well as socio-spatial relations of various stakeholders. This can build on the lessons from accommodating policy instruments and tolerant practices, discussed in the previous section. In sum, these emerging notions pertaining to urban governance and planning indicate that a dualistic framework is inherently deficient in the midst of a complex web of structural constraints, socio-spatial relations and different agency expressions.

2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explained the different notions about informality using three theoretical approaches – the structural approach, neoliberalism, and the structuration theory. In answering the question identified at the beginning of this section - *how conceptual discourses and policy perspectives on informality relate to each other,* I have shown how various authors and policy perspectives view informality in a structuralist and dualistic manner. In relation to the thesis questions, I have demonstrated the importance of looking at formal systems, informal

mechanisms, and their interface by employing conceptual lenses. I have thus illustrated the need to examine how both the structural forces and individual/organizational agents shape informal practices.

Based on the analysis of worldwide cases on state policies on informal vending, I have shown how the structure-agency nexus can support a nuanced understanding of the government approaches to informal vending. By classifying these approaches into policy epistemologies, I have drawn attention to the relationship of policy models to images of informality and the role of structure-agency interaction in producing and reproducing policy orientations.

Finally, I have argued on the need to embrace a post-dualist lens, which underscores that the structure-agency nexus is a useful analytical tool in examining the inherent relations between formal and informal activities. I have laid out the conceptual underpinnings of post-dualist lens which include the following: the enmeshed approach to informality, the structurationist view of the structure-agency relations, the relational and institutionalist planning perspective. As an example, I have cited how the presence of overlapping policy epistemologies and spatialized policy enforcement mechanisms amplifies the need for a post-dualist approach. I discuss in Chapter 6 and 7 the presence of overlapping policy epistemologies with layered and spatialized enforcement mechanisms in Baclaran. In the next chapter, I expand the discussion on how informality is linked to planning and governance.

CHAPTER 3. INFORMALITY, PLANNING AND GOVERNANCE: BUILDING THE LINKS AND THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I touched on the different conceptions of informality and the policy epistemologies on street vending. In this chapter, I deepen the discussion on how informality is linked to planning and governance. I explain in Section 3.2 how informality is embedded in planning praxis as the latter influences and defines informal practices. I then argue that planning is a governance dimension involved in managing co-existence in shared and contested spaces. Since the appropriation of urban spaces entails relational issues, I also discuss the importance of discourses on power. I then present key concepts relating to informality, planning and governance. These themes have informed my analytical tools in answering the thesis questions I laid out in Chapter 1. In Section 3.3, I tackle major concepts and practical issues surrounding grassroots collective action and agency. The discussion situates in the literature the different strategic, short-term, and organized schemes undertaken by informal actors to engage or avoid state regulation. Here, I stress the importance of examining how urban informal actors, street vendors in particular, exercise their sense of agency and wield political power that can influence planning and policy-making. In Section 3.4, I summarise the key insights emerging from the literature review. More importantly, I discuss in that section the thesis' conceptual framework, which is informed by the research questions explained in Chapter 1. While the conceptual framework is a critical aspect of this thesis, its key premises flow from the discussion of salient ideas and cases in the literature review. I thus place this section at the end of the chapter.

3.2. Informality and Planning

In the last few decades, a trend toward a more inclusive process that reaches out to different stakeholders has gained recognition. This participatory engagement arguably constitutes what Smith (2009) calls democratic innovations, which refer to institutions that depart from traditional institutional architecture and promote direct engagement with citizens through institutionalized forms of participation. The appreciation of participatory process resonates with calls for planning to respond to the increasing complexity of urban spaces. Dovey (2012), for instance, stresses the need for reflexive policies that mirror and accommodate processes of informality.

> This is the great challenge for the urban planning profession: how to move towards a model that accepts unpredictability and informality without surrender to the ravages of

> market-led ideology? How to plan for the eradication of poverty in a manner that does not kill the vitality, productivity and adaptability that sustains lives? (Dovey, 2012, p. 365)

Since dealing with informality is a planning dilemma, it is important to see how they relate to each other. The planning literature is replete with references to informality. Some scholars are critical of the role of planning in informal arrangements. Yiftachel (2006) laments how planning contributes to the "stratification of informalities" by legitimizing certain activities ("whitening") and criminalizing others ("blackening"). Seen in this manner, some forms of informality become the realm outside what is prescribed (Castillo, 2006) while others are recognized as acceptable. Thus, even the prescribed procedures entrench what is designated as informal. As Roy (2009, p. 10) argues, informality "is not a set of unregulated activities that lies beyond the reach of planning; rather it is planning that inscribes the informal by designating some activities as authorized and others as unauthorized". Porter (2011, p. 116) echoes this view asserting that "[i]nformality is not "outside" formal systems, but is instead produced by formal structures and always intimately related to them". If planning is inherently involved, deliberately or otherwise, in the inscription, stratification and intensification of informality, it then has a key role in approaching the phenomenon in a manner, as Dovey (2012) suggests, that does not kill the vitality, productivity and adaptability of informal practices[19].

In relation to the importance of adaptability, other authors have emphasized the fluid and connected processes in relation to informality and planning. Innes et al. (2007) use informality to mean planning strategies that are neither prescribed nor proscribed any rules with planners often operating in the interface between the formal and the informal (Innes, Connick, & Booher, 2007). Friedmann (2005, p. 194) talks about planning cultures characterized by a degree of informality, which he describes as "a category of activity that results from the interweaving of the formal and informal and of the legal and the illegal and criminal". These insights indicate that while Yiftachel (2006) and Roy (2009) underscore how planning contributes to informality, Innes et al. (2007) and Friedmann (2005) essentially say that informal practices are embedded in planning itself. This is relevant to this thesis since if planning, as an integral aspect of formal governance processes, is riddled with informal arrangements it is critical to determine whether

[19] While Roy (2005) offers some useful tips on how policy-makers can better deal with informality, her suggestions mainly pertain to informal settlements. In the case of informal vending, I examine in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 how the points raised by Yiftachel (2006) and Roy (2009) happen in relation to planning and the formal-informal interface in contested public spaces.

such nature of planning facilitates or undermines the interface of formal systems and informal mechanisms. The next section frames how planning is linked to governance.

3.2.1. Planning and Governance

In relation to the previous insight on the embeddedness of informal practices in planning process, Healey's (2003) conception of planning as a governance project is critical. As a governance project, planning deals with the dilemmas of co-existence in shared spaces (Healey, 1997, 2003, 2007b). By governance[20], she refers to "the processes by which societies, and social groups, manage their collective affairs" (Healey, 2003, p. 104) "…for public purposes, wider than the purposes of individual agents…" (p. 17). For her, planning exercises become interventions aimed at "framing the rules for managing co-existence in shared spaces" (Healey, 1997, p. 113), which influences how and with whom resources are generated and distributed.

Gleeson and Low (2000) have a similar view on the relationship of planning and governance. For them, planning is "a domain of urban governance—that part of governance concerned with the provision of services to a city—and an approach to urban governance which seeks effective, equitable and democratic steering of the state apparatus for the benefit of citizens" (Gleeson & Low, 2000, pp. 4-5). Although Healey (1997, 2003) and Gleeson and Low (2000) both link planning to governance, the latter's view is more focused on state-centred service provision. Even if Healey (1997, 2003) does not explicitly link planning as a way to manage informality, her ideas of planning encompass informal activities and are thus more relevant to this thesis. Her framing of planning as a governance project concerned with issues of coexistence in shared spaces is pertinent to this thesis as informal vending is a practice that coexists in shared and/or contested urban areas. Her concept of governance is also broad enough to consider the collective action initiated by non-state actors. This means that even the informal mechanisms by vendor groups aimed at promoting public purposes can be considered as a legitimate

[20] I recognize the diverse perspectives on the evolution of governance praxis. For one, Healey (2007b) writes that the shift from government to governance paradigm is prompted by 1) neoliberalism's emphasis on reducing the role of formal government in society and encouraging a more active participation of non-government agencies, civil society and individuals in the economy; and 2) social democratic programs promoting citizen engagement with democratic processes through participation, empowerment and political inclusion. On other hand, Cajvaneanu (2011) traces the genealogy of governance to the notion of private government, systems theory, cybernetic model, and economic models such as neo-corporatism and neo-institutionalism. In this section, the discussion mainly revolves around the importance of governance to urban informality.

governance engagement. In other words, Healey's (1997, 2003, 2007b) ideas are relevant as they link planning to informal practices (as part of the dilemma in coexistence in shared spaces) and recognize informal mechanisms collectively pursued by vendor associations as a governance undertaking.

Healey's (1997) awareness of how power influences rules of social relations and human actions indicate the value of looking at planning as a complex process filled with conflicting interests, iniquitous arrangements and hierarchical structures. This is seen in the presence of policy epistemologies on informality (Section 2.1.4) and different collective actions and state engagements by informal groups (Section 3.2.3) in various contexts.

3.2.2. The Importance of Power

Viewing planning as a process filled with partnerships and conflicts requires a discussion on power. Power has been viewed as ingrained in every form and level of relations. Different theorists offer diverging ideas about power relations. But why is power relevant to informality, planning and governance? Healey (1997) offers an explanation.

> The[se] multiple dimensions of potential social division, and the inequalities that are generated through them, raise enormous problems for efforts in managing co-existence in shared spaces, as the potential social diversity is substantial. Consultative strategies for developing local policy often flounder on conflicts of interest, the power of dominant interests or the realization that those actively involved in a consultative process in fact represent a minority interest. (Healey, 1997, p. 118)

Healey (1997) broadly presents how power affects governance of co-existence in shared spaces. It would help at this point to dissect this general description by explaining some basic concepts of power.

Several years before Dahl (1957) wrote his famous book (*Who Governs?*) on community power in the United Sates, he had defined power in this manner: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Dahl, 1957, p. 202). Following this line, Polsby (1963, p. 55) argues that power can be examined by looking into "who participates, who gains and who loses, and who prevails in decision-making" (p 55). In this framing, power is seen as a zero-sum equation where those who are able to participate and eventually prevail emerge as the powerful. This relates to Healey's (1997) consultative

strategies and formal processes. This thesis, however, goes beyond the formal spaces and looks into informal players and their arrangements, which may not necessarily be part of the formal consultative forums. Dahl (1957) and Polsby's (1963) conception of power is therefore deficient when applied to the issues in this thesis.

Contrary to Dahl (1957) and Polsby's (1963) unidimensional and capacity-oriented view of power, for Foucault (1978), power is everywhere and never wielded by individuals, groups or institutions.

> Power is everywhere: not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere… power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name one attributes to a complex strategic situation in a particular society. (Foucault, 1978, p. 93)

He also views power beyond its nefarious connotations.

> We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. (Foucault, 1979, p. 194)

Foucault's (1978) notion of power as ubiquitous and multi-faceted shatters the traditional zero-sum equation and is crucial to acknowledging the multiple forms and sources of power. This would have been a critical vantage point where the thesis can recognize how different formal-informal actors with their diverse practices produce, strengthen, and resist power. As he further argues, "[w]here there is power, there is resistance… and consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power." (Foucault, 1978, p. 95). This indicates a non-linear notion of power. Yet, it becomes problematic when one considers his assertion that power is not possessed nor shared by anyone[21]. This means that his conception of power is unclear with respect to the role of agents. If this lens is employed in this thesis, I need to grapple with how power shapes and/or is influenced by formal and informal actors engaged in various arrangements to pursue their own interests, promote collaboration or resolve conflicts. As

[21] This assertion contradicts the idea of Talcott Parsons, Hannah Arendt, and Nicos Poulantzas, among others, that "power is specifically a property of the social community, a medium whereby common interests or class interests are realised" (Giddens, 1979, p. 89). It is therefore easy to echo Garland's (1990) contention that Foucault's (1978) idea of power is not a property or an instrument that classes or individuals can simply employ. Rather, it constitutes "the various forms of domination and subordination and the asymmetrical balance of forces which operate whenever and wherever social relations exist" (Garland, 1990, p. 138).

Gaventa (2003, p. 5) asserts, "[i]n situations of clear oppression or domination, an easier way of assessing 'power over' would be more useful than deconstructing notions of agency".

It is equally hard to understand how and from whom resistance to an oppressive system arises if one goes back to Foucault's (1978) framing of power and resistance. It is quite a challenge applying this to structurally-influenced and agent-initiated acts of resistance in formal and informal arrangements. A notion of power that takes into account the role of structures and agents is therefore more useful for this thesis. Giddens is among those who link power and agency. He sees power "both as transformative capacity… and as domination..." (Giddens, 1979, p. 91). In talking about its transformative capacity, Giddens refers to the stream of thought that views power in terms of the conduct of agents.

> Action depends on the capability of the individual to 'make a difference' to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. An agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to 'make a difference', that is, to exercise some sort of power. (Giddens, 1984, p. 14)

Meanwhile, his treatment of the domination aspect of power pertains to its structural quality. Giddens (1979) stresses here the layers of structural factors that may constrain the agents' capacity and/or intensify the systems of domination. In this conception, he emphasizes the significance of 'resources'.

> Resources are media through which power is exercised, and structures of domination reproduced... Resources are the media whereby transformative capacity is employed as power in the routine course of social interaction; but they are at the same time structural elements of social systems, reconstituted through their utilization in social interaction. (Giddens, 1979, pp. 91-92)

With Giddens' (1979; 1984) recognition of the role of agents and structures, his framework is able to consider both the local forms of power and the larger societal structures (Gaventa, 2003). This is important to the thesis as the relations of players in both formal and informal arrangements are shaped by collective and individual agents as well as structural factors.

Another author who recognizes the importance of structure and agency to the conception of power is Lukes (2005). He refutes Dahl (1957) and Poslby's (1963) notion of power by asserting that power must be understood both in terms of who participates and who does not. For Lukes (2005, p. 12), power "is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity (it may never be, and never

need to be, exercised)" and one "can be powerful by satisfying and advancing others' interests". In focusing on power-as-domination conundrum, he argues that power has three faces, namely *a) public face*, which mainly refers to Dahl (1957) and Polsby's (1963) concept of power; *b) hidden face*, which is the ability of a person or group – consciously or unconsciously – to create or reinforce barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962); and *c) insidious face*, through which the relatively powerless have come to internalize and accept their own condition, and thus might not be aware of nor act upon their interests in any observable way (Gaventa, 2011). Lukes' (2005) conception of power is critical to the thesis' discussion of players, policies, practices and governing relations in the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces. It can shed light on how formal laws and informal rules in vending spaces are developed and sustained by different actors. His three-dimensional view can also help in examining how the players engage in collaborative partnerships and/or manage conflicts and changes.

In an effort to understand power in relation to social change, Gaventa (2011) builds on Lukes' (2005) ideas in developing what he calls forms of power. For Gaventa (2011), power consists of visible, hidden and invisible forms. The definitions of these forms, which echo Lukes' (2005) public, hidden, and insidious faces of power, are in Table 3.1, on page 45. Gaventa's (2011) reiteration of three-dimensional view of power is necessary for the thesis' aim to examine both the collaborative and conflictive aspects of governing relations in contested vending spaces. In particular, Gaventa (2011) and Lukes' (2005) emphasis on the ability of insidious or invisible form of power to influence or shape people's preferences demonstrates that power relations and struggles do not only manifest in conflict situations but rather can be observed even in seemingly smooth relations or in the prevention of conflicts. In this thesis, this implies digging deeper into how and by whom collaborations are managed, and/or conflicts addressed, in governing contested vending spaces.

Table 3.1: Forms and Spaces of Power

Forms of Power 1. **Visible forms of power** are contests over interests which are visible in public spaces or formal decision-making bodies. Often these refer to political bodies, such as legislatures, local government bodies, local assemblies, or consultative forums. However, they can equally apply to the decision-making arenas of organizations and even of social movements or other spaces for collective action. 2. **Hidden forms of power** are used by vested interests to maintain their power and privilege by creating barriers to participation, by excluding key issues from the public arena, or by controlling politics 'backstage'. They may occur not only within political processes, but in organizational and other group contexts as well, such as workplaces, NGOs or community-based organizations. 3. **Invisible forms of power** involve the ways in which awareness of one's rights and interests are hidden through the adoption of dominating ideologies, values and forms of behaviour by relatively powerless groups. This is referred to as the 'internalization of powerlessness' in a way that affects the awareness and consciousness of potential issues and conflicts, even by those directly affected.
Spaces of Power 1. **Closed spaces** are where elites such as politicians, bureaucrats, experts, bosses, managers and leaders make decisions with little broad consultation or involvement. These often involve issues like trade, macro-economic and finance policies, military policies, etc. which have a great deal of impact on peoples' lives but which are considered off-limits for public participation. 2. **Invited spaces** are new opportunities for involvement and consultation, usually through 'invitation' from various authorities, be they government, supra-national agencies or non-governmental organizations. These may be regularized, that is they are institutionalized and ongoing, such as we find in various legally constituted participatory fora, or more transient, through one-off consultations. 3. **Claimed spaces** range from ones created by social movements and community associations, to those involving natural places where people gather to debate, discuss and resist, outside of the institutionalized policy arenas.

Source: Gaventa, 2011

Gaventa (2011) also moves beyond the faces/forms of power and expounds on the spaces of power, which refer to the opportunities, moments and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions and relationships affecting their lives and interests. He describes the spaces of power as closed, invited and claimed, as shown in Table 3.1. Gaventa's (2011) forms and spaces of power can complement Lukes' (2005) faces of power in the thesis' analysis of how formal and informal arrangements are developed and sustained and who are able and unable to influence these processes and outcomes. For

instance, it is important to determine how, and to what extent, the closed, invited and claimed spaces are created in both formal and informal processes in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces. This illuminates how players and their practices are able or unable to maximize existing venues for participation and how they are able to create their own opportunities for state engagement and management of vending spaces[22]. Finally, these aspects of power can also help in analysing the implications of the formal-informal interface for urban planning processes where power relations are inherently embedded.

3.2.3. Discourses on Urban Governance

Debates on urban development and socio-spatial relations have emphasized the importance of various players in shaping policies and planning processes. In urban political economy literature, the local governments and business groups act as the main actors in forming the urban regime's 'governing coalition' (Stone, 1989). The notion of 'growth machine' echoes this prominent role of government units and private sector players in achieving economic growth (Logan & Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976; 1993). While urban regime and growth machine frameworks acknowledge how these leading groups collaborate to attain certain agenda, they are silent on the conflicts in governance processes and on how other actors take part in policy-making.

This is where Minnery's (2007) conception of urban governance is crucial as an analytical tool. Treating urban governance as a process, Minnery (2007) considers the civil society/community, along with the state and the private sector, as key actors in policy-making. He sees the collaborative and conflictive relations as part of urban governance[23]. He defines it as "the processes of direction-setting, policy making and implementation that incorporate the roles and responsibilities of government, the private sector and civil society in urban settings, as well as the partnerships and conflicts amongst them" (Minnery, 2007, p. 333).

Minnery's (2007) attention to conflict as an element of governance is important in recognizing power dynamics and antagonistic relations within and among the formal-informal players. This

[22] This point relates to Honwana's (2008) notion of strategic and tactical forms of agency, which is discussed in Section 3.3 below.

[23] This resembles Harvey's (1989) earlier recognition of the conflictual aspect of urban governance, a process where the power to organise space and urban life comes from various social agents.

conception speaks to Healey's (1997) view of the planning-governance nexus as a complex process filled with conflicting interests and hierarchical structures. In this sense, it challenges the governance orthodoxy model, which "views that the relationships amongst the major stakeholders are mainly cooperative and consensual, captured in the common use of the terms 'partnerships' or collaborative networks" (Minnery, 2007, p. 327). Besides, there are other salient aspects captured in his definition. As Roitman (2014, p. 465) explains, these include

1. The understanding of governance as a process, therefore in constant change;
2. The notion of a direction set by process, which involves objectives and goals identified that might be explicit or implicit;
3. The identification of a multiplicity of actors that can be organized in three main groups: public sector, private sector and civil society;
4. The understanding that governance involves not only good relations, agreements and partnerships amongst actors, but also difficult relationships, disagreements and conflicts. The latter also need to be addressed to achieve the objectives and goals set.

Despite Minnery's more inclusive view about the players in urban governance, similar to Stone's and Molotch's models, he seems primarily concerned with formal processes. Since informal activities and relations are a key subject in this thesis, it is crucial to pay attention to DiGaetano and Strom's (2003) notion of institutional milieu as "the complexes of formal and informal political and governmental arrangements that mediate interactions among the structural context, political culture, and political actors" (Digaetano & Strom, 2003, p. 363). For DiGaetano and Strom (2003), an institutional milieu is composed of institutional bases and modes of governance. Institutional bases or formal institutional arrangements refer to the governmental bodies/agencies, political parties, interest group organizations, and partnerships that provide visible form to urban governance through rules and organization. Modes of governance, on the other hand, are the informal arrangements that define the governing relationships among and within formal institutions implicated in urban politics (DiGaetano & Strom, 2003).

The institutional milieu, particularly the modes of governance, can complement Minnery's (2007) urban governance in describing and examining the micro-level interactions between formal and informal arrangements. For instance, the discussion on the role of street vendors and their interaction with state authorities demonstrates this analytical imperative. Although Minnery's (2007) urban governance and Strom and DiGaetano's institutional milieu depart from

the usual elite-oriented players, their frameworks still look at governance processes from the perspective of those who govern. Thus, while they recognize the formal, informal, multi-level, fragmented interactions within and among various players, community participation is regarded as a dimension of governance. Yet, as Chatterjee (2004, p. 69) points out, participation "has one meaning when it is seen from the standpoint of those who govern, i.e., as a category of governance. It will have a very different meaning when seen from the position of the governed…" Even Minnery (2007) has also acknowledged the tendency of state actors to view civil society/community participation as a tool for legitimacy.

One implication of recognizing the limits of dominant network-driven and formal urban governance prisms is the need to pay attention to Chatterjee's (2004) argument on the role of grassroots players, which he labels 'political society'. Drawing on the Indian context, he defines political society as those groups, organized into associations, who "transgress the strict lines of legality in struggling to live and work. They… accept that their activities are often illegal and contrary to good civic behaviour but they make a claim to a habitation and a livelihood as a matter of right" (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 40). Chatterjee's insight is important in recognizing the perspectives of those who are governed[24]. He further argues that the way the state engages with political society groups is different from how it deals with civic organizations.

> In dealing with them [political society], the authorities cannot treat them on the same footing as other civic associations following more legitimate social pursuits. Yet state agencies and nongovernmental associations cannot ignore them either, since they are among thousands of similar associations representing groups of population whose very livelihood or habitation involve[s] violation of the law. These agencies therefore deal with these associations not as bodies of citizens but as convenient instruments for the administration of welfare to marginal and underprivileged population groups. (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 40)

In describing the grassroots players outside the state and the private sector, which are commonly put under the broad civil society umbrella, Chatterjee draws attention to the often unrecognized and unaccepted spaces of engagement and structures of power, as explained in Section 3.2.2 above. Political society then echoes one key argument in other grassroots agency writings such as in Hobsbawm's (1959) city mob, Friedmann's (1987) urban proletariat, Kaufmann's (1997) grassroots democracy, Kerkvliet's (2009) everyday politics, and Bayat's (2013) quiet encroachment of the ordinary, which are all discussed in Section 3.3 below. They

[24] The implications of this attention to grassroots players are examined in Chapters 7 and 8.

emphasize the importance of spontaneous and/or organized initiatives of marginalized groups to earn a living and improve their social well-being. They likewise acknowledge the urban subaltern populations as a potent political force.

The preceding discussion thus unveils how the conversations on the players in urban political economy, particularly on the policy-making and planning processes, must go beyond the dominant actors who have the capacity to engage in formal and informal processes which shape or influence recognized decision-making spaces. While Minnery's urban governance and DiGaetano and Strom's institutional milieu are useful in unpacking the players and processes within formal institutions, Lukes' and Gaventa's arguments on power relations along with Chatterjee's insight on political society call for attention to other engagement spaces, including informal channels created by marginalized groups such as street vendors. In the Philippines, such attention to the role of grassroots actors is captured in Quimpo's (2005) 'contested democracy' and in the work of Shatkin (2000, 2007, 2008) on informal settlements and urban governance. Quimpo (2005) particularly acknowledges the role of poor Filipinos in the historical struggle for independence from colonial invaders and in the continuing fight of marginalized communities for social justice. Meanwhile, Shatkin (2008) recognizes how popular movements have helped maintained the vibrancy of neglected urban spaces in Metro Manila.

Based on the foregoing insights, I contend that the post-dualist framework, as explained in Chapter 2, is able to address the issues pertaining to the multi-actor involvement in various engagement spaces. For instance, the post-dualist enmeshed view of the formal-informal relations provides spaces for interrogating the processes and players concerned. Its institutionalist and relational stance, meanwhile, requires attention to the evolving, complex, socio-spatial interactions, planning processes, transactions, costs, rules, norms and broader social contexts in an urban area. Mindful of the key points laid out in this section, I therefore see post-dualist lens as a reflexive analytical tool in examining relations of players in the formal-informal interface.

To summarise, I have established in this section the links among informality, planning and governance. I have presented the embeddedness of informality in planning and how the latter influences and may entrench informal practices. I have situated planning as a governance

dimension involved in governing co-existence in shared and contested spaces. In this regard, I have also explained why the discourse on power is critical to this thesis. Finally, I have discussed key issues surrounding urban governance, policy-making and planning. While I recognize the value of Minnery's urban governance, DiGaetano and Strom's institutional milieu, I also consider Lukes' and Gaventa's framing of forms of power as well as Chatterjee's view on political society as important insights in analysing the players, policies, practices and governing relations in contested vending spaces. I posit that the post-dualist lens is a reflexive conceptual tool that resonate with these insights and can analytically respond to the issues raised in this section. In what follows, I review key writings on collective action, agency, and informal vendors' practices. These themes are crucial to examining grassroots practices and informal mechanisms in contested vending spaces.

3.3. Grassroots Collective Action and Agency: Concepts and Experiences

Despite the incremental changes in policies affecting informal actors with some laws accommodating informal livelihoods, informal spaces are still generally viewed as an aberration to prescribed planning system, lying outside its ambit of control. The interaction of government officials and informal vendors, for example, is often contextual and contingent on spatial location as urban spaces are nestled in multiple layers of control and regulation. This is where grassroots collective action becomes crucial. Collective action happens when more than one individual is required to contribute to an effort in order to achieve an outcome (Ostrom, 2004). The succeeding paragraphs present ideas on collective action and agency. These ideas are helpful in analysing the shared activities undertaken by informal vendor associations.

3.3.1. Collective Action and Agency

In an insecure working environment, informal actors' collective action may at times take the form of Kerkvliet's (2009) everyday politics. Everyday politics involves "people embracing, complying with, adjusting and contesting norms and rules regarding authority over, production of, or allocation of resources and doing so in quiet, mundane, and subtle expressions and acts that are rarely organized or direct" (Kerkvliet, 2009, p. 232). Kaufman's (1997) conception of grassroots democracy as the ability to appropriate spaces and manage their own economic and political lives also speaks to informal workers' daily collective action practices. Grassroots democracy enables people in their communities and workplaces to control their lives and

livelihoods through grassroots mobilization and the development of community forms of popular democracy (Kaufman, 1997). Kerkvliet's (2009) everyday politics and Kaufman's (1997) grassroots democracy capture how informal vendors engage with state agencies and manage their own collective affairs.

Everyday politics describes how vendors wrestle with government policies in various ways. Its recognition of the diversity of schemes is important to the situation of informal hawkers. As will be evident in Section 3.3.3, vendor groups have been able to design multiple schemes to deal with the rules governing their workplaces. For its part, grassroots democracy makes sense when informal vendors initiate organising work and take part in democratic political processes to fight for their rights and push for social inclusion policies. Even the ability of vendor organizations to devise and sustain their informal mechanisms in managing spaces is a manifestation of a vibrant grassroots agency and collective action. Yet, while collective action enables vendors to engage with state regulation, evidence from some global South cities (Osella, 2014; Piliavsky, 2014; Routray, 2015) indicates that some grassroots practices are more clientelistic than democratic. As I will discuss in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, although Baclaran hawkers cooperate with some NGO-affiliated vendor organisers to push for some social inclusion agenda, they also engage in patronage political relations in sustaining their self-help mechanisms to gain access to and control over contested streetscapes.

One critical element in everyday politics and grassroots democracy is the exercise of human agency. For Giddens (1984, p.9), agency "concerns events of which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently. Whatever happened would not have happened if that individual had not intervened". Investigating this sense of agency or what Lofland et al. (2006) call 'agentic conception' is crucial to attaining a better understanding of human behaviour as humans are influencing their social settings.

Honwana (2008) offers a more nuanced view of agency, one which may depict how informal vendors live their daily lives. Building on de Certeau's (1984) notion of strategy and tactic,[25]

[25] For de Certeau (1984, pp. 35-36), strategy is "the calculation or manipulation of force relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power… can be isolated… [E]very 'strategic' rationalization seeks first of all to distinguish its 'own' place, that is, the place of its own power and will, from an environment". On the

Honwana (2008) coins strategic and tactical agencies[26]. Strategic agency requires a basis of power, mastery of the larger picture, and some comprehension of the long-term consequences of actions (Honwana, 2008). Actors resorting to tactical agency, on the contrary, must constantly manoeuvre events and turn them into opportunities (Honwana, 2008). This demarcation between strategic and tactical agency is essential to understanding informal players' collective action as they navigate their way through the precarious social, political and economic conditions.

As the previous paragraphs demonstrate, it can be argued that the people's sense of agency is what drives them to initiate and engage in collective action. In informal hawking, any organizational activity takes shape and, in the long run, gains sustainability due to a strong sense of agency and collective action. While these two may always be found in any setting, the extent of their depth and effects may partly be defined by the social contexts. This is where Honwana's (2008) strategic and tactical delineation makes a lot of sense. As discussed in Sections 2.3 in the previous chapter, structural forces and human/social agents interact to shape and reproduce informal arrangements. In this thesis, these collective action and agency concepts help in framing how different actors develop and get involved in various processes and in identifying the factors and forces that influence their actions.

Leading to the next section, these forms of collective action and agency are captured by experiences of street vendors. But before delving into the cases on vendors' collective action, the definitions and attributes of street vendors are presented below.

3.3.2. Informal Vendors

As explained in Section 1.1, informal vending is a major planning concern as most hawking activities occur in public areas. This becomes more critical in developing countries where limited public spaces are shared, if not contested, by a number of stakeholders. McGee et al. (1970) define street vendors as people who offer goods or services for sale from public spaces, primarily streets and pavements. Bhowmik (2005) describes a street vendor as "a person who

contrary, "a tactic is a calculated action determined by the absence of locus… It takes advantage of 'opportunities' and depends on them… build up its own, and plan raids" (de Certeau, 1984, p. 37).

[26] This conception bears some semblance to Lukes' (2005) 'context-bound' and 'context-transcending' ability of power. The first is maximized when resistance or obstacles to power are minimized; the latter is greater when resistance and obstacles the power can overcome are greater (Lukes, 2005).

offers goods for sale to the public without having a permanent built-up structure from which to sell" (Bhowmik, 2005, p. 2256). They may be stationary in the sense that they occupy space on the pavements or spaces or mobile in the sense that they move from place to place by carrying their wares on push carts or in baskets (Bhowmik, 2005). I adopt Bhowmik's description of street vendors as it is broad enough to capture the different types of hawkers – from mobile to stationary – with the primary objective of selling goods to the public.

Two ideas explain the emergence of street vending. One views vending as a job borne out of the desperate need to survive (Kimwell, 2004). This perspective sees street hawkers as poor and marginalized people who try to make a living. The other idea holds that people engage in vending activities by choice. Grice (1988) cites three motivations why some people prefer vending as a form of employment: a) to obtain a higher income; b) to achieve greater social and economic mobility; and c) to gain personal autonomy. In terms of its viability as a livelihood, Lubell (1991, p. 99) argues that street trading will continue "as long as other sources of urban employment lag behind populations and labour force increases, and that the government will continue to experience the tensions arising from the necessity to combine control and accommodation".

Street vending has positive and negative effects. One positive feature of street vending is its ability to make the cost of living relatively low by providing cheaper goods and services (Guerrero, 1975; Lubell, 1991). They also contribute to the formal sector growth by retailing the latter's products; thereby making them affordable for the low-income groups. Hawkers also perform welfare functions by providing employment opportunities (Guerrero, 1975). With respect to negative impacts, some problems associated with street hawking include the following: occupying urban spaces in a disorderly manner; causing traffic congestion; promoting unfair competition with formal retail shops; attracting pickpockets and other threats to peace and order Lubell (1991), and improper health and hygiene practices among food vendors (Kimwell, 2004).

In terms of trade relations, Mintz (1959, cited in McGee & Yeung, 1977, p. 22) claims that vending involves two types of exchange. One is the horizontal exchange where the goods are consumed by much the same class as the producers. The other one, the vertical exchange,

generates consumption by a class different from that of the producers. McGee and Yeung (1977) write that many studies in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and Asian countries reveal that petty traders are engaged in horizontal exchange of goods. In the urban area, hawkers are generally involved in vertical exchange either selling urban-produced goods or foodstuffs from the countryside (McGee & Yeung, 1977).

3.3.3. Street Vendors: Their Conditions and Engagement with the State

In the preceding section, I defined street vendors and explained the good contributions and negative effects of informal vending on society. In this part, I provide an overview of street vendors and their organizations across different contexts. Before presenting some cases, the next paragraph briefly discusses the significance of informal groups' socio-political engagement.

With their sheer presence and volume, informal players have gained scholars' interest in examining how they affect the socio-political processes in urban areas. Hobsbawm (1959, p. 110), for instance, considered city hawkers as part of his notion of 'city mob', which refers to a pre-political "movement of all the classes of the urban poor for the achievement of economic or political changes by direct action – that is by riot or rebellion –but as a movement which was as yet inspired by no specific ideology". He argued that the mob as 'social phenomenon' has tended to give way to the industrial working class. Castells (1983; 1985), meanwhile, stresses how informal settler groups challenge the dominant cultural values and political institutions and establish political legitimacy based on popular mobilization. Friedmann (1987) notes the political significance of urban proletariat (informal actors) who lack skills and are excluded from most of the benefits of society. For his part, Bayat (2013, pp. 14-15) calls the politics of the informal actors as the 'nonmovement of the urban dispossessed', which represents the "discreet and prolonged ways in which the poor struggle to survive and to better their lives by quietly impinging on the propertied and powerful, and on society at large". While the authors' terminologies and degree of emphasis on socio-political significance of informal groups vary, their ideas essentially capture the ability of these actors to occupy urban spaces and influence socio-political processes to advance their cause. This recognition relates to some studies showcasing how informal actors' political power is manifested in different contexts. In what follows, I present the vendors' conditions and their engagement with state agencies in various

countries. After discussing the vendors' engagement experiences, I sum up some points relevant to the thesis.

3.3.3.1. *Asian Region*

In Bhowmik's (2005) review of street vendors' situation in selected Asian cities, he noted that in Bangladesh (Dhaka), some hawkers bribe local authorities just to gain tolerance; but this is not an assurance of a smooth relationship with the abusive government officials. In Vietnam, there is a challenge for organizing work among the vendors (Bhowmik, 2005). In Sri Lanka (Colombo), vendor organizations deal with hostile policies by partnership with local government and/or by corrupt practices such as bribery (Shuaib, 2007).

In Indonesia (Yogyakarta), street hawkers formed cooperatives to make the vendors legal under a formally recognized organization and to provide a savings and loan service to its members (Timothy & Wall, 1997). The cooperatives offer members low-interest loans and pays interest on funds deposited. The association also act as a legal liaison between the vendors and the municipal government (Timothy & Wall, 1997).

In some Philippine cities, vendors have gained some political recognition, although local administrators do not provide for operational needs (Bhowmik, 2005). In Cebu City, the power of vendors' coalition has contributed to tolerance of street hawking despite the presence of anti-vending national and local laws. One challenge, however, is the need to transcend vendors' reliance on a charismatic leader and develop professional management to ensure transparency and accountability (Etemadi, 2004). In Caloocan City, vendors resort to a spectrum of strategies – from formal to extra-legal – to deal with state authorities and gain access to vending spaces (Recio, 2010).

3.3.3.2. *Latin American Region*

A regional study in six cities - Bogotá (Colombia), Lima (Peru), Caracas (Venezuela) and Sao Paolo (Brazil), Santiago (Chile) and Mexico City – found that street traders have established thousands of associations in the region to facilitate their work and defend their interests in the political arena (Roever, 2006). Vendor organizations' roles include resolving conflicts among members, coordinating with other groups, and serving as interlocutors with local government

officials. For Roever (2006), this vast number of organized vendors indicates low barriers to grassroots collective action and a potential for consolidating political voice.

In a separate study, Mexico City vendors' act as negotiators or deal-makers and as managers of social assets (Peña, 1999). In another instance, Bogotá (Colombia) government's engagement with vendors takes the form of token participation[27] (Hunt, 2009). Vendors' negotiation with the state was valued for its educational quality, participatory nature, and the legitimacy it lent the government (Hunt, 2009).

3.3.3.3. *African Region*

In a study in Senegal, Ghana, Tanzania and Lesotho, Brown et al. (2010) note that traders and market associations fall into two groups: the formal associations recognized by the authorities, such as management committees and trade unions; and the informal kinship, religious or other social networks which derive their power outside the formal political or administrative process. They emphasize that while both groups offer a means for civic engagement with institutions and local authorities, the organizations often focus on self-help and fail to maintain long-term influence (Brown et al., 2010).

Meanwhile, in South Africa (Johannesburg), Hlela (2003) questions the accountability of vendor groups that seem to wield substantial power on who is able to trade in the city's strategic location. The group determines the rental which "favours more affluent traders, who might also be more organized, at the expense of those who are poorer and less organized" (Hlela, 2003, p. 2). This case unmasks the undemocratic and rent-seeking side of informal groups. It shows the heterogeneity of street vendors and the power relations within informal organizations.

Further, a comparative study of hawkers' associations in Ghana, Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi, found that the relations of recently-established local organizations with the local governments are largely confrontational (War on Want et al., 2006). This situation shows the importance of adopting advocacy and self-help tactics amid the hostile local governments (Brown et al., 2010).

[27] It is a kind of participation where citizens are allowed to hear and be heard but they "lack the power to ensure that their views are heeded by the powerful" (Arnstein, 1969, p. 217).

Aside from the national and local initiatives, Brown et al. (2010) document the crafting of the 1995 Bellagio International Declaration of Street Vendors, a statement calling for coordinated action to support street traders and demanding policies that protect their rights. In 2002, this declaration led to the formation of StreetNet, an international association of street vendors with nearly 300 organizations in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Brown et al., 2010).

The foregoing cases illustrate several insights. First, street vendor organizations are present from local to international levels. Relating to the previous section, this proves that informal hawkers have a strong sense of agency, collective action, and the power to network with other associations. Second, the accounts reveal the multiple roles that vendor groups play in their own contexts. They act as self-help groups, negotiate or mediate conflict among their members and engage state authorities in their effort to gain recognition as legitimate workers. Third, the lack of organizing and abuse perpetuated by erring government officials remain an enduring problem in many places. Among those that have organizations, a key issue is the accountability within the associations (Etemadi, 2004; Hlela, 2003). Accountability problems complicate the vendors' precarious conditions, especially among the poorer members (Hlela, 2003). Minnery (2007) also raises accountability in questioning whether the incorporation of non-state actors into policy-making making and implementation necessitates going beyond the traditional mechanisms for authority, legitimacy and accountability among non-state actors involved in urban governance. In Chapters 6 and 7, I will show how accountability problem exists within state institutions and the relationships between vendors and local officials. Fourth, for organized vendors that have engaged with state agencies, two issues are noteworthy. One is the reality of falling into the trap of token participation as experienced in Bogotá Colombia. The other challenge has to do with engaging governments that have a different view about informal vending. For some, confrontation is seen as the way to deal with the situation.

The foregoing insights are critical in examining the collective action practices in Baclaran. In the remainder of this chapter, I recapitulate the main points that have emerged from the preceding literature review and explain the thesis' conceptual framework.

3.4. Tackling the Formal-Informal Interface: Key Ideas in the Literature and the Conceptual Framework

Based on the foregoing literature review, I sum up here the key ideas and present the thesis' conceptual framework. First, the conceptions of informality have evolved - from a highly dualistic to an enmeshed understanding of the formal and informal economy. In this regard, I argue that the informal and formal sectors are part of a single economic continuum with relations in many aspects of production, consumption and exchange. I therefore use the informal sector/economy and formal sector/economy labels as a heuristic device to analyse the arrangements arising from the dualistic framing. Admittedly, this dichotomous view has shaped urban planning perspectives and governance practices for a long time.

Second, most discussions of formal-informal concepts – whether seen as a dichotomy or a spectrum - are viewed from a structuralist perspective. Many of these structuralist-oriented discourses focus more on the economic and political dimensions and less on socio-spatial aspects. To address this gap, I employ the relational lens, as part of the thesis' post-dualist framework, in analysing the formal-informal processes and transactions. As noted in Section 2.4 in the previous chapter, this relational standpoint is grounded in Healey's (2007b) relational planning, which in turn builds on the work of relational geographers - see Amin (2002; 2004) and Massey (2005) – who see the interactions that occur in specific social or nodal 'sites' as complex and embedded in past trajectories and wider contexts. In examining socio-spatial issues, I also echo Healey's (2007b) and Lefebvre's (1991) argument about the constant interaction of material experiences, intellectual prisms, and cultural expressions in producing space.

Third, a spectrum of policy epistemologies exemplifies the state approaches to informal vending: hostile, tolerant, and accommodating. Structural dimensions and agency expressions influence how each policy orientation operates. For instance, the formal rules prohibiting street vending often hinge on the dualistic view of informality issues and on the state's desire to enforce order. The tolerant political atmosphere, meanwhile, stems from factors like vendors' ability to devise engagement strategies amid the lack of clear national policies on informal vending. As will be evident in Chapters 6 and 7, these insights have informed the thesis in

assessing the factors that affect the policy environment in the study area. They also serve as crucial inputs in developing the thesis' post-dualist conceptual lens.

Fourth, the literature has pointed out that planning is not only involved in the inscription, stratification and intensification of informality, but that informal practices are embedded in planning itself. Thus, if planning, as an integral aspect of formal systems, is riddled with informal arrangements it is critical to determine whether such nature of planning facilitates or undermines the formal-informal interface. I will explain in Chapters 6 and 8 how planning is implicated in the issues arising from socio-spatial relations in Baclaran's contested vending spaces.

Fifth, the writings on grassroots collective action and street vending recognize the political significance of informal actors. From Castells' (1983) urban populism and Friedmann's (1987) urban proletariat to Bayat's (2013) non-movement of the dispossessed, the reviewed cases show the presence of organized street vendors - from local to international levels. These groups function as self-help groups, negotiate or mediate conflicts among their members, and engage state authorities in their effort to gain recognition as legitimate workers. I will tackle in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 how these issues are relevant to vendor organizing in Baclaran.

I build on these insights in developing the thesis' conceptual framework. A number of premises drawn from the literature review have informed my understanding of informality and planning. I view urban informality as a planning issue as the latter affects how informality is defined and managed (Roy, 2009; Yiftachel, 2006). I adopt Healey's (2007b) contention that planning is a governance dimension concerned with managing co-existence in shared spaces and the relations in collective action. This emphasis on relations in collective action is linked to my reading of informal organizations in urban spaces. I argue that informal vendor organizations are non-market agents of collective action as they implement mechanisms to address urban 'disfunctionalities' (Scott & Storper, 2015) and manage hawking spaces with or without state support. By non-market agents of collective action, I draw from Scott and Storper's (2015, p. 8) contention that "market logic alone is congenitally incapable of regulating the urban commons in the interests of economic efficiency and social wellbeing". Thus, "non-market agencies of

collective action typically emerge to keep the urban land nexus[28] in some sort of functioning workable order" (Scott & Storper, 2015 p. 9). These agencies are local in character and/or they exist at higher levels in the governance hierarchy. For instance, land use regulation is undertaken mostly (though not exclusively) by local institutions like formal government units and various civil associations (Scott & Storper, 2015). I consider vendor organizations as part of local civil associations that enforce collective action mechanisms to pursue goals that are not purely economic-driven or market-oriented. In Chapters 7 and 8, I will discuss how Baclaran vendors' collective action practices go beyond market-oriented goals.

Given these conceptual considerations, I contend that urban informality, as a planning and governance concern, is addressed through the formal systems and informal mechanisms. The literature affirms this as evidenced by policy epistemologies and vendor organizations' array of collective action initiatives, which are presented in Sections 2.3 and 3.3, respectively. What is lacking, however, is an examination of the interface between formal systems and informal mechanisms since the literature has mainly touched on each of these as separate entities. I focus on this research gap. Figure 3-1 on page 61 captures how the thesis' main elements relate to each other. It shows how the formal-informal interface - as the research gap - is examined through the chosen governance dimensions using the post-dualist lens.

By formal-informal interface, I adopt Hansen and Vaa's (2004, p. 9) notion of the interface as the "encounters between entities or processes that are governed by different rules; the outcomes may be neutral, implying non-recognition or accommodation, or they may entail conflict or cooperation". These engagements occur in public places and courtrooms, spontaneous and planned encounters, households and networks, and may include individuals or groups, practices, beliefs, and institutions (Hansen & Vaa, 2004). In unpacking the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces, I look at five governance dimensions. These include a) players, b) policies, c) practices, d) governing relations, and e) planning implications. The selection of these governance dimensions has emerged from the insights and issues in the literature.

[28] Urban land nexus refers to an interacting set of land uses that show how "the social and economic activities of the city condense out into a differentiated, polarized, locational mosaic" (Scott & Storper, 2015, p. 8; see also Scott, 1980; Roweis & Scott, 1978)



Figure 3-1: Tackling the Formal-Informal Interface: A Conceptual Framework

With respect to the first governance dimension - players, many studies have documented how vendor associations function and how they engage government agencies in instances where policies prohibit vending. But there is a dearth of evidence on how other stakeholders (e.g. non-organized vendors, civil society groups, and private sector) relate to each other in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces. One way to tackle this void is to identify and examine the key actors, their roles and relations that drive the processes within, as well as the interface between, formal systems and informal mechanisms. I will particularly discuss in Chapter 6 how state agencies (and their officials), the informal organizations, and other stakeholders interact with each other. I will also present the issues arising from the competing interests and the unequal socio-spatial relations of these players.

In analysing the second dimension – policies, I build on the discussion on policy epistemologies in examining how state laws and programs are implicated in informality issues. As already noted above, I will examine in Chapter 7 the factors, issues and implications of government policies on informality and street vending in Baclaran.

Moving on to the third dimension – practices, I address here the scant literature discussion on the socio-spatial aspects of the formal-informal interface. Thus, I employ the relational lens, as an aspect of the thesis' post dualist framework, in examining the practices of key actors, particularly how vendors have been able to gain access to and control over vending spaces. In Chapter 7, I will explain how contested vending spaces also serve as sites for political organizing, street-level corruption, and state-informal vendors' engagement, among others. I will also illustrate how the different stakeholders make these events happen, how they give meaning to such activities and how these practices impact on the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces.

For the fourth dimension, I use governing relations to refer to systemic arrangements and micro socio-spatial modes of engagements that lie beneath the rules, interactions, norms, and actions in Baclaran. I address here how the previous two dimensions are linked to the larger structural dimensions of informality and the evolving agency expressions of Balaran vendors. I will tackle in Chapter 8 four governing relations that shape the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces. These relations include a) disjunctive urban governance; b) strong kinship ties; c) clientelist political relations; and d) grassroots democratic entanglements. In examining each of these, I recognize the multilayered and overlapping processes and outcomes arising from the entwined relations.

In the fifth dimension – planning implications, I pay attention to how the formal-informal interface, as manifested in the first three dimensions, influences and is affected by urban planning. In Chapter 8, I will show how four critical implications can inform planners in understanding the links between the formal-informal interface and planning processes. These implications are a) the post-dualist approach to informality; b) the agglomeration of land uses; c) the links between gentrification, informality and globalization; and d) the need for inclusive urban governance.

Finally, as already explained in Chapters 1 and 2, I employ the post-dualist lens as a conceptual analytical tool in examining these four interrelated governance dimensions. As expounded on in Section 2.3.4 of Chapter 2, the post-dualist lens is rooted in the enmeshed view of informality,

the structurationist framing of structure-agency nexus, and the relational-institutionalist approach to planning. I also take into account the value of Minnery's (2007) urban governance, DiGaetano and Strom's (2003) institutional milieu, Chatterjee's (2004) insight on political society and Lukes' (2005) and Gaventa's (2011) framing of forms of power in analysing the players, policies, practices and governing relations in contested vending spaces. As already noted in Section 3.2.3, I construe that the post-dualist lens is a reflexive conceptual tool that can accommodate these complementary ideas on urban governance and power relations.

3.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown how informality is linked to planning and governance. I have touched on debates on power and the key issues surrounding urban governance, policy-making and planning. While I recognize the value of Minnery's (2007) urban governance, DiGaetano and Strom's (2003) institutional milieu, I also consider Lukes' (2005) and Gaventa's (2011) framing of forms of power as well as Chatterjee's (2004) view on political society as important insights in analysing the players, policies, practices and governing relations in contested vending spaces. I posit that the post-dualist lens is a reflexive conceptual tool that resonate with these insights and can analytically respond to the issues raised in this chapter.

To situate grassroots agency, particularly by vendors, I have presented key concepts and cases on collective action and street vendors' engagement with governments in select global South cities. These themes, along with the issues presented in Chapter 2, have informed the development of the thesis' Conceptual Framework. In this framework, I have explained the five governance dimensions and reiterated the importance of the post-dualist lens as the thesis' conceptual analytical tool. In the succeeding chapter, I explain the thesis' methodological framework, which further elaborates the key elements in the research design.

CHAPTER 4. RESEARCHING INFORMALITY: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

4.1. Introduction

The literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 has shown how urban informality is a complex research arena where the formal policies intersect with informal arrangements and socio-spatial relations. Thus, this thesis requires a systematic yet reflexive design, which can capture the various accounts that may appear contentious and puzzling. In this chapter, I present the thesis' overall research design. I first clarify the thesis' ontological and epistemological stance on the nature of the problem under study. I then present the detailed methodology with the corresponding research strategy and case study design. Following this, I discuss the collected information, the data gathering methods, and the sampling techniques. Then, I explain the strategies employed to get in touch with the research participants during the fieldwork. Finally, I describe the steps for data processing and analysis.

4.2. Ontology and Epistemology

The literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 has pointed out how diverse views have shaped the discourses on the causes, consequences, and dynamics of informality. While the disciplinal divide has arguably influenced the different perspectives, it is unclear how ontological and epistemological standpoints have affected the on-going debates around informality. In this context, I begin with explaining what ontological and epistemological traditions guide this research and how they impact on the topics under study.

In this thesis, I espouse a critical realist ontological position and a constructivist epistemological stance. Ontologically, critical realism posits that there is a 'real' world out there independent of human perceptions and theoretical abstractions. It rejects the notion that one "can have any objective or certain knowledge of the world" and affirms "the possibility of alternative valid accounts of any phenomenon" (Maxwell, 2012, p. 5). Mental states and attributes (e.g. meanings, interpretations, and intentions) are part of the real world and interpreted using concepts and frameworks (Maxwell, 2012). Thus, while I subscribe to critical realist ontology, I employ a constructivist epistemology. Constructivist epistemology asserts that the understanding or knowledge of the world is a construction of personal perspectives and standpoints (Barth, 1987; Frazer & Lacey, 1993; Maxwell, 2012) that are situated in social

contexts and relations. As Frazer and Lacey (1993, p. 182) frame it, “Even if one is a realist at the ontological level, one could be an epistemological interpretivist … our knowledge of the real world is inevitably interpretive and provisional rather than straightforwardly representational”. Maxwell (2012) also contends that it is possible for researchers to adhere to critical realist ontology while adopting constructivist epistemology. He notes that this position has gained widespread acceptance as an alternative to naïve realism and radical constructivism, which refutes the existence of any reality apart from our constructions.

These ontological and epistemological perspectives have five key implications. First, I view the thesis’ knowledge contribution as one among the many possible approaches to understanding the research problem. Second, analysing the formal-informal interface in governing contested vending spaces implies acknowledging the presence of this interface, which is situated in the social contexts of the study area, prior to and independent of the thesis’ conceptual abstraction. Third, examining the formal-informal interface means going beyond the superficial manifestations of the issues under study. This requires analysing the key factors and forces that generate and sustain the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces. In this regard, a list of governance dimensions, aimed at surfacing the factors and forces, was presented in the Conceptual Framework in Section 3.4. Fourth, with respect to research positionality and reflexivity, I acknowledge that the way of seeing employed in this thesis is shaped by my own conceptual views and contextual realities. My personal and social circumstances as a young Filipino researcher who was born and raised in the global South have deepened my familiarity with the issues surrounding urban informality. My past experience working with social movements, including urban poor groups, in the Philippines has influenced the analytical lens I have deployed in this research. To an extent, this experience has enabled me to embrace Haraway’s (1991) notion of ‘embodied objectivity’, which involves ‘seeing’ from the standpoint of the ‘subjugated’, not because oppressed people are ‘innocent’ but because “in principle they are least likely to allow denial of the critical and interpretative core of all knowledge…” (in Watson, 2003, p. 404). Besides my earlier professional engagement, my current positionality as a researcher affiliated with an Australian university has afforded me the access to resources, which puts me at a certain position of privilege in relation to some participants of this study. Given the complexity of the factors and forces shaping the formal-informal interface, I also recognize that the knowledge production in this research is informed

by the social contexts and perspectives of the stakeholders - government officials, street vendors and other players – who participated in the research as informants. With these considerations, I believe that the critical realist ontology and constructivist epistemology provide the reflexivity I need in examining the issues under study and in situating my own subjectivities in the research process. Fifth, while I recognize the importance of generating knowledge through data derived from people's experiences and understandings of identified issues, I also employ initial theoretical lenses against which empirical patterns, outliers, and nuances are examined. Based on an iterative process, the preliminary conceptual constructs may change or new sets of mental framings may emerge. Thus, I deploy retroductive and abductive approaches to data analysis and theoretical abstraction, which are accepted analytical tools in critical realism (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 1997).

Retroductive inference requires the researcher to go beyond what is empirically observable by asking questions about and developing concepts relevant to the phenomena being studied (Meyer & Lunnay, 2013). It allows the investigator to have assumptions or *a priori* knowledge which enables her/him to clarify, question, and move beyond the prerequisites for initial theoretical frameworks (Meyer & Lunnay, 2013). In other words, retroductive process treats the theoretical premise as a take-off point for explaining certain phenomenon, say, the formal-informal interface as in the case of this thesis.

In contrast to retroductive approach, the abductive inference begins with findings that fall outside the initially identified theoretical frame/s. It "rests on the cultivation of anomalous and surprising empirical findings against a background of multiple existing sociological theories and through systematic methodological analysis" (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012, p. 169). In this thesis, it entails explaining the findings on the formal-informal interface that have never been fully captured and/or problematized in the same way by relevant theories on informality. Accordingly, the different thematic information on views of government officials, vendors, and other stakeholders also served as critical components in the analysis. In a similar vein, the theoretical constructs, as developed in the thesis' conceptual framework, informed the coding and analysis of key findings and the development of emerging conceptual precepts. The retroductive-abductive process is reflected in Section 4.3.6 (Data Analysis) below.

4.3. Research Design

To contextualize the discussion in this chapter, I reiterate that the thesis probes into the question *'How can the interface of formal systems and informal mechanisms to govern and appropriate contested vending spaces be explained?'* As essential components of this main inquiry, I tackle five sub-questions below:

1. Who are the key players that drive formal systems and informal mechanisms, as well as their interface, in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces?
2. Under what government rules do these players use streets and assert their claims?
3. What practices and norms do informal vendors observe in relation to street use and informal vending?
4. What relational logics and entrenched arrangements influence the governing processes and interactions of the different players?
5. What are the implications of the formal-informal interface for urban planning processes, particularly in the context of governing and appropriating contested vending spaces?

In designing the research methodology, I ensured that the thesis satisfies the key attributes of qualitative research. These include 1) covering the contextual conditions within which people live; 2) representing the perspectives of the people in a study; 3) contributing insights into existing or emerging concepts that may help to explain human social behaviour; 4) striving to use multiple sources of evidence rather than relying on a single source alone (Yin, 2011). In producing a context-dependent knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2006), I deployed case study as the strategy of inquiry. I dwelt on the views of different players - government officials, vendors, non-government organizations, private sector groups, academics and experienced development workers. As Section 4.3.4 below will show, I also utilized various data collection methods.

4.3.1. Research Strategy

I employed case study as a strategy of inquiry. Case study is a research design encompassing research question development, data collection technique selection, data analysis and generalization to theory (Morrison, 2004). It is the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed about a contemporary set of events over which an investigator has little or no control (Yin, 2014). Case study is also appropriate for this research as it is consistent with the thesis' ontological and epistemological grounding. As Yin (2014) explains, while much

case study is oriented towards realist perspective, which assumes the existence of reality independent of the observer, it can also accommodate epistemological positions, which acknowledge multiple meanings with findings that are influenced by the investigator.

While case study has received criticism on its supposed inability to produce scientific generalization, Yin (2014) points out that case studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. That is, a case study does not represent a sampling unit and the researcher's goal is to shed light on some theoretical concepts or principles - analytic generalization (Yin, 2014). This analytic generalization may anchor (a) on corroborating, modifying, rejecting, or advancing theoretical concepts referenced in the design; or (b) new concepts that arose from the completion of case study (Yin, 2014). In this thesis, analytic generalization is informed by ideas and theories in the literature review, the conceptual framework, and the collected data. At the same time, the thesis' case study aims to cultivate "concrete, context-dependent knowledge" (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 224) on the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces, situated in one research setting.

I used a single-case (embedded) design focusing on one geographical location that satisfies the criteria for study area selection. Three criteria guided the selection of the study area: the magnitude of informal vending activity; the informal mechanisms for governing vending spaces; and the vendors' engagement with state authorities. (In Chapter 5, I will discuss the case study area). I applied a single-case embedded design as it tackles more than one unit of analysis. As Yin (2014) clarifies, embedded case studies occur when within a single case the study may involve more than one unit of analysis. In this thesis, the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces serve as the main unit of analysis. The intricacies within the formal systems and informal mechanisms, and how they impact on the interface, represent other units of analysis.

4.3.2. Case Study Selection Criteria

As noted above, three criteria guided the selection of the study area: the magnitude of informal vending activity, the informal mechanisms employed to govern and/or use vending spaces, and the vendors' engagement with state authorities. The magnitude of informal vending activity pertains to the presence of informal vendors occupying public spaces such as streets,

easements, sidewalks, transport terminals, and parking lots. The literature shows the importance of the magnitude of street vending in describing how different players appropriate urban spaces, particularly in the context of conflicting interests (Peña, 1999; Hlela, 2003; Etemadi, 2004; Setšabi & Leduka, 2008; Oriard, 2015; Tucker, 2016). I build on these findings in interrogating other unexamined issues on the formal-informal interface in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces.

The second criterion pertains to the informal mechanisms for governing vending spaces. These mechanisms have received much attention from scholars like Peña (1999), Hlela (2003), Etemadi (2004), Shuaib (2007), and Setšabi & Leduka (2008), among others. These authors looked at the mechanisms that street hawkers have employed to sustain the informal practices in vending spaces. While the literature demonstrates the importance of the informal mechanisms to understand how an urban space is governed, there is a gap in employing a theoretically-informed analysis of the links and tensions between informal mechanisms and state-led interventions. Therefore, it served as a critical take off point for the selection of the case study area.

The vendors' engagement with state officials is the third criterion in choosing the case study area. It refers to the different strategies or approaches that informal vendors employ to engage with state officials and gain access to and control over vending spaces. While past studies documented the activities and relations between vendors and government officials (Etemadi, 2004; Setšabi & Leduka, 2008), there is a gap in problematizing the connections between governing relations and formal planning processes.

Given these criteria, Baclaran was chosen as the case study area. Baclaran is situated on the borders of two cities - Pasay and Parañaque - in Metropolitan Manila, Philippines. In terms of the magnitude of vending activity, Morelos (2011) writes that Baclaran is one of the biggest street vending sites in Metropolitan Manila. In August 2013, the Parañaque local government conducted a clearing operation affecting around 3000 hawkers (Josue, 2013). Baclaran also met the second criterion as it is home to many individuals engaged in flea market and hawking activities. These groups employ informal strategies to sustain their vending practices. With respect to state engagement, Baclaran vendors have devised various approaches as part of

their efforts to fight off evictions and gain access to vending spaces (Morelos, 2011). In this vein, the relational dynamics equally deserve a scholarly inquiry as Baclaran's location – being on the geo-political boundaries of two cities – may create complex arrangements between vendors and state officials.

Two previous studies have also looked at Baclaran as case study area. The first – a Master thesis undertaken in 1996 – focused on the socio-economic benefits of street vending in Baclaran (Valladolid, 1996). The second research – a PhD thesis completed in 2013 - was a sociological account of the Filipino devotion to the Our Lady of Perpetual Help (Sapitula, 2013a) housed in the Perpetual Help Shrine – popularly known as the Baclaran Church. I draw some insights from these two studies in examining the issues of street vendors in Baclaran.

4.3.3. Collected Data

I gathered primary and secondary data to answer the research questions. I collected five sets of information, namely:

1) Relevant literatures on the topics under study;
2) Regulatory and institutional laws, programs, written agreement, and plans (both at the local and national scales) on street use and informal vending;
3) Written and verbal organizational policies and agreements among government officials, vendor groups, and other stakeholders (private sector, non-government organizations or NGOs) that are relevant to street use and informal vending;
4) Actual practices of government officials, vendors and other stakeholders affecting the vending space governance;
5) Perceptions of government officials, vendors and other stakeholders on the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces.

These data sets illustrate how formal and informal approaches simultaneously exist and are appropriated by different stakeholders. They reveal issues arising from the formal-informal interface in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces. In the next section, I explain how these data were collected using various methods and sampling techniques.

4.3.4. Data Gathering Methods and Sampling Techniques

The research fieldwork took place between May 2015 and February 2016 in Baclaran vending area. Before the fieldwork, a scoping activity was done in February 2015 to gather preliminary information about the area. Baclaran is located on the borders of Pasay and Parañaque, two component cities of Metropolitan Manila. In what follows, I narrate how I utilized different data gathering methods and sampling techniques.

4.3.4.1. *Document Review*

Collating secondary information from national and local government offices and NGOs was an important step before reviewing the documents. Gathering the first set of materials happened during the scoping activity in February 2015. This continued in the succeeding months. I collected the documents by visiting university libraries and government offices in-charge of developing and implementing formal systems pertaining to informal economy and street vending. Collated documents include laws, programs, plans, and agreements that are relevant to urban informal economy, informal vending and street use.

The secondary data provided a direction in answering the thesis questions and helped me design and revise the interview and FGD guide questions. The materials shed light on formal policies and programs relevant to the role of government agencies in governing vending spaces. Some documents also present historical accounts on structural factors that contributed to informality issues in the Philippines. These accounts, for instance, discuss how colonial regimes affected the Philippine economic policies, migration, and urbanization patterns.

4.3.4.2. *Interviews*

Interviews proved to be effective in generating experiences and perceptions of various stakeholders on processes, structures, and issues affecting street use and informal vending. The respondents were divided into seven clusters: 1) national government officials; 2) local government officials; 3) members and leaders of organized vendors; 4) unorganized vendors; 5) NGO leaders; 6) individuals representing the private sector; and 7) academics and development workers.

In terms of sampling, I employed purposive, quota, and snowball approaches. Purposive sampling was done by choosing samples in a deliberate manner (Yin, 2011) to gain "broadest range of information and perspectives on the subject of study" (Kuzel, 1992, p. 37). This entailed purposively selecting individuals who could provide in-depth information on a particular issue and/or contrary evidence or opinions related to the topic to avoid having a bias or any appearance of it (Yin, 2011). In this thesis, interviewees were selected through purposive sampling from government agencies, vendor organizations, private sector groups and NGOs.

In addition, I used quota sampling, non-proportional quota sampling in particular, which requires non-randomly selecting people and enables representation of smaller groups (Trochim, 2006). A grid (see Table 4.1, below) guided the non-random selection of quota participants. This grid contains attributes relevant to selection of quota, purposive and snowball sampling respondents.

Table 4.1: Sampling Grid

	Government Officials		**Vendors**		**Other Stakeholders**		
	National/ Regional	Local (City/ Barangay[29])	Member of vendors' group/s	Un-organized vendors'	Private Sector & Individual residents	Non-government Organizations	Scholars/ Academics
Male							
Female							

For government officials, the minimum quota was at least one representative of each office whose tasks are relevant to informal economy and street vending. For vendors, the minimum quota was at least one male and one female member of each vendor group. The same number served as quota for non-organized vendors. For other stakeholders, at least one representative of NGOs and private sector groups involved in activities affecting of vending spaces in Baclaran was used as the minimum quota.

The selection of variables in the sampling grid (Table 4.1) stems from two considerations. First, the participants' biological sexual identity is a crucial factor in surfacing multiple views and contextual understandings of issues being studied. As Harding (2004) reminds, aside from men's perspectives, women's unique experiences are critical to address the imbalance in

[29] Barangay is the smallest political administrative unit in the Philippines. It has formal village-level government structure, with elected executive and legislative officials.

interpreting realities and producing knowledge. Women's views are also important as women represent a significant number in street trading (Brown, 2006a). It is important to note, however, that although biological sexual identity has been a major criterion in the selection of respondents, such that there were 45 male participants and 37 female participants, the gendered dimensions of urban informality were not part of the thesis' research questions. Thus, the analysis did not dwell on deeper gendered (particularly women-oriented) issues pertaining to Baclaran street vending. Second, three major stakeholder groups were identified. These are government officials, vendors, and other stakeholders. Government officials involved in the implementation of formal systems governing the vending spaces explained institutional issues and contexts that affect how the statutory rules operate. The recognition of the layers and intricacies within the bureaucracy provided a holistic view of the formal systems. Thus, government officials were grouped into national and local categories. While the national leaders described the wider policy perspectives, the local bureaucrats discussed the contextual issues as they constantly deal with informal players.

Similarly, informal vendors have varying degrees of involvement in the development and execution of informal mechanisms to govern vending spaces. When I became familiar with the spatial distribution and group affiliation of vendors, I conducted interviews with unorganized vendors whose location are far from the stalls of the previous respondents. It was done to ensure that interviewees came from different vending locations (Pasay vs. Parañaque jurisdiction) and to capture the views of those who have no organization. I also took into account the religious affiliation - Christian and Muslim vendors - in choosing the respondents. This was crucial in capturing the processes and tensions in governing vending spaces.

The third group of stakeholders consisted of private sector groups and individuals including residents and NGOs that are affected by informal vending and/or have worked with government institutions and Baclaran street vendors. Individual academics and researchers who have studied issues pertaining to informality, planning and governance are also part of this last set of informants.

Given the variety of respondents identified above, I also used snowball sampling to complement the first two sampling strategies. Through snowball approach, I contacted new interviewees

who were suggested by previous respondents. This technique enabled me to get a clearer picture of other stakeholders based on the knowledge of the previous respondents. As Yin (2011) notes, this sampling strategy can be acceptable if it is purposeful, not done out of convenience, and if there are reasons for choosing the subsequent interviewees. To address this concern, the snowball sampling was guided by the same grid used for the quota sampling.

A total of 82 individuals became part of the series of individual and group interviews - 37 females and 45 males. While most interviews were done with individual respondents, in six instances (twice with government officials and four times with vendors) the participants requested for group interviews as they did not have other available time for one-on-one conversation. Table 4.2 below reflects the sectoral and gender profile of the interviewees.

Table 4.2: Summary of Sectoral and Gender Profile of the Interviewees

	Government Officials		**Vendors**		**Other Stakeholders**			**TOTAL**
	National/ Regional	Local (City/ Barangay	Member of vendors' group/s	Un-organized vendors'	Private Sector & Individual residents	NGOs	Experts	
Male	5	10	7	4	8	3	8	**45**
Female	7	9	5	7	6	0	3	**37**
TOTAL	**12**	**19**	**12**	**11**	**14**	**3**	**10**	**82**

For each interview, a list of guide questions helped in ensuring that the results of the conversation were relevant to the thesis. Except for a few interviews with some government officials where I used English, all other interviews were conducted in Filipino. I did not encounter any issue with language and/or local cultural contexts in talking to the participants since I am from the Philippines and familiar with the practices and customs in the country. I had also interviewed street vendors and government officials in previous research projects. I followed the ethical procedures by The University of Queensland in conducting the interviews. A digital recorder was used to document the interviews. Each recording was then transcribed in Filipino and only relevant quotes were translated into English.

4.3.4.3. *Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)*

FGDs assume that an individual's attitudes and beliefs are not shaped in a vacuum and that people often need to listen to others' opinions and understandings to form their own (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). Aided by guide questions, FGDs helped in surfacing vendors' common and

different viewpoints in the same conversation. For the sampling, I employed the non-random quota method to get representatives from organized and unorganized vendors. The justification presented in Table 4.1 sampling grid was similarly applied to these two categories of hawkers.

The FGDs enabled me to talk to vendors whose diverse views are shaped by their socio-economic conditions, organizational affiliation, and vending locations, among others. Three FGDs took place involving vendors who were not part of the interviews. Each FGD had different set of participants. FGD participants, who were identified through snowball approach, comprised the following: 1) members and leaders of vending groups; 2) unorganized vendors with varied religious affiliations; and 3) unorganized Muslim vendors.

A total of 8 vendors – 5 females and 3 males – took part in the first FGD. Of the 8 participants, 6 were Christians and 2 were Muslims. In the second discussion, 7 unorganized vendors participated – 5 males and 2 females. In this FGD, 4 of the participants were Christians and 3 were Muslims. After conducting two FGDs – the first with vendors who have recognized leaders and the second with unorganized ones, I realized that while there were Muslim vendors who took part in these two discussions, they were a minority in both discussions. It appeared crucial to get the Muslim perspectives[30] as many vendors and barangay officials claimed that their numbers have continued to rise and that they have concerns different from Christian hawkers. Thus, a third FGD was convened with Muslim vendors as the participants. Six unorganized Muslim vendors got involved in this last FGD – 4 males and 2 females.

Apart from the organizational and religious affiliations of the vendors, I ensured that the vending locations of the FGD participants were not in the same area. This helped in tackling issues related to variation in vending locations. FGDs were documented through note-taking. In one instance, the participants agreed on using digital recording to document the discussion. Photos were also taken during the activities after gaining consent from the vendors. Two field assistants, who are professional community organizers, assisted in convening the FGDs.

[30] Although religious divide (Christian and Muslim) was a crucial element in the selection of vendor respondents, this was not the case among other stakeholders (government officials, private players, NGOs, academics) who are predominantly Christian. Thus, I did not include religious affiliation as a general criterion in the selection of other stakeholders. In the case of one barangay where the residents and local officials are Muslims, Muslim representation was a key criterion in recruiting participants for in-depth interviews and FGDs.

4.3.4.4. *Observation*

I conducted a series of site and people observations to document and examine how the vendors behave in their respective vending spaces, how they enforce the recognized norms, and how they interact with one another and with other stakeholders. The observations took place in various places at different times to capture the practices and routines that are relevant to the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces. The process followed what Marshall and Rossman (2006) suggest as a systematic procedure. In the first few weeks I went to the case study area with general areas of concern to cover. After certain patterns and relationships emerged through field notes, these themes were compared against preliminary interview and FGD results. The results of initial observations also informed some interviews and FGDs. After determining some preliminary themes, I came up with more focused observation checklists. Using these instruments, observations focusing on specific themes were undertaken to examine the patterns and nuances that were initially identified. Some of these themes were a) how the vendors interact with street-level bureaucrats and formal stallholders; b) how evictions are carried out; and c) how vending affects pedestrian and vehicular traffic.

During the fieldwork, observation activities entailed varying degrees of involvement on my part. In observing street spaces, situations, and events, a passive attitude was the strategy. Meanwhile, paying attention to people, their activities and interactions, entailed a more active role in that I was conversing with some vendors to clarify certain things. For example, when I witnessed an eviction enforced by local authorities during an observation activity, I talked to some vendors about the schedule of the eviction, whether this was a regular event, and what reasons were cited by the officials. There were also instances when I gained the consent of vendors to occupy their hawking spaces and observe their activities. While keeping track of the practices and interactions, I was also speaking to the vendors and asking them to tell stories about their daily routines, aspirations, and the wider prevailing conditions.

In broad terms, the observations generated information on the following: 1) how the formal systems operate on the ground; 2) who implement the formal systems and how they deal with issues arising from the latter; 3) how informal mechanisms and *de facto* arrangements function; 4) who implement the informal mechanisms; 5) the interactions among vendors and other

stakeholders; and 6) the empirical visual evidence on the vending practices including how vending is done, the products that vendors sell, and the buyers, among others.

Aside from these themes, I was able to capture specific events that are critical to how formal regulation, strategies for partnership and negotiation, and mechanisms for collaboration, conflict management and accountability among different players are carried out. For instance, I saw how several evictions were enforced, how vendors protected their spaces against authorities and encroachment of fellow vendors. I was also able to record the number of vendors on different streets at various periods in a year.

Field notes, observation checklists and digital camera were used as instruments in capturing images and events in the research setting. In every observation, field notes were recorded in my fieldwork journal while the photos were saved in a password-protected laptop. In instances when it was hard to jot down the observation highlights, I did the note-taking a few hours after the actual observation was done. Photographs were taken to capture the scenes, events, spatial arrangements, and specific images such as the volume of vendors, vending stalls, products sold, and pedestrian and vehicular traffic, among others.

4.3.4.5. *Life-history*

In contextualizing the policy and planning issues related to informality and how they affect the lives of individual vendors, I utilized life-history as the final method for gathering primary data. Watson and Watson-Franke (1985) define life-history as “any retrospective account by the individual of his [or her] life in whole or part, in written or oral form, *that has been elicited or prompted by another person*” (p. 2, authors’ italics). In this thesis, this entailed chronicling the life-histories of seven vendors – 5 women and 2 men, with different backgrounds and who became part of the conducted interviews. Besides recounting the narratives, I observed the different activities of these hawkers at various days in a week. In three instances, the vendors welcomed me into their residences.

While I acknowledge the difficulty in generalizing information derived from life-history accounts, the narratives helped me better understand the daily activities and struggles of street vendors, the responses they employ to deal with their problems, their arrangements with other

stakeholders to occupy the streets, and the power relations influencing their everyday lives. In this way, this method generated "nuanced accounts that subvert established knowledge" (Lewis, 2008, p. 562). In selecting the respondents for this method, I considered the following: gender, age, duration of being a vendor, ethnic background, location of vending stalls, and involvement in vending groups. Three transcribers helped me encode the recorded life-narratives of the chosen vendors.

4.3.5. Strategies for Contacting the Participants

With respect to specific steps undertaken to get in touch with the participants, Figure 4-1 below demonstrates how I identified and selected the respondents for the interviews, FGDs and life-history. I started identifying the respondents through the document review where I focused on 1) the government agencies involved in the implementation of formal systems; 2) the vendor organizations employing informal mechanisms in contested vending spaces; and 3) academics who have studied informal vending issues in relation to planning and governance.



Figure 4-1: Respondent Selection Flowchart

Based on the list of agencies and organizations, individuals representing these groups - agency heads or organizational leaders, formed the first set of interviewees. Once interviewed, these respondents then served as sources for contacting new set of participants via snowball sampling approach. After getting in touch with the identified persons, I asked for their consent to be part of the research as interviewees.

The list of names referred by the first set of interviewees and who agreed to take part in the research constituted the second batch of interviewees. For both the national and local government respondents, the interviewees were identified based on the predetermined list of offices whose legal mandates have to do with informal economy, street use, and informal vending. I also used snowball purposive sampling by asking for the recommendations of officials who were already interviewed about other agencies whose functions are also relevant to planning, informal economy, and street vending. A series of visits and conversations with officials of these suggested offices was conducted.

In terms of getting access to vendors, three factors were crucial. First, the referrals from barangay officials were important as most street hawkers were suspicious of individuals who collect information about vendors and their activities. I also got in touch with the individuals identified by the previously interviewed leaders. The second factor was the timing of interviews. In Baclaran, Wednesdays, Saturdays and Sundays[31] are considered as peak days for selling. The interviews with vendors were done outside these days and most conversations took place at their stalls or *pwesto*. Finally, in instances when it became difficult to go to the case study area and talk to vendors due to a number of evictions conducted by the government, the role of veteran community organizers who are familiar with the political dynamics in Pasay and Parañaque was critical. They assisted in gaining access to officials and vendors who are not affiliated with known leaders in the area.

With respect to identifying the respondents for the private sector, I utilized two approaches – purposive sampling and snowball purposive technique. For managers and stall owners in shopping malls in Baclaran, purposive sampling was done by identifying all the commercial

[31] These are the days when many people troop to Baclaran. Wednesday is locally known as 'Baclaran Day' due to the weekly day-long Novena, which according to a church leader attracts roughly 120,000 devotees. During weekends, buyers and commuters also roam around the Baclaran streets.

shopping establishments in the area which are affected by and/or in close proximity to vending spaces. I sent out formal letters to mall managers and interviewed those who agreed to be part of the research.

For other individuals such as formal stall owners, private residents, property owner, private employees and jeepney drivers, snowball purposive sampling was employed. Besides sub-group representation, I ensured that the residential/property or employment areas of the interviewees are located either in Pasay or Parañaque.

When it comes to NGOs, I identified the participants after doing a series of field visits and interviews with vendors and barangay officials who provided information about NGOs in the area. Three NGO leaders were interviewed. They represent the Redemptorist Church (more popularly known as 'Baclaran Church'), a Muslim Religious Group, and the Baclaran Vendors' Development Cooperative.

Finally, getting the views of academics and experienced individuals is important in making sense of certain information that seems tricky at a glance. I spoke with two planning academics – one is an expert on land use planning, the other on institutional planning – to solicit their ideas on issues surrounding planning and urban informality. Two other scholars, one on community organizing in the Philippines and the other on religious practices in Baclaran - shed light on collective action initiatives vis-à-vis informal vendors' conditions and agency.

In order to gain a more textured and sectoral insights about street vending organizing and local politics in the study area, I first interviewed some personal contacts who in turn referred me to other urban poor leaders and political organizers. Thus, I was able to conduct a series of conversations with veteran vendor organizers, urban poor community organizers, local political operators and urban poor leaders.

4.3.6. Data Analysis

The data collection methods employed in the thesis - document review, interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), observation, and life-history - served as a triangulation strategy to strengthen the validity of the findings. Figure 4-2 on page 81 illustrates how the data gathering

techniques, which were divided into three stages, complemented each other in validating the collected data. The diagram also shows how the data were examined.



Figure 4-2: Data Gathering Process and Analysis

The Stage 1 focused on document review which yielded information and themes relevant to answering the research questions. Guided by the retroductive inference, the initial themes generated through the document review informed the revision of instruments such as the interview and FGD guides and the broad observation checklist. This phase provided preliminary and limited answer to sub-questions 1 to 4 as the document review was able to identify some players and explain their roles and governing relations in the formal-informal interface.

The Stage 2 generated primary data through the first set of interviews, observations and FGDs. Using the Nvivo software, the data were categorized into themes represented by Nvivo nodes. Some of these themes include vendors' collective action, conflicts and tensions between players, and eviction episodes, among others. The identified themes emerged from the thesis'

conceptual framework and the synthesizing concepts from the literature review. As the data analysis continued, new themes – e.g. planning approaches, seasonal dimensions of street vending, and financial problems of hawkers - were added based on the emerging issues and topics.

Retroductive and abductive approaches guided the classification and examination of ideas. As explained in Section 4.1, the retroductive approach treats the theoretical premise as the take-off point for finding sound explanation on certain phenomenon (e.g. formal-informal interface in this thesis) while the abductive inference begins with analysing the findings that are outside the realm of the identified theoretical frame/s.

After clustering the emerging themes, the Stage 2 continued with another round of document review and chronicling of life-history accounts. The clustered themes developed from this phase were compared against the results from these two methods. This comparison validated and contextualized the themes and ideas through the retroductive-abductive process, which served as the preliminary analysed data. The processed information from the Stage 2 provided answers to the sub-questions 1 to 4 and served as inputs for tackling the main question and the sub-question 5. The analysed data also guided the development of a more focused observation checklist and guide questions for in-depth interviews. When these instruments got finalized, the Stage 3 began.

The last stage (Stage 3) dealt with focused observations and another round of interviews to clarify and validate the initially examined information and to seek further explanation on the established as well as the emerging themes. Encoded field notes from observations were processed using the Nvivo software. In this phase, focused observations meant paying closer attention to themes and issues that surfaced through the previously conducted observations, interview, and FGDs. Besides these data gathering activities, it was in this final phase when I repeatedly coded the new data, identified and modified analytical themes, and examined the patterns, nuances, and issues in the established themes. Retroductive and abductive approaches guided this process of coding and analysis. Using the examined data, the Stage 3 enabled me to answer the main research question (formal-informal interface) and the five sub-questions.

4.4. Conclusion

I this chapter, I have explained the thesis' methodological framework beginning with the ontological and epistemological stance. I have touched on the case study design, the needed data, the data collection methods, the sampling techniques, and the data analysis process. In explaining these different aspects of the research design, I have begun unfolding the complexity of documenting the many accounts from various stakeholders in the chosen study area. The succeeding chapters tackle these dimensions of the research. In the next chapter, I discuss the thesis' case study area focusing on its location and contextual issues.

CHAPTER 5. BACLARAN'S BROADER CONTEXTS AND SOCIO-SPATIAL FUNCTIONS

5.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I emphasized the role of case study in producing analytic generalization and context-dependent knowledge. To understand the conditions in which the collected data are rooted, I explain in this chapter the broader contexts that shed light on the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces. I first present the historical and structural issues that have influenced the Philippine political economy and urbanization patterns. After discussing the larger picture, I dwell on the main characteristics of Baclaran, the case study area, as an urban informal vending site. In the final section, I discuss the implications of key themes, which emerge from the structural issues in the Philippines and Metropolitan Manila, for Baclaran condition.

5.2. The Philippine Political Economy and Urbanization Patterns: A Historical Gaze

In informality literature, urban informal practices are seen as situated in territories that contain geographically extensive and transnational linkages (Bunnell & Harris, 2012; Donovan, 2008; Tucker, 2016). These cross-border connections are rooted in historical trajectories, which shape urban relations (Oriard, 2015; Ortega, 2016; Shatkin, 2008). Similarly, the street vending literature shows how urban policies hinge on broader national and international trends (Hlela, 2003; Hanser, 2016; Tucker, 2016) and historical issues (Coquery-Vidovitch, 1991; Oriard, 2015; Recio et al., 2017). These spatial and historical connections are important in the Philippines where colonialism has maintained an enduring impact on property relations (Ortega, 2012), urban development design, and planning policies in former colonial centres (Caoili, 1988).

With these considerations, the subsequent section narrates how the larger historical issues and socio-spatial relations in the Philippines have influenced Metropolitan Manila, the country's primary urban region within which Baclaran is historically and politically embedded. Its intention is not to provide a holistic historical account; rather, it aims to present key junctures – events, policies, issues – that have influenced the Philippine political economy and Metropolitan Manila's socio-spatial evolution.

5.2.1. Colonial Urbanization Patterns and Socio-Spatial Relations

Manila, the core city of the Philippines's primary metropolitan region, is considered today as one of the world's densest places. People attach traffic congestion, pollution, and chaotic spatial patterns when they describe the city. Novelist Dan Brown even calls it *'the Gates of Hell'* in his 2013 *Inferno* book. These descriptions are far from the grandiose title *'the noble and ever loyal city'*, which Manila gained from Spanish King, Felipe II, in 1574. So, how has Manila's historical evolution influenced the Philippine political economy and the country's urbanization patterns?

Since its establishment as the Spanish colonial capital in 1571[32], Manila had witnessed for over 300 years how the foreign invaders altered the country's land ownership and property relations. One strong Spanish influence on the Philippines was the change in land tenure where private ownership of land and monetary exchange emerged as an important system (Constantino, 1975; Cushner, 1976; Serote, 1991). Subsistence cultivation and land use gave way to production for exchange and market purposes as a new agricultural pattern (Cushner, 1976). This change from communal to private land ownership resulted in social class formation composed of lessors, small farmers, sharecroppers, landless labourers and landlords. The landowning class later on controlled the economic and political power while peasants and sharecroppers experienced land dispossession through various colonial impositions (Caoili, 1985, 1988; Constantino, 1975; Cushner, 1976). Many native residents lost their lands to powerful religious orders[33] (Cushner, 1976; Duldulao, 1998) because of tribute tax and forced labour (Duldulao, 1998). Moreover, *bandala* or the compulsory sale of agricultural products to government, often at prices lower than market rates, impelled rural dwellers and landless labourers to move to Manila and its suburbs resulting in an accelerated urbanization (Caoili, 1985; 1988).

As Manila generated urban migration, the local economy became connected to international trading system through the galleon trade, where Manila functioned as a way-station for gathering of silks and other Asian luxuries for shipment across the Pacific (Reed, 1967). By the

[32] Spanish conquistador Miguel Lopez de Legazpi occupied Manila after he won savage battles against the natives in 1571 (Constantino, 1975; Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016).

[33] Cushner (1976, p. 35) even noted that by the eighteenth century "the religious orders had become the largest single group of landed estate owners" due to the unwillingness or "inability of Spanish laymen to engage in agricultural pursuits".

19th century, the country became part of the world capitalism when the European free trade induced Spain to open the Philippines to world trade (Caoili, 1985; Francisco & Arriola, 1987). Although there were changes in the rural communities because of high demand for cash crops, the Philippine urban areas, primarily Manila, remained the loci of change (Reed, 1967).

When landless farmers flocked to Manila and its suburbs, they built settlements near commercial district and cigar factories (Doeppers, 1998). While many of them ended up as workers in cigar factories (Reed, 1967), some engaged in what is currently regarded as informal work. In particular, people living in Creekside neighbourhoods outside *Intramuros*[34], notably the Sampaloc suburb, served as launderers for *Intramuros* residents (Doeppers, 1998; Ocampo, 1992). There were also *tinderas* (retail shopkeepers) in the 1890s in Manila's Tondo and Sampaloc districts (Doeppers, 1998). Their retail shops, which were located adjacent to or in the *silong* or open space below the house (Doeppers, 1998), resemble the contemporary informal home-based retail practices in urban settlements in the country. Even Chinese *sari-sari* stores[35] were ubiquitous features of urban landscape in the middle of the nineteenth century (Reed, 1967).

The foregoing account shows how the introduction of private land ownership, the peasants' land deprivation, forced labour, tribute tax and *bandala* led to migration and urbanization in Manila and neighbouring areas. It also illustrates how some activities, which are considered today as part of urban informal economy, existed during the Spanish occupation. At the same time, the colonial political economy hinged on internationally-oriented agricultural production. This reliance on international market continued under the American occupation.

When the Americans from the United States hijacked in 1898 the short-lived Filipino independence under the first Philippine Republic, they came upon a deeply unequal society. The collaboration between the new colonizers and the local elites led to a centralized and oligarchic political system, where big landlords were controlling the agricultural lands since agrarian reform was confined to friar lands (Francisco & Arriola, 1987). The free trade

[34] *Intramuros* (Latin for within walls) was Manila's 1.2 square kilometre walled city, which served as the political-administrative and religious seat of power during the Spanish regime (Cushner, 1976).
[35] *Sari-sari* (a Tagalog term for variety) stores are home-based retail shops that offer a range of household goods and food products. Currently, it is considered as a form of informal petty trade practice.

institutionalization in the country in 1909 through the Payne-Aldrich Act had placed large landholdings in the hands of local and American businesses. This kept the Philippine agricultural sector export-oriented and made the country a supplier of raw materials and a consumer of finished products (Francisco & Arriola, 1987).

As the development in the rural areas continued to be oriented towards the urban and international demands, Manila maintained its primate city status. The Americans developed a masterplan for Manila following Daniel Burnham's 'City Beautiful' model. Beyond the glittering façade of Burnham's plan, however, the social inequities in the Philippines had merely turned the city into "a symbol of the failures of American rule" (Shatkin, 2006, p. 585). Even the grand features of the plan had not been realized as the World War II ruined the old Manila.

A few years after the war, the Philippines gained independence from the United States of America (USA) in 1946 ending the 381 years of colonial occupation. Throughout the almost four centuries of foreign rule, Manila sustained its rank as the country's foremost city (Reed, 1967). This dominant urban status of Manila, along with other fundamental issues, would persist as the young independent nation began charting its own destiny.

5.2.2. Confronting the Continuing Problems: Post-War to Present-day Metro Manila

The destruction of Manila during the World War II led to suburban exodus and expansion of the metropolis as more rural migrants moved to the city (Flieger, Koppin, & Lim, 1976; Ortega, 2016; Pascual, 1966). The post-war urban migration caused by rural unrest[36], underdevelopment and people's desire for better job opportunities had strained the capacity of local governments in Manila and its adjacent areas - now dubbed as Metro Manila (van Naerssen, Ligthart, & Zapanta, 1996). Local governments had to address urban congestion, poor housing condition, inadequate water supply, health and sanitation problems, and public transport management (Caoili, 1985).

[36] Some factors that contributed to the rural unrest had to do with the expulsion of the Democratic Alliance (a party of socialist and communist leaders) which forced some leaders to go underground and embraced a rebel cause against the State. The World War II had also compelled many rural folks to migrate to the city due to the loss of a huge number of farm carabaos (water buffaloes), "which were either killed for food or were casualties of fighting" (Alcazaren et al., 2011, p. 61).

In spite of these challenges, Metro Manila kept its primacy so that by 1975 it accounted for 12.4% of the country's population and 47.4 percent of industrial employment (Pernia, Paderanga Jr, & Hermoso, 1983). By 1980, its 5.9 million populations were close to eight times larger than the country's second largest urban centre (Pernia et al., 1983). As part of the nation's central industrial region, Metro Manila's dominance arguably resulted from the government's economic policies. In fact, between the late 1940s and 1970s the region benefited from the state's import-substitution policy and the return to export promotion (Pernia et al., 1983).

As Metro Manila areas enjoyed locational-economic advantages and grappled with intense urban migration, the traditional elites continued to control the country's political and economic power in a clientelist and particularistic political atmosphere. This condition fostered dependency on the USA-influenced Philippine economic policies even after the 1946 liberation (Caoili, 1985). Additionally, the wealthy landed class began investing in Metro Manila's growing economy. The intense urbanization also led to the growth of new classes – industrial labour, the intelligentsia, and the middle class – who influenced the political environment (Shatkin, 2007). This was the broader context when Ferdinand Marcos, Sr. began his regime.

When the Marcos administration moved from import substitution to export promotion, it considered the spatial dimension of development. There was an emphasis towards geographical diversification and export-oriented agricultural sector outside the country's central industrial region (Pernia et al., 1983). Yet, this regionalization policy was often overwhelmed by reconcentration as decision-making processes took place at the centre (Alcazaren et al., 2011). Reconcentration manifested in forming the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) in 1975, which consolidated 17 cities and towns under one government agency in-charge of planning and policy-making (Caoili, 1985; Shatkin, 2007). Established to address rapid urbanization and growth in Metro Manila, it was viewed as part of political manoeuvres to consolidate the regime, carry out a foreign-funded national development plan, and neutralize political opponents and radical groups (Ruland, 1985).

Reconcentration and consolidation of power permeated down to Metro Manila's neighbourhoods. Months after Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, the government

established neighbourhood organizations (*barangays*) throughout the country. Portrayed as instruments for citizen participation, delivery of basic services, and agents of development, barangays became the Marcos regime's "grassroots eyes and ears" (van Naerssen et al., 1996, p. 174) to exert control over urban poor communities[37], which were potential source of subversive elements and social unrest (Bello, Kinley, & Elinson, 1982; Ruland, 1985).

As Marcos consolidated political power, he enforced his 'modernist' approach (Shatkin, 2006) and 'Western-style' development (Ruland, 1985) through authoritarian measures, patronage ties, and corruption. Yet, the systemic government corruption, human rights violations, military abuses, rising poverty, and the growing political disenchantment gradually hounded the dictator's reign (Ruland, 1985). His employment of competent technocrats was not enough to arrest the worsening economic conditions manifested in the country's ballooning debt. The killing of Benigno 'Ninoy' Aquino, Jr., a prominent opposition leader, further fuelled the growing resistance from student movements, faith-based groups, labour unions, middle class, and disenchanted corporate sector, among others. In February 1986, the series of mass actions protesting the fraudulent presidential election results eventually culminated in Marcos ouster. New political-economic players came to the fore with their respective interests.

In the post-Marcos Philippines, rich landed families have adeptly used their wealth to perpetuate themselves in national and local government posts (Shatkin, 2008). This contributed to a system of 'booty capitalism', where "powerful business class extracts privilege from a largely incoherent bureaucracy" (Hutchcroft, 1998, p. 20). Elite domination has continued to date as the nation becomes integrated into globalization and the state embraces neo-liberal policies characterized by privatization, deregulation, liberalization, and debt repayment (Bello, Docena, de Guzman, & Malig, 2004). In this globalization era, the government's role is to develop the capital city as a 'global city' that can attract foreign investments, generate jobs (Ortega, 2012), and convince their citizens to believe in the "power of global integration to transform their societies" (Shatkin, 2006, p. 581).

[37] In Chapter 7, I discuss the effects of this Marcos political strategy on the contemporary urban governance in Baclaran's contested spaces.

Towards this end, infrastructure and social investment has remained concentrated in Metro Manila and its surrounding regions. This time, Metro Manila acts as 1) the command and control centre for the country's integration into the global economy; 2) the centre for consumption; 3) an area for tourist trade; and 4) a city of labour export (Shatkin, 2006). Given the new roles of the country's primary metropolis, the national government is seen as a mere facilitator for creating business-oriented and investment-friendly regions for the global market (Ortega, 2012; Porio, 2016; Shatkin, 2008). This drive towards neoliberal-oriented agenda has produced a bifurcated space "between the privately planned 'global city' for the middle and upper classes and the neglected and marginalized spaces of the rest of the population" (Shatkin, 2006, p. 600). In his work, Shatkin (2008) explains that this socio-spatial pattern emanates from 'bypass-implant urbanism', a condition where

> "… private developers have been granted considerable power to reengineer cities to create new spaces for production and consumption, and to facilitate the flow of people and capital between these spaces, by `bypassing' the congested arteries of the `public city' and `implanting' new spaces for capital accumulation that are designed for consumerism and export-oriented production. (Shatkin, 2008, p. 388)

In terms of institutional design, bypass-implant urbanism stems from the 'privatization of planning' where the government passes on to the private sector "the power over and responsibility for the visioning of urban futures and the exercise of social action for urban change" (Shatkin, 2008, p. 388). Shatkin (2004) also links this privatization trend to external factors such as the economic impacts of globalization, the new real estate market, the accessibility of funding from international capital, and the influence of foreign planners and architects.

Mega-projects offering agglomeration of corporate investment, residential use, and recreational activities represent the bypass-implant urban development. Spaces of these projects are carefully planned and strictly regulated to prevent 'informalization' and distinguish them from the neglected 'public' city in Metro Manila (Shatkin, 2008). Ortega (2016) considers these mega-projects as urban gentrification in the neo-liberal age. Apart from the active role of private corporations, this gentrification necessitates a struggle against urban informality, which pertains to urban poor's informal settlements (Ortega, 2016) and self-initiated economic activities.

Thus far, I have presented in the preceding discussion the historical trajectory that has influenced the Philippine political economy and Metro Manila's urbanization patterns. How have these dynamics affected Baclaran? Before tackling the implications of the issues explained above, in the next section I touch on Baclaran's historical past and its present socio-spatial characteristics.

5.3. From Colonial to Global Era: Baclaran through the Years

Baclaran comes from the Tagalog word '*baklad*' which is a native instrument for fishing. Before the Philippine government launched a massive reclamation project near this coastal area, Baclaran was a small fishing village famous for its *baklads* and dubbed as the "*bakladan*", which later on became "*baclaran*". While Barangay Baclaran is part of the political and administrative jurisdiction of Parañaque City, the area occupied by many street vendors also covers some barangays in the neighbouring Pasay City.

In this study, Baclaran (see Figure 5-1, on page 92) refers to the area occupied by informal vendors, which traverses one barangay in Parañaque (Barangay Baclaran) and five barangays in Pasay (Barangays 77, 78, 79, 145 and 146). In terms of land area coverage, barangays in Pasay are far smaller than those in Parañaque. The total land area of Pasay's five barangays is 21.7 hectares while Parañaque's Barangay Baclaran covers 69.8 hectares. As I will discuss below, this difference in barangay land area coverage has an impact on control over contested vending spaces. In terms of population size, the 2015 Philippine census reveals 9,921 residents in five barangays in Pasay and 28,385 dwellers in one barangay in Parañaque. Baclaran's location on the boundaries of two cities provides an opportunity to compare how the local governments deal with informal vending in their territories.



Source: Metropolitan Manila Map - http://www.retireinthephilippines.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/metro-manila-map.gif

Figure 5-1: Location of Baclaran (The Case Study Area)

Historically, Baclaran was part of *arrabales* settlements, which constituted the towns within the fifteen-mile radius of Manila's *Intramuros* (Cushner, 1976), the Spanish colonial capital for over 300 years. In particular, Pasay was part of a large land estate surrounding Manila. When the Americans from the United States occupied the Philippines, they introduced subdivisions and established the Pasay Estate, covering the areas of San Andres (Manila) to Baclaran. Beyond the areas reserved for the wealthy, one American realtor described the Pasay Estate's haphazard pattern as "slums" (Alcazaren et al., 2011). Until now, the remnants of this Estate manifest in large parcels of individual gated lots with big houses in the midst of poor slum-like communities.

After the colonial period, Pasay and Parañaque became part of what is now Metropolitan Manila. It happened in 1975 when then President Ferdinand Marcos formed the Metro Manila Commission (Caoili, 1988; Shatkin, 2007). Another Marcosian political strategy that has impacted on the current conditions of Baclaran was the establishment of neighbourhood organizations (*barangays*) throughout the country. Portrayed as instruments for citizen participation and agents of development, *barangays* became Marcos' platform to exert control over urban poor communities (Bello et al., 1982; Ruland, 1985).

In relation to Baclaran, the creation of *barangays* led to certain local political dynamics. In Pasay, Pablo Cuneta, then City Mayor and Marcos ally, requested for the establishment of 200 small *barangays*. This explains why Pasay's many barangays are undersized in land area compared with that of Parañaque's. Cuneta reasoned that since the Presidential Decree for establishing *barangays* did not specify particular number and size, "[t]he more barangay captains [chairs] named, the better to please more [local] political leaders. More importantly, in line with the national policy of rendering financial aid to each barangay, more of them meant more national government subsidy pouring into coffers of Pasay City" (Duldulao, 1998, p. 55). This astute move enabled Cuneta to choose his political ward leaders as *barangay* officials. In the long run, it has nurtured deeper political patronage relations in smaller spatially partitioned *barangays*. In Pasay, the little involvement of *barangays* in governing vending spaces partly arises from the fact the vendors' residential areas and voting registration are geographically dispersed in five barangays. This has allowed the city government to have full control over vendor leaders.

It was also during the Marcos authoritarian regime when the Perpetual Shrine in Baclaran served as an important civic space as political dissidents sought refuge in the church (Hechanova, 1998; Sapitula, 2013b). When a series of mass protests ousted Marcos, Aquino's revolutionary government appointed an officer-in-charge for Barangay Baclaran, treating it as an independent town for a short time. Then between the late 1980s and early 1990s, Baclaran began earning the reputation as a commercial centre for affordable garments and other merchandises.

By the mid-1990s, when the implementation of neo-liberal policies reached its peak in the Philippines (Bello, 2017), Chinese traders were already renting commercial stalls in Baclaran and competing with local entrepreneurs for spaces and customers. It was also during this period when many migrants began occupying Baclaran streets as informal hawkers. One study notes that about 60% of Baclaran vendors were from Luzon provinces while 29% were from the Visayas areas (Valladolid, 1996). Towards the end the 1990s, Muslim traders and poor migrants from Mindanao began settling in Baclaran's residential areas. Many of these Mindanaoans ended up working as sales staff in shopping malls or as street vendors.

Currently, Baclaran is in the middle of major transport nodes and a mega-project dubbed as the Bay City, a mixed-use agglomeration of commercial centres such as the ASEANA City and the Mall of Asia Complex (Ortega, 2016; Rivera, 2014). This large-scale public-private urban development project, an outcome of Marcos land reclamation project, intends to showcase the area as Asia's Broadway and promote Manila as a world-class Philippine capital (Dumlao-Abadilla, 2015). As an urban district occupied by many poor residents and informal traders, Baclaran's present location arguably fits Shatkin's (2008) notion of 'public city', which is characterized by congested arteries and neglected spaces situated between carefully planned commercial areas like the Bay City. The next section expands this discussion of Baclaran location and relates its contemporary land use patterns to the larger Metro Manila's socio-spatial arrangements.

5.4. Baclaran's Socio-Spatial Functions

Pasay and Parañaque's official land use maps designate Baclaran as a commercial and a residential area. The two maps below (Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3) show this official classification.



The **Baclaran vending district** is designated as a commercial zone and a residential area in Pasay City's 2001-2010 Land Use Map

Source: Pasay City Comprehensive Land Use Plan 2001-2010

Figure 5-2: Baclaran Area as Identified in Pasay's Land Use Map



The **Baclaran vending district** is designated as a commercial zone and an institutional area in Parañaque City's 2001-2010 Land Use Map

Source: Parañaque City's Land Use and Zoning Map 2007

Figure 5-3: Baclaran Area as Identified in Parañaque's Land Use Map

The series of observations, however, revealed that Baclaran is home to establishments with diverse functions. Figure 5-4 on page 98 shows that Baclaran serves as a dynamic space for settlement, transport, and socio-cultural activities. One of the everyday functions pertains to religious practices. The National Shrine of Our Lady of Perpetual Help, popularly known as Baclaran Church, is in Barangay Baclaran. In an interview, church leader, Francis, said that around 120,000 devotees visit this Catholic pilgrimage site every Wednesday. This contributes to the large volume of foot traffic in Baclaran. Two other Christian structures - one for *Iglesia ni Cristo*[38] (Church of Christ) members and another for Protestant believers - are located in the area. Aside from these churches, three Mosques stand in Baclaran, which caters to Muslim residents and traders. This congregation of different religious establishments close to manufacturing and commercial centres is one of Baclaran's unique features.

As a commercial district, Baclaran welcomes shoppers who want to buy cheap products such as shoes, bags, clothes, household accessories, and schools supplies, among others. Sold in shopping malls and wholesale centres, these goods are a source of income for informal vendors who have used Baclaran streets for a living.

In terms of its relationship to the spatial arrangement of Metropolitan Manila, Baclaran was already a metropolitan transport hub even before the construction of malls in the 1990s. There were bus terminals for people going to and from nearby cities and provinces. In 1984, the completion of the Baclaran Light Rail Transit (LRT) terminal, the last South-bound station of Southeast Asia's first LRT, attracted more people to the area. This LRT line runs in the south-north direction along the west side of Manila with initial 64 cars and a capacity of 374 passengers - 81 seated and 293 standing at normal capacity (Pacheco-Raguz, 2010).

In 2014, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) data showed that Baclaran LRT station alone had an average of about two million passengers every month[39]. Baclaran is also close to the busiest station of the Metro Rail Transit (MRT3), which had a monthly average of 2, 427, 220 passengers in 2014 (DOTC, 2015).

[38] *Iglesia ni Cristo* or INC is an international Christian domination founded in the Philippines in 1914.
[39] Based on the DOTC 2015 data, the actual monthly average is 1, 992,102 passengers.



Sources: Data source – Author's fieldwork observations; Street Map – Google Maps (2015)

Figure 5-4: Baclaran as a Strategic Space for Multiple Activities



Sources: Data source – Author's fieldwork observations; Street Map – Google Maps (2015); Simplified Road Network Map – Wikipedia (2015)

Figure 5-5: Baclaran Area and its Relationship to Metro Manila Road Networks

In addition, Baclaran is nestled within three major roads considered as important in the metropolitan-wide transportation network. Figure 5-5 on page 99 illustrates this relationship of Baclaran to major road networks in Metro Manila. Two radial roads – the Roxas Boulevard (radial road 1) to the West and the stretch of Taft Avenue-Quirino Road (radial road 2) to the East – serve as key thoroughfares for public and private vehicles. A few meters up north is the location of Metro Manila's busiest road – the Epifanio De Los Santos Avenue (EDSA), which functions as the region's circumferential road 3 (C3). This puts Baclaran as a key transport channel since Metro Manila's radial and circumferential roads are part of the region's arterial road network, which connects its component cities and the surrounding provinces.

In terms of national and international trips, Baclaran is very close to the country's busiest airport – the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). Because of its proximity to NAIA and its reputation as home of affordable merchandises, some local officials have even proposed to make Baclaran a major destination for tourists who are looking for local products and souvenirs.

Baclaran's role in Metro Manila's transport channels is crucial since the metropolis has been experiencing slow traffic at an average speed of 12 kilometre per hour (kph) during peak hours, which is much slower than Bangkok (21 kph) and Jakarta (26 kph) (Webster, Corpuz, & Pablo, 2003). This is due in part to the increasing volume of vehicles, which was over 1.5 million or close to 30% of the country's registered automobiles in 2006 (Pacheco-Raguz, 2010). The government's insufficient and erratic efforts to improve public transport have likewise aggravated the traffic problem. In fact, the government has not provided new high capacity public transit facilities (e.g. MRT or BRT) since the 1990s; while the limited road construction has been unable to keep pace with the volume of vehicles (Pacheco-Raguz, 2010).

Given the issues presented in the foregoing discussion, what emerging lessons could interweave the broader contexts with Baclaran's situation? In the section that follows, I explain the implications of the historical issues and socio-economic conditions for Baclaran.

5.5. Structural Issues and the Baclaran Context: Lessons and Implications

In the first section of this chapter I narrated the evolution of the broader socio-political system that encompasses urban planning in the Philippines. From this brief historical account, five

interrelated themes have emerged as important in understanding Metropolitan Manila and its component areas like Baclaran. These themes include 1) the Philippine economy's link to international trade; 2) Manila's prominence as urban centre; 3) the unabated rural-to-urban migration; 4) the unequal and elite-dominated political economy; and 5) the varied forms of agency and resistance. In the subsequent paragraphs, I explain the importance of these issues to Baclaran context.

5.5.1. The Philippine economy's link to international trade

In Sections 5.1 and 5.2 above, I showed how the colonial Philippine economy became linked to international trading system through the Spanish galleon trade and the American export-oriented economic paradigm. In the post-colonial Philippines, the government started implementing in the 1970s a set neo-liberal policies[40] under Marcos' authoritarian regime (Ofreneo & Habana, 1987). In the succeeding decades, the Philippine government has adhered to the rhetoric of globalization and economic neoliberalism reached its apogee in the mid-1990s (Bello, 2017). While neo-liberal policies have attracted foreign investment since the 1970s, they have similarly restrained livelihood opportunities for majority of the urban residents[41] (Balisacan, 1995; Ofreneo & Habana, 1987). This problem intersects with the continuing urban migration and a decrease in urban formal sector jobs. Thus, "people's dependence on street economy enterprises and their integration of these services into their daily lives evidence" (Milgram, 2009, p.23) prove that such practices have become parts of the wider urban economy.

In Baclaran's adjacent areas, as in many other global South cities, the interplay of global neo-liberal trends and urban informality involves the private investment-driven change in land values and the proliferation of new urban master plans involving face-lifted city centres, shopping malls, and luxurious hotels (Hansen, Little, & Milgram, 2013; Shatkin, 2004, 2008). These two phenomena manifest in the Bay City, a mega urban project across Baclaran where privatization of planning (Shatkin, 2008) and gentrification against informality (Ortega, 2016) are carried out. The bias against informal livelihoods is likewise seen in how the government, in its effort to project Manila as a global city, has repeatedly evicted Baclaran

[40] Neo-liberal policies aim to reduce tariffs, deregulate the economy, and privatise government enterprises (Bello, 2017).

[41] This situation has similarly occurred in Cairo (Egypt) where the local and national governments' efforts to modernize and globalize often place limitations on urban informal livelihoods (Elyachar, 2005). Also, MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000) documented how transnational informal economic traders, composed of Congolese immigrant traders in Paris (France), operate in the fissures of global systems by maximizing how the world economy works without completely playing by its rules.

vendors when there are international visitors or when the government hosted international events such as the Asia Pacific Economic Conference in 2015. Evictions are tackled in detail in Chapter 7.

5.5.2. Manila's prominence as urban centre

As the country's premiere trading and political-administrative centre, Metro Manila's prominent status should be situated as part of state interventions. From being the Spanish colonial capital, American site for masterplan design and Marcos' central industrial region to its current role as the Philippines' foremost globalizing metropolis, Metro Manila has remained an attractive destination for those who look for better employment. Besides the locational advantage, the country's urban-oriented and market-driven agricultural production has maintained Metro Manila's dominant status. From the colonial regime until the globalization era, the Philippine agriculture has been oriented towards urban consumption and market exchanges. As a result, Metro Manila's adjacent areas including Baclaran have accommodated business enterprises as well as job seekers.

An implication of Manila's prominent urban status is the need to link informal economic activities in Baclaran to the larger metropolitan and national socio-economic trends and policy interventions. As several authors have shown, even migrants during the Spanish regime embraced urban informal work to earn a living (Reed, 1967; Ocampo, 1992; Doeppers, 1998). Situating Baclaran informal vending and Metro Manila's position in the country's urban hierarchy can therefore provide a broader perspective on urban informality. This is further explored in the succeeding chapters where urban informality and planning processes are analysed.

5.5.3. The unabated urban migration

The street vending literature shows that migration is a major factor of urban informality (Musoni, 2010; Swider, 2015; Weng & Kim, 2016). In Metro Manila, urban migration began when the Spanish impositions of tribute tax, forced labour, compulsory sale of local products and land dispossession impelled landless peasants and sharecroppers to flock to Manila and its suburbs. The aftermath of World War II coupled with rural unrest and underdevelopment continued this rural exodus pattern.

In the post-colonial era, migration has persisted due in part to the state's failure to implement agrarian reform (Bello et al., 2004) and the lack of livelihood opportunities in rural areas

(Perez, 2015). By government account, eight out of ten Filipinos will be living in cities and urban agglomerations by 2030 (Tirona, 2013). In 2010, 37% of migrants moved to Metro Manila and its two neighbouring regions (Philippine Statistical Authority, 2010, cited in Perez, 2015). As I pointed out in Section 5.2, this unabated migration to Metro Manila is seen in how Baclaran serves as an economic space for poor migrants, where in 1996 almost 90% of street vendors came from the provinces (Valladolid, 1996).

5.5.4. The unequal and elite-dominated political economy

Another theme has to do with the country's highly unequal and elite-dominated political economy. This entrenched elite influence has generated scholarly studies where authors have described the Philippine case as a form of 'cacique democracy' (Anderson, 1988), 'elite democracy' (Bello & Gershman, 1990; Stauffer, 1990), 'anarchy of families'[42] (McCoy, 1993b), and 'booty capitalism' (Hutchcroft, 1998). As explained Section 5.2.1 above, elite domination originated from the social formation during the Spanish regime and perpetuated through American occupation until the post-colonial era. The landed capitalists, for instance, dominated the manufacturing sector when the government implemented the import substitution policy in the 1950s-1960s (Rivera, 1994). The long tradition of political influence on state institutions and access to resources enabled these landed capitalist families to shape government policies (Rivera, 1994) and urban development in Metro Manila.

As van Naerssen et al. (1996) underscore, the landed elites in Manila have had strong impact on the urban management system as many of them were able to strengthen their power base. From their land resources, the rich families diversified their economic base by taking part in urban activities such as construction industries, banking, real estate, shipping, land transportation and communication (Simbulan, 1965). Another enduring effect of elite domination on urban planning is what Shatkin (2008) has termed 'privatization of planning', which results in an urban pattern divided into the neglected 'public city' and carefully planned consumerist spaces. In this socio-spatial pattern, Baclaran can arguably be considered as a public city near a strictly planned and regulated commercial area. Baclaran's socio-spatial patterns are therefore never insulated from elite influence in national and regional planning.

[42] Although this description has largely been associated with McCoy's (1993) edited book with the same title, it was Fox (1959) who first used the phrase 'anarchy of families' to portray the broader Filipino society.

5.5.5. Varied forms of agency and resistance

Beyond elite power, the last important idea that links structural issues and Baclaran's local context pertains to the varied forms of agency and resistance from below. In discussing grassroots resistance, it helps to revisit Quimpo's (2005) critique of some scholars' predisposition to paint the Philippine society as elite-dominated. He explains that elite-centred perspective suffers from one-sided and top-down view. Quimpo (2005, p. 242) thus argues for a 'contested democracy' framework, which claims that "colonial and postcolonial elite rule constitutes a single continuous seam in Philippine politics yet contends that they are not the only important thread". He then stresses the importance of acknowledging the Filipinos' historical struggle for independence from colonial invaders and the continuing fight of marginalized communities for social justice. In planning literature, this democracy-from-below approach resonates with insurgent citizenship (Holston, 1998), insurgent planning (Miraftab, 2009), and disjunctive democracy (Caldeira & Holston, 1999). These notions emphasize the need to examine how grassroots resistance and agency expressions, though embedded in broader social structures, contribute to urban socio-spatial relations and radical planning processes.

Van Naerssen et al. (1996), for instance, explain that the struggle of Metro Manila urban poor organizations and their partner NGOs represents an 'urban management from below'. In similar vein, Pinches (1992) examines how one Manila informal settlement resists class degradation while Shatkin (2004) emphasizes how some Metro Manila community associations and NGOs were able to influence city-building processes by employing legal means or undertaking mass action to resist informal settlers' eviction or stop urban development interventions. His recognition of the strength of popular movement to make 'public city' more resilient (Shatkin, 2008) is also a departure from the usual structuralist and elite-centred approach. This attention to people's capacity to resist and exercise agency is crucial in explaining how various actors in Baclaran like street vendors are able to occupy contested streetscapes and oppose or appropriate government decision-making and planning processes.

5.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented the historical trajectory and the socio-spatial relations that have influenced the Philippine political economy and urbanization patterns. By discussing the structural issues, I have provided the broader context which is useful in situating Baclaran as a site for the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces. Five key

themes have emerged as critical: the Philippine economy's link to international trade, the unabated rural-to-urban migration, Manila's prominence as urban centre, the unequal and elite-dominated political economy, and the varied forms of agency and resistance. These themes emphasize the importance of situating the local conditions in the broader historical, geographical, socio-political dimensions and agency expressions of urban relations. They serve as an important milieu in examining the different stakeholders in Baclaran. The chapter that follows discusses these multiple players.

CHAPTER 6. PLAYERS IN INFORMALITY: ROLES AND RELATIONS

6.1. Introduction

In the preceding chapter, I explained the historical and contemporary issues that have shaped the Philippine political economy and urbanization patterns. Building on such contextual milieu, I address in this chapter the thesis sub-question 1: who are the players that drive the formal systems and informal mechanisms, and their interface, in governing and appropriating vending spaces? In answering this query, I consider the players as a governance dimension following the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3.

In the Philippines, scholars have examined the roles of the state, private sector, elite families, and community associations in urban development (Caoili, 1988; Shatkin, 2007; Alcazaren et al., 2011). In the previous chapter, I noted how the privatisation of planning and the global-city imaging emerge from the interplay of government and corporate interests (Shatkin, 2008; Ortega, 2016). Yet, grassroots agency and resistance have likewise produced contested spaces for the marginalized urban population (Milgram, 2013; Recio, 2016; Shatkin, 2007). NGOs have similarly played as policy champions in pushing for the interests of the urban poor (Etemadi, 2004; Milgram; 2009; 2013; Porio, 2002; Recio, 2010; 2013; 2015). These accounts demonstrate the roles that various players perform in Philippine urban socio-spatial relations.

The discussion below examines the different players involved in informality. In the first two sections, I discuss the government institutions, which are classified into national agencies and local units. In the third and fourth sections, I analyse the non-state players at the local level. They are divided into two groups: 1) the NGOs and private sector and 2) the grassroots players. In the final section, I summarise the analytical threads that flow from the discussion.

6.2. National Government Agencies (NGAs)

As explained in Chapter 3, street vending is considered part of the informal economy. This implies that state interventions in economic activities considered as informal affect the conditions of vendors. Thus, this section analyses five NGAs that deal with informal economy or informal workers based on their institutional mandates. These NGAs include the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP), the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), the Department of

Labour and Employment – Bureau of Workers with Special Concerns (BWSC), and the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)[43].

Five analytical threads flow from examining the institutional roles and the issues that these agencies face in fulfilling their mandates. These are 1) the limited engagement with grassroots players; 2) the institutional fragmentation; 3) the unresponsive tools and processes; 4) the dualist and developmentalist approach to informality; and 5) the complex local political dynamics. These issues serve as a national backdrop that partly explains why and how local powerful players dominate the socio-spatial relations in Baclaran.

6.2.1. Limited Engagement with Grassroots Players

As the government's socio-economic planning agency, NEDA's role in shaping plans that respond to informality issues is crucial. In 2003, the NEDA – Social Development Committee approved the Philippine Country Program for the informal sector. The program seeks to institutionalize interventions for the informal sector actors through local governments. It identifies street hawkers as a beneficiary and sees improvement in application for hawking permits as a success indicator and tags informal sector groups as key partners.

In reality, however, NEDA mainly involves NGOs in its meetings. As Miguel, a senior NEDA staff, narrated,

> [I]n the social sector, we have a Multisectoral Committee on International Human Development Commitments that monitors the key [international] commitments of the Philippines [like] the Millennium Development Goals… But [these consultations are done] through NGOs... [Their involvement] serves as representation from the people's organizations… [which] are too many and scattered.

Such limited grassroots engagement also happens within the PCUP. This seems a paradox since the Commission was created in 1986 to address rampant evictions and human rights violations against the urban poor. As the state's link to the urban poor, the PCUP's role is critical in addressing vendors' issues. However, Baclaran hawkers are unaware of the existence of the PCUP and its mandate. The PCUP's limited engagement stems from how it has solely focused on urban poor's shelter-related issues. As PCUP senior official, Noriel, explained,

> Right now, we do not have much sectoral engagement with informal sector workers… At first, I thought the PCUP was too focused on land and housing [issues]. Then I

[43] While the MMDA is a regional entity, it is lumped together with the NGAs as it operates under the Office of the Philippine President and supervises Metro Manila, dubbed as National Capital Region to emphasize its national importance.

> realized, every time I would observe our consultation activities, the common issues that the urban poor leaders bring up have to do with provisions on [land title] proclamation and community mortgage program. It turns out that jobs and livelihoods are only part of their peripheral agenda. I'm not sure though if there is a problem in facilitation process for them to articulate these [employment and livelihood concerns].

The statement above indicates that the inability to go beyond shelter issues partly stems from the nature of the PCUP's partner urban poor groups, which are primarily concerned with housing issues. This minimal role of PCUP in addressing issues beyond housing requires contextualizing. In its early days, the Commission employed former anti-Marcos activists as community organizers in informal settlements in Metro Manila and other parts of the country. They engaged in political organizing around land tenure, land speculation and infrastructure issues in informal settlements (Karaos, 1995). The organizing initiatives soon generated resistance from local governments and business interests, which eventually resulted in weakening of PCUP's original mandate (Shatkin, 2004). Recently, the agency was stripped off its task as the clearing house for all evictions involving urban poor.

Besides NEDA and the PCUP, the NAPC similarly finds it hard to reach out to grassroots workers. The NAPC's main mandate is to monitor the government's poverty-related policies and programs. It has 14 councils representing the sectors identified in Republic Act 8425[44], the law that created NAPC. Workers in the informal sector, which includes street vendors, are among the NAPC sectors. Belen, a member of the Workers in the Informal Council (WISC), described their role as a "bridge between the sector and the government agencies".

As informal workers' representative in the government, Belen feels there is much to be desired in involving grassroots associations: "That is one aspect where we are deficient. What usually happens is, in my case, I could give an update to my local organization and to the federation where I belong. But it's not inclusive". The resource constraint adds to the WISC's inability to talk to many informal economic workers like vendors. "We have PhP 1 million (US 20,000) annual budget for the quarterly meetings. We spend the money on the meetings", Belen explained. For her, there is no money allocated for leaders who wish to go to communities and interact with other workers.

Taken together, the limited grassroots engagements of the NGAs cast doubt on how their initiatives, which should benefit the informal workers, are able to reach the intended

[44] In Chapter 7, I examine this law and other legal instruments concerning informal workers.

populations and get them engaged in the programs. This problem is exacerbated by institutional fragmentation.

6.2.2. Institutional Fragmentation

While fragmentation hounds most institutions, it is more challenging for NAPC since it should oversee all the government anti-poverty interventions. Cynthia, official of the BWSC (which is a NAPC partner agency), shared her observation: "It is like they [NAPC] are not functioning as expected. They seem to pass on to us [the burden of overseeing the WIS]. Supposedly, as the oversight [agency] of [anti-poverty programs], they should be on top of anything. That is their mandate". Glenda, a senior BWSC staff, feels that the NAPC has "constraints in terms of power". But, how is this manifested?

> "…[T]hey [NAPC] are lacking in terms of coordinating with other agencies. As the implementing agencies, we merely implement what we have and in terms of projects. So, we cannot impose on other agencies... So, they [NAPC] should be steering [the process] …" (Cynthia)

Cynthia's reading of the NAPC situation is crucial because she sees it as someone who experiences fragmentation in her own agency – BWSC. The BWSC emerged in 2010 from the integration of the DOLE's Bureau of Rural Workers and Bureau of Women and Young Workers. It got involved with informal workers when the latter's issues were lodged under the Bureau of Rural Workers. The informal vendors fall under its clients as workers with special concerns. For Cynthia, tackling the informal work issues is a challenge as the DOLE focuses on the formal employment.

> [T]he mandate of the DOLE is for the formal [workers]. We started paying attention to informality when we became the lead convenor at the NAPC [WIS Council] … But, if you will look at the structure of the DOLE, it is [about formal] labour standards and regulations.

In addition, the BWSC grapples with all other issues that fall under its 'special concerns' designation. As Cynthia recounted,

> If you look at [other DOLE Bureaus such as the] Bureau of Labour Relations, their name says that they concentrate on labour relations … When it comes to our Bureau, it became focused on the people - Bureau of Workers with Special Concerns… [E]very concern that falls outside the [DOLE] regular program is brought to us. It's like we are the catch basin of [all workers] with special issues.

The insights above indicate how developmentalism[45] informs DOLE's approach to informality and how the interventions are an add-on, rather than, an integral aspect of comprehensive policies and programs. They also highlight the government's reactive and fragmented interventions. Thus, the program implementation becomes very challenging. As Cynthia lamented: "It is really difficult considering their increasing number… Then the LGUs [local government units] have different ordinances. There is no single national policy."

The preceding discussion reveals the institutional fragmentation and the potentially overlapping mandates among NGAs involved in informal workers. Thus, it is crucial to ask: What dimensions of informality are addressed by anti-poverty programs? Which agencies are accountable? These questions echo Lemanski and Marx's (2015) concern on the effectiveness and accountability of overlapping institutions in addressing poverty. They also indicate the need for tools with which government processes can be critically assessed. This lack of appropriate tools is also an issue.

6.2.3. The Unresponsive Tools and Processes

As discussed in Chapter 2, how the state views informality impacts on the conditions of informal workers. More so, when the latest estimate indicates that 75% of Philippine labour force is employed in informal economy (World Bank, 2013). It thus becomes problematic when NEDA as the government's leading socio-economic planning agency has no adequate tools to examine the issues of informal workers. "Our economic model is really capturing the output of formal sector, national income accounts… If that is informal - unlicensed, unregistered, unregulated – I don't know what the basis will be", NEDA staff, Miguel, admitted.

As a result, the precise figures on informal workers are still a problem and the country's development plan remains unresponsive to informal sector issues (Casanova-Dorotan, 2010). Failure to develop effective tools might also affect the government's efforts to address poverty as the number of poor people increases when poverty measure becomes more sensitive to the conditions of the most impoverished (Martinez, 2015).

[45] Building on Robinson (2006), I refer to developmentalism as a policy model that largely pays attention to economic and poverty-related dimensions of informality without considering the broader socio-spatial and political aspects.

The same problem afflicts the BWSC's process of reaching out to their beneficiaries. It's DOLE Integrated Livelihood and Emergency Employment Program (DILEEP) program requires informal workers to be organized, a challenge for many unorganized vendors. BWSC's Glenda clarified their reason.

> Yes, that [having an organization] is our requirement. [Otherwise], we would have a hard time when it comes to monitoring if they are individually [accommodated]. Sometimes you can't locate them. For instance, the vendors, you cannot track them down unless they are organized [whereby] you can go to a leader to ask about them.

While it is crucial for informal workers like vendors to organize their ranks, the justification above reflects Chatterjee's (2004) point on how state agencies approach social problems from the standpoint of those who govern. Insisting on using unresponsive processes reveals how and why government institutions rarely comprehend the complex conditions and relations among informal workers. In Scott's (1998, p. 303) words, "[s]tate simplifications ... strip down reality to the bare bones so that the rules will in fact explain more of the situation". In relation to BWSC's condition, organizing, as will be discussed below, is particularly trickier when linked to local politics. One thing clear though is that the inadequate tools and rigid process never exist in a vacuum. They are linked to certain ways of approaching informality. The next section turns to this concern.

6.2.4. The Dualist and Developmentalist Approach to Informality

In revisiting the policy approaches to informality, the discussion in Chapter 3 emphasized how a dualist (formal-versus-informal) approach favours what is accepted as 'formal'. Yet, this bias occurs amid poverty and inequality where the formal employment is unable to absorb many poor workers. Inevitably, state decision-makers resort to developmentalism as a complementing approach. As noted in Section 6.2.2 above, developmentalism is seen here as a model that largely pays attention to economic and poverty-related dimensions of informality without considering the broader socio-spatial and political aspects (Robinson, 2006).

The combined dualist-developmentalist approach frames some of NGAs' informality interventions. First, placing WIS Council within NAPC - the state's leading anti-poverty agency - is proof of a developmentalist drive. Second, the BWSC's principal program for informal workers – DILEEP - primarily aims to generate jobs and reduce poverty. Its major component - the KABUHAYAN - is a grant-assistance for livelihood capacity-building. Third, as the previous section amplified, NEDA has been unable to account for informal workers'

contribution because it only focuses on the formal sector. Instead, the agency's intervention is linked to poverty-reduction. As Miguel further explained,

> The assistance for the informal economy is an objective pursued to address poverty since we have a 25-40 percent poverty incidence… Many of the informal settlers (sic) would not be able to access the employment opportunities in the formal job search. The next approach would be informal livelihood, microenterprise, microfinance.

In sum, the NGAs approach to informality emanates from economistic poverty-intervention perspective without necessarily understanding the socio-spatial and political relations that shape the appropriation of urban spaces. Planning academic, Fredo, believes this unresponsive approach comes from the state's hostile view of informality. "[T]he official attitude towards the informal sector is it is an outlaw. It has to be eliminated. That is the official attitude". The usual intervention thus pertains to formalization of the informal, which is partly hinged on the desire to control and incorporate populations into state regulated system (Watson, 2003). As a result, the unresponsive NGA interventions tend to see informal workers as mere instruments for implementing welfare programs for the impoverished groups (Chatterjee, 2004). Compounding these issues, the NGAs also complain about how the local political dynamics undermine their policies and programs. The next section analyses these dynamics.

6.2.5. Complex Local Political Dynamics

The BWSC and the MMDA constantly deal with local governments in implementing their mandates. Both view the complex local politics as a major concern. One issue pertains to patronage politics. "It's a big problem… The number one issue is if in one LGU the local officials do not belong to the same political party... What usually happens, to avoid trouble, we accommodate the constituents of the mayor and the constituents of another [official from the rival party]", BWSC's Cynthia revealed. This problem complicates the DILEEP implementation. Glenda gave an example.

> We have a lot of cases where the LGU is our accredited co-partner in implementing the livelihood program... [We only need] a Sanggunian (Local Council) Resolution. That Resolution does not get signed [by the local officials] because they [Mayor and Vice Mayor] do not get along. So, there were cases where the implementation got totally terminated…

This BWSC's account shows how the informal workers should hurdle local political dynamics to avail of government programs. The implications of local dynamics are also reflected in how the MMDA oversees urban spaces. As the agency tasked to supervise Metro Manila transport and traffic management, the MMDA has direct role in governing streets including

vending spaces in Baclaran. Peter, an MMDA official, described how local politics comes into the picture.

> If there is interface [between main thoroughfares and local streets], we closely coordinate [with local governments] because we are also mindful of their constituents. They [local governments] have special arrangements that we do not know about… In Baclaran, for instance, Wednesday is Baclaran day; perhaps there is day and time consideration. If there are special arrangements, we are allowing them… for political considerations.

Even if the MMDA recognizes local arrangements, the agency intervenes when it feels that the public interest is at stake. "They [vendors] are there, they were allowed [by local governments]. We will just evict them if they are on major thoroughfares or if the space they occupy is a critical area, a connecting thoroughfare," MMDA official, Gina, clarified. Here, the MMDA construes eviction[46] of vendors as a way to clear main roads of obstructions, a common state intervention even in other global South countries (Gibbings, 2013; Hanser, 2016).

In Baclaran, the MMDA and the local governments observe certain protocol on evictions. "They [local governments] police their own locality; they have their own task force. But in some cases, they ask for our help. That is part of our relationship with the LGUs", Gina shared. Jason, a local official, confirmed this arrangement: "We can request for MMDA's assistance but there has to be a letter signed by our Mayor. The policy now is that the MMDA cannot simply intervene in certain LGUs without the permit from the Mayor[47]".

This arrangement echoes what the literature has shown on local authorities' layered and calculated mechanisms to manage contested spaces. In Baclaran, it is apparent in the politics of buck-passing. As planning academic, Manuel, explained,

> There is always the factor of the local government when MMDA came in to do its sidewalk clearing operation… [T]he local government - either the city hall or the barangay - allowed the vendors to locate themselves there when they should have not been located there or failed to provide a space for them, an alternative space… [I]mplicitly, it was easy to let MMDA do that [eviction] because of course they would take the heat... They can always put the blame on another level of government...

[46] In Chapter 7, I deepen the discussion on MMDA's role in a series of evictions.
[47] I discuss the legal dimension of this issue in Chapter 7.

These insights reveal an issue that comes with decentralization policy[48]. They reflect the dynamics of local politics and the varying interests of social groups in the Philippines (Shatkin, 2007). In what follows, the roles of local governments are analysed.

6.3. Local Government Units (LGUs)

Pasay and Parañaque cities have different policy orientations on street use and informal vending in Baclaran. Yet, three patterns emerge from how the LGUs deal with vendors: 1) the discretionary power of the local executives; 2) the role of Barangays in spatial hierarchy in policy enforcement; and 3) the depoliticized planning approach to informality.

6.3.1. Discretionary Power of the Local Executives

In Pasay, the Ordinance No. 1890 (Series of 2000) prohibits street vending. Its Section 1 reads: "No person or entity shall sell, peddle, vend and obstruct, in any manner whatsoever, any street… in Pasay City". To enforce this policy, the Mayor has assigned an office, albeit without any legal document, to monitor vending activities. Dubbed as Mayor Total Clean Team or MTCT, this office ensures that vendors do not obstruct vehicular and foot traffic.

"Our focus is on illegal vending and the obstruction on city streets and sidewalks… We have monitoring [teams]. They monitor the daily activities [of vendors]. There are about 13-14 [monitoring] groups", local government staff, Jason, shared. To ensure that vendors do not block the traffic, the MTCT designates spaces or line beyond which the vendors are unauthorized to sell. The authority to identify spaces and draw a demarcation line has made the MTCT a powerful local player. While Jason claims that the authority to oversee city-streets is passed on to barangay officials, this hardly happens on the ground. As barangay leader, Danny, claimed, "… [W]e don't actually meddle in [issuing verbal] permit [to vendors] because it is a common practice that a president of the vendors directly coordinates with the MTCT…" Bernardo, another barangay leader, echoed this sentiment, "That [consultation] is a problem; they [MTCT] never consult [with us] … We don't interfere...If you'll think of it, that [vending space] entails taxes, which we should collect".

Bernardo's statement reflects how the regulatory power over space is linked to financial transaction, whether it is done legally or otherwise. Legally, Pasay's Treasury Office collects money from vendors daily – PhP 5.00 (US$ 0.11) for a 1-x-1-meter space and PhP 10.00

[48] In Chapter 7, I tackle decentralization in relation to broader issues.

(US$ 0.22) for 1-x-2-meter stall. The Treasury uses the City's Market Code (Ordinance No. 4090, Series of 2008) as basis for taxing vendors even if they are considered illegal. The Code's Section 20 states,

> "A cash receipt shall be issued to *talipapa*[49] vendor or space occupant which shall be torn in half, one half to be given to the vendor or space occupant and the other half to be retained by the City Treasurer's duly authorized representative who shall remit the same to the Office of the City Treasurer."

Besides the treasury collection, the MTCT remits the payments from vendors when the latter reclaim their products that were confiscated during evictions. As Jason recounted, "There is payment – PhP 1000 (US$ 22) per item… They [vendors] must get an order of payment, remit the fee to the City Treasury. Once they have a receipt, they go to our office for the release order".

Apart from the legal taxation, there are collectors who are accountable to some politicians. "There is one group here in Pasay, here in our area, [it is] the MTCT… Obviously, those assigned by the City [government] to supervise [the vendors] benefit from it," Bernardo shares. Lian, a staff of the city government, explained how this occurs.

> Redento: Do vendors have to pay to their leaders?
> Lian: Yes, they pay. [Then] they [leaders] bring it to the city hall… The collected money moves around. [It is remitted] to the leaders, police, [and] the city hall.

Lian's account shows how the MTCT's role goes beyond spatial regulation. The office is also involved in the illicit financial collection. In Parañaque, the Mayor's Office plays an equally critical role in regulating street use for vending and in illicit financial collection. In contrast to Pasay, several Parañaque Ordinances - No. 03-13, Series of 2003; No. 13-10, Series of 2013; No. 13-12, Series of 2013; No. 13-16, Series of 2013[50] - legally recognize street vending in certain roads near Baclaran Church.

These ordinances specify the streets covered, the amount charged per vending stall, and the period for the flea market (October 15 to January 6 annually). The ordinances also require the creation of Baclaran Flea Market Committee. Since the Mayor heads the Committee, his office plays a crucial role in managing Baclaran spaces and vendors. While the City Treasury collects a legal *arkabala*[51] from the vendors throughout the year, some of

[49] *Talipapa* is a Filipino term for small market that offers wet and dry goods.
[50] These City Ordinances empower the City government to allow the use of city streets in Baclaran as flea markets (*tiangge*) and/or vending areas for agro-industrial fair under certain conditions.
[51] *Arkabala* is a Spanish term for excise duty.

Mayor's personnel reportedly benefit from a separate collection scheme. As city government staff, Krisha, recalled, "Before, the Mayor's personnel earned from the vending spaces. One meter-size [space] has a corresponding amount… There was a portion that went into the city treasury and a portion that did not…"

The payment comes from the PhP 1000 (US$ 19.88) fee per stall, which the Ordinance requires without specific size. This has led to arbitrary fees. As formal stallholder, Nancy, recalled, "I was compelled to rent two vending spaces... Last year, I paid PhP 7,000 (US$ 139.17) [for the] two-meter-by-two-meter-space… The city hall has personnel who collect the payment... [W]e don't know where the PhP 7000 rent was remitted to [because] there was no receipt… Every year, there was no receipt…"

Church leader, Francis, expressed a similar sentiment, "As far as I know, there is no receipt. That's difficult [because] there is no official [receipt]. Where does it [collection] go? It does not go to the public coffer… There is big money [involved]; [that's] big corruption". Nancy and Francis' statements reveal the arbitrary system not just in the payment scheme but also in the selection of vendors. The fact that Nancy was allowed to rent a space even if she is already a formal stallholder indicates how the vague provisions in the ordinances have empowered the Mayor's personnel. Allen, a local official, confirmed this.

> … [T]here is another group that does not recognize the authority of anyone – the Mayor Action Team... [To put up a Flea] market, there should be organized vending tents [in 2013]. What they did was simply to allow vendors to occupy all vacant spaces. They never provided tents. [What they did] was illegal since they collected money without issuing receipts. Based on the Ordinance, there must be a receipt and everything should go to the public coffers…"

While the ordinances have provided the broad provisions for street use at certain time of the year, the narratives above demonstrate the power of the City Mayor and his personnel, something that also occurs in Pasay, to control the rules governing the use of contested Baclaran vending spaces. Yet, contrary to Pasay's MTCT, which uses an ordinance critical of vending to govern the city's public spaces, the Parañaque Mayor's personnel employs a legal instrument supportive of vending to control the access to spaces. The paradox lies in the ability of these players to deploy formal state apparatus to generate their own informal rules and relations.

This has three implications. First, the local executives' immense authority has contributed to the emergence of the illicit financial collection, as discussed above, and has entrenched

local officials' ties with hawker leaders, which will be examined in the latter part of this Chapter. Second, the reshaping of rules arguably contributes to a spatial hierarchy in policy enforcement, which also occurs in other global South cities as examined in Chapter 3. Third, the Mayors' discretionary power reveals the political dimension of informality, which has discouraged local planners from engaging the hawkers. The last two issues are tackled next.

6.3.2. Barangays and the Spatial Hierarchy in Policy Enforcement

Barangays in both cities primarily deal with conflicts involving vendors. As Barangay official, Brando, revealed: "Once they [vendor leaders] are unable to address the tensions among their members, they approach the barangay. They say, '[Barangay] Chair, I could not resolve this [conflict], I would refer this problem of vendors to you". If the problems pertain to criminal activities, the barangay officials refer them to the police.

In other cases, barangay officials go beyond their usual troubleshooting role. In one Pasay barangay, officials passed a resolution that allows vending on some parts of Taft Avenue and EDSA Rotunda as a livelihood project. As described in Chapter 5, this Taft Avenue-EDSA interchange is a crowded space where the MRT3 and LRT1 stations converge. The MMDA and the MTCT put this area under their supervisory jurisdiction. In this context, passing a local regulation is not merely about implementing a barangay livelihood initiative. It represents staking a claim to a highly-coveted streetscape. This is evident in how barangay official, Bernardo, justifies the resolution.

> "[In our area], there were more hawkers [from other places]. When we called their attention, they had already set up [their vending items]. So, what else could we do? We passed a resolution stating that if it [vending] is within the vicinity of our barangay, they [the vendors] should be our constituents. We do not say they need to register [as our residents]. But, of course, we need to prioritize our constituents".

This assertion of authority over a contested street also occurs in another barangay in Pasay, where there is an informal agreement between barangay officials and a big shopping mall. Moises, mall executive, shared: "They [barangay] have a monthly financial support… It's like they [barangay] have a salary [to police the mall vicinity] … [W]e allow some of them [vendors] in front [of the building]; but only a very few of them… We talk to the barangay. [Then] they go here to get their monthly financial support". Barangay official, Danny, confirmed their role in getting rid of vendors during mall hours: "We can only act [on vendors] if there are complaints. Look at the shopping mall [vicinity], there are no vendors. It's because that's their [mall] complaint; there should be zero-vendors".

Moreover, officials in one barangay in Parañaque collect local taxes from street vendors through their own *arkabala*. For official, Allen, their ascendant role in managing hawkers comes from the geographical reach of their barangay, which is bigger than the adjacent barangays, and from their daily interactions with vendors.

> From a peace and order [standpoint], it is difficult if many [barangays] are involved... In Pasay, it is the city government, not the barangays, which handles the vendors… Here in Baclaran [Parañaque], they [vendors] should first deal with the barangay. [It is] because here vendors recognize us as we deal with them every day; whereas, the city government [personnel] only visit occasionally.

There is more to the frequent barangay-vendor interactions. Their relationship entails contradictions and tensions. For one, the barangay passed Ordinance No 17 (Series of 2003) prohibiting "all kinds of obstruction on all Barangay roads/streets within [its] territorial jurisdiction…" Further, its Resolution No 19-0827-S-2011 supports a Church-led campaign to save Baclaran streets from "public nuisance and impairment of rights of individual to access an orderly and peaceful environment". While these statements never mention informal hawking, they allude to vendors as part of the road obstruction.

Despite issuing the policies above, the barangay still allows vendors to sell on the streets. Thus, church leader, Francis, asked, "If they [barangay] have ordinances, why are there many vendors?" Local official, Allen, offered an explanation.

> We have ordinances [on vending] but we do not implement them. [We say], it's up to you [vendors]; you may put up [stalls] because that's your livelihood. [We realized], if there is no livelihood, the crime rate goes up. There's a lot of hold-up and housebreak incidents…

The statement shows compassion. Yet, selective empathy steers this approach as the Barangay picks between the 'illegal ambulant' and the 'legitimate' vendors. As Andy, another official, clarified, "The illegal vendors, those we call ambulant are those who occupy any vacant space… [I]f there is clearing operation they just run…. The legitimate [vendors] are those who inherit [the vending spaces] from their parents, [who] were the old vendors before.". This implies that the Barangay protects the 'legitimate' vendors when there is eviction.

Nelson, a leader of one non-government organization in Baclaran, believes there is a bigger issue: "The problem here, it may be difficult to say but we know that the barangay earns from it [street vending]". Allen admitted being part of the issue.

> There is so much corruption... On my part… if I ask for something it's not for me. For example, we ask from the establishment owners; [we would say], can you sponsor our uniforms? Then, they would give us willingly. But if you [stallholders or vendors] are not my friend, why would I ask you [to give me something] ... Many [vendors] want to give me [money] but I refuse.

The foregoing discussion illustrates how the local regulation of street spaces and informal vending is contingent, layered, and relational. This is seen in how barangay officials have devised their formal and informal arrangements to lay a claim to contested public spaces within their jurisdiction. It shows how different schemes – formal or informal – to promote varying interests thrive in insecure political environment and unequal socio-spatial relations. This echoes Illy's (1986) observation in Manila about interest aggregation at policy enforcement stage, where the power constellations of the actors involved distorted street vending regulations. These complex power relations also affect the local planning approach.

6.3.3. Depoliticized Planning Approach to Informality

The complex relations discussed above have discouraged the City Planning and Development Offices (CPDOs) in both cities from engaging the vendors in formal planning processes. As planning official, Kaye, expressed, "There are different dynamics in the local government. You have ideal plans; yet, because of political dynamics, you cannot implement [the plans] … Right now, they [city officials] circumvent the laws just to accommodate them [vendors]. Therefore, they [vendors] become more confident to squat on the streets". So, what does the CPDO do? Kaye categorically answered, "I do not meddle".

The statements above raise two planning issues. First, it assumes that ideal plans are never compatible with local political dynamics. What then underlies this assumption of mismatch? The ideas guiding the Philippine planning practice and education have mainly originated from Western thoughts and trends (Endriga & Nierras, 1983; Viloria, 1990). The normative planning ideals are thus shaped by Western modernist rationality. Local planning academic Fredo's view of government approach to informality captures this dilemma: "[T]he official attitude towards the informal sector is it is an outlaw. It has to be eliminated. That is the official attitude… because in the first place they [government officials] are influenced by the foreign literature".

Local politics, on the other hand, have evolved from the complex blend of historical colonization, highly unequal political economy, and diverse socio-cultural practices. This has led to an ensemble of local political arrangements that is not totally receptive to the logic of

Western standards. These clashes between Western-inspired 'ideal plans' and local politics resonate with what Watson (2003, p. 395) calls conflicting rationalities, a situation where there is a great gap "between the notion of… 'proper living environments' espoused by the municipality, and the nature of the rationality guiding the actions… of the other parties involved". Failure to recognize the gaps between the conceptual origins of planning ideals and the contextual issues confounds planners when they deal with issues that fall outside the borders of conventional planning paradigms. Inevitably, this generates a detached attitude - apparent in Kaye's statement above - that refuses to engage with the complex processes and outcomes of political dynamics.

Second, the detached attitude partly emanates from how planning in the Philippines is viewed as a technical process where local planning offices have no decision-making powers (DILG, 2008) as they need to follow the decisions of the elected officials. Inevitably, planning staff shy away from processes they see as highly political. This results in a depoliticized and technical approach to informality issues. Thus, the Comprehensive Land Use Plans (CLUPs) in both cities never mention the vendors in Baclaran. In Pasay, the CLUP merely identifies Baclaran area as part of Pasay's original settlement that requires urban redevelopment. In Parañaque's CLUP, Baclaran is simply marked off as a commercial area with congestion and traffic issues.

Yet, local official, Melissa, sees Baclaran vendors as a planning concern: "Yes [it's a planning issue], because we don't want that kind of urban blight. How can you showcase your city if you have areas that are not supposed to be like that...?" What then is the perceived solution? "Urban renewal may be a broad concern; but perhaps it is what our city needs... We have seen the decaying spots in our city… especially now that our MOA[52] [Mall of Asia] is taking shape", Melissa concluded. The current Parañaque Mayor, meanwhile, considers placing the Baclaran vendors in a flea market as the answer to vending and traffic issues (Ramirez, 2017). This approach to informal vending follows the usual gentrification model, which sees informal practices as an 'urban blight' ought to be removed.

Gentrification lies at the core of neoliberal-oriented entrepreneurial urban governance, which consists of strategies pursued by local governments to entice private and/or foreign investments and attain economic growth from below (Harvey, 1989; Crossa, 2009; Shatkin,

[52] MOA is part of the Bay City mega-project, which was discussed in Chapter 5.

2011). This growth from below rhetoric is evident in Pasay's and Parañaque's vision-mission statements below, as featured on their official websites.

> A premier gateway city and world-class destination (Pasay vision)
>
> The City of Parañaque … will emerge as the primary investment and tourist destination in Metro Manila by creating a business and environment friendly atmosphere... (Parañaque mission)

Gentrification is then coupled with another common approach to informality – formalization. As city official, Kaye, shared, "The strategy is for the informal sector to eventually become part of the formal sector – how they can get a permit, how they can get an SSS [Social Security System identification card] … [T]he one that dealt with them before was the TESDC [Technical Education Skills Development Council], which [caters to] the small and micro businesses]". The vendors, however, were unaware of any TESDC program that has involved them.

In sum, while local planning offices are expected to play a role in addressing urban informal vending, the accounts above show the depoliticized and technical view of CPDOs on street hawking. This depoliticized approach impels planners and local officials to resort to gentrification and formalization strategies as the way forward. As discussed in Chapter 3, however, interventions inspired by these models often fail to consider the complex needs of vendors. They also emanate from the neoliberal rhetoric of 'word-class' and business-friendly city.

Outside the government, how do non-state actors influence street use and informal vending? The following section touches on this.

6.4. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and the Private Sector

NGOs that influence street use and informal vending include the Baclaran Vendors Development Cooperative (BVDC) and the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer (CMHR). For the private sector, the players are shopping malls, stallholders, and jeepney[53] drivers. Two lessons can be gleaned from examining the roles and relations of these players: 1) the value of economic and cultural capital; and 2) the presence of collaborative and conflictive arrangements among contending street users.

[53] Jeepney is a Philippine public utility vehicle that originated from surplus USA military jeeps after World War II.

6.4.1. Economic and Cultural Capital: Capacities and Constraints

The BVDC's role in Baclaran informal economy centres on providing economic resources to some vendors. Established in 1976 by 250 street vendors to address the usurious lending arrangements with loan sharks, the BVDC now requires a business permit if one wishes to apply. Thus, they have only accepted hawkers as associate members who can only avail of certain loan packages. As BVDC leader, Nelson, clarified,

> Since one purpose of the Cooperative is to uplift the well-being of the members, we now accept [some of] them [street vendors] as associate members… so we can provide [financial] capital because they do not simply disappear [from the streets] … But, when it comes to [access to] services such as loan, that's where we have a screening [process].

For old vendor, Julie, it is good to be a member: "Yes, it [Cooperative] is a big help. We have savings and shares in the cooperative". Hannah, another vendor, agreed but pointed out a concern: "I'm a member of the Baclaran Cooperative. I pay them daily [for my past loan]. [But], during lean season I could hardly pay". Besides payment issue, Myra, former street vendor and now a stallholder, raised another concern: "I used to be a Cooperative member; but I left because it is not really an association that protects [vendors' welfare]. It's more about loans, livelihood stuff. It is not focused on promoting the interests of vendors [beyond economic concerns]".

Mayeth, a social worker who tried organizing Baclaran vendors, explained the implications of Myra's concern.

> Before, we tried to organize [Baclaran vendors] but it was difficult because the cooperative is strong… They reacted adversely… because our approach [to street vendor organizing] is [it should be seen as] a mass struggle… [We believe], they [vendors] must assert their rights and exert pressure on the local government to address their problems… Their traditional approach is not like that. They are not after the security of tenure… Still, the members keep paying. Yes, they have big [financial] asset but it's purely economic. It is not concerned with governance; they don't think about how to be political [about other issues] … The [vendors] are fine with it as long as they receive annual dividends. Of course, the government likes it because they [vendors] do not resist".

Mayeth's explanation captures the constraint of BVDC's economic-oriented engagement with vendors. It reveals the Cooperative's limited role in the broader local political relations. As Nelson admitted, "We are an accredited NGO [by one barangay in Baclaran] so we attend their meetings... But we don't want to interfere when it comes to implementation [of policies on vendors] since we know how complex the situation is". The BVDC's detached attitude is

akin to how the Pasay CPDO refuses to engage with the messy political relations behind street use and informal vending. The Cooperative's apathy is in contrast with the CMHR's willingness to influence decision-making despite its limited access to formal governance structures.

The CMHR runs the Baclaran Church, a Catholic pilgrimage site with around 120,000 devotees every Wednesday. For Francis, a CMHR official, the Church has put Baclaran on the map: "It [Baclaran] was an obscure village until the devotion to the Mother of Perpetual Help became a phenomenon. All the businesses here owe their existence to the [people's devotion] to the Mother of Perpetual Help… That's why our position [on street vendors] is for them to free up the roads because they owe their existence [to the church]".

Despite the Church's socio-cultural value in Baclaran, the government rarely consults with the CMHR. "No, [we are not consulted]. Sometimes [we are], but it's not a [regular] practice... For them [government], that's their own jurisdiction, they are the authority," Francis shared. This limited CMHR-government interaction is reflected in a CMHR Rector's open letter[54] opposing Parañaque Mayor's plan to turn the Redemptorist Road into a mall for street vendors (Morelos, 2011). An extract from the letter reads,

> We support a permanent solution to the problem of the small vendors, but it should not be one that roofs and turns a national road, which is beyond the commerce of man, into a mall, which jeopardizes the security and access of the devotees to the shrine and in effect desecrates the spiritual heritage and dignity of Baclaran. We would like, therefore, to express our strong opposition to the continuous commercialization and desecration of Baclaran.

In August 2011, the CMHR protested the draft Parañaque City Ordinance No 25[55] which allows vending stalls on the streets around Baclaran Church. Its facebook and signature campaign slogans – End Abuses, Uphold Decent Services; Do not Vote for the Instrument of Abuses in Baclaran – aimed at the local officials. The online platform also shows images of street vendors surrounding the Church (see Figure 6-1 on page 124).

After 20 days, the campaign gathered over 100,000 signatures. Besides, as mentioned above in Section 6.3.2, Barangay Baclaran issued a formal council resolution supporting this campaign. This shows that the CMHR, although seldom consulted, could oppose and

[54] The open letter was published on 24 January 2007 in one major broadsheet in the Philippines.
[55] The City Council actually passed a resolution (No. 11-074, dated 25 August 2011) asking for the consent of three national government agencies to allow the city government to construct a multi-level, mixed-use parking and commercial building in Baclaran.

influence decision-makers by employing civic actions, mobilizing its clout, and invoking the Baclaran Church's cultural value.

Figure 6-1: CMHR Facebook Post - 'Clean up Baclaran, Keep it Sacred'[56]

When linked to the broader discourses in planning and urban studies, the CMHR actions follow an urban revanchist intervention. Urban revanchism (Smith, 1998) is a policy model that seeks to restore order on city streets by taking revenge against and getting rid of the supposed theft of the city (Mackie, Swanson, & Goode, 2017) and the undesirable elements of public spaces (Huang & Xue, 2017; Smith, 1998). The CMHR campaign against informal vendors shows how the drive for urban revanchism might come from religious civic groups who feel that their faith-based practices are threatened by the socio-spatial patterns produced by street vending.

6.4.2. Collaborative and Conflictive Arrangements in Contested Spaces

Baclaran is home to shopping malls and individual stallholders who are legally registered to own or rent business spaces. These merchants offer garment products, houseware, jewellery, and gadgets, among others. As discussed in Chapter 5, Baclaran is also a major transport node where jeepneys, Metro Manila's most popular small-scale public transport

[56] I downloaded these images from the Facebook page of CMHR's Save Baclaran online campaign: https://www.facebook.com/Save-Baclaran-199761476750506/

operate. These private sector stakeholders share a common concern in running their respective enterprises – dealing with street vendors.

The malls supply products to street vendors who in turn sell the goods to their customers. As Moises, mall executive, shared, “They [vendors] are a big help to the malls. It is like an ecosystem. It circulates as they buy on a wholesale [basis] then they sell it on a retail basis”. Old vendor, Esperanza, confirmed this arrangement: “All the supplies of these vendors are from them [malls]. [As an ordinary buyer], you cannot buy one item from them [malls] since they are wholesalers. If you’re just buying one piece, get it from the vendors outside [the mall] …” Apart from the supply chain circulation, malls play a critical role during evictions. “When there are [clearing] operations, we run to the basement floor of shopping [mall] because they [eviction teams] never go to that area”. Some stallholders also support vendors who occupy the sidewalks in front of their stores. As stallholder, Myra, shared, “When there are evictions we sympathize [with vendors] by giving them a space so they could still sell… we allow them to be inside our stall. There’s that relationship as we have been with them for a long time”.

However, alongside the symbiotic co-existence, conflicts occur in some areas. “They [mall operators] really complain and get pissed off because vendors do not follow the rules,” Esperanza recalled. These rules come from an agreement between vendors and malls.

> “Before, they [mall operators] were the ones requesting for clearing operation. Then, they realized that if they do that [clearing operation], they have fewer buyers because these [vendors] buy from them… Then, we requested if we could go back [to our vending spaces]. [We said], we would widen the footpaths; we would remove the things that block [the paths to the malls]. (Esperanza)

The mall operators’ past requests for eviction of vendors depicts their ability to use an accepted formal approach to address their problem. Yet, they also resort to backdoor negotiations with vendors, as seen in Esperanza’s account, when they feel these channels could benefit them. The monthly financial allowance that another mall provides to one barangay, as narrated in Section 6.3.2, also captures this tendency of mall operators to embrace and maintain illicit transactions. In other words, the malls, like LGUs, exemplify players who deploy both the formal and informal structures of power, or the public/visible and the hidden forms of power (Gaventa, 2011; Lukes, 2005). They just need to calculate when and how these spaces will work for them.

In addition, many stallholders also occupy the streets. Stallholder, Nancy, admitted doing this: “It is better that I occupy this space. This will be invaded by ambulant hawkers, anyway”. City government staff, Krisha, said she is aware of this: “They [stallholders] have business permit but they extend [beyond their stalls]”. Besides direct street encroachment, vendor organizer, Leo, disclosed another tactic.

> Some commercial stalls complain that the customers rarely go up to their stores [inside the building] since the products they sell can also be found on the streets… So, they see that as a problem... What we witnessed [was that] … they formed a network. [Their argument goes like this], ‘Ok, you [vendors] get your supplies from us and we will give you a share [from the sales]; we will give [the products] to you at cheaper prices. Sell it at your vending spaces’. So, there is that agreement. Then, when the vendors already trust them, they started hiring other vendors and occupied their spaces on the streets… [There are now] individual salaried [vendors].”

As stallholders and vendors try to outmanoeuvre each other, their street presence has taken toll on jeepneys, which used to pass through roads leading to the Baclaran LRT-station. Now, jeepney routes have changed due to the heavy presence of vendors. As driver, Alejo, lamented, “Before, jeepneys used to pass through that area. Now, it is difficult for jeepney [drivers to drive through that area] because of vendors. Once you hit their products, they would gang up on you”.

Mike, an auto-mechanic who grew up in Baclaran, could relate to Alejo’s concern: “Some people were actually killed [before]… How can one person fight back? Is it the fault of the drivers [to use the streets] considering that we’re talking about roads?” Ambulant vendor, Eugene, disclosed one way they get rid of jeepneys: “The jeepney [drivers] find it difficult to go here because of many vendors. When they [jeepneys] come near [vending stalls], the hawkers pierce their wheels using nails”.

Some drivers have also altered their routes after getting an order from the city government to cut short their endpoint. Boyeth, a driver for two decades, cited two reasons: “It’s [because of] the cars parked [near shopping malls] … and the many vendors”. This ability of hawkers to alter public transport channels echoes Oriard’s (2015) argument on how vendors are able to produce a space[57], where streets become attractive and vibrant marketplaces.

[57] In producing a space, Oriard (2015) contends that vendors’ entrepreneurial activities might increase streets’ land value and establish new spatial relations.

The jeepney re-routing has also affected the commuters. As Alejo shared, "… We had to let go of the [passengers] we can pick up until Tomas-Claudio [Avenue]… They [passengers] also complain… It [re-routing] costs them PhP5.00 (US$ 0.1) from that area [Tomas Claudio] and another PhP5.00 from this point". Despite these adverse effects, jeepney drivers have not collectively acted to question the local government order. As Alejo voiced out, "[e]ven if we go to the City Hall, nothing will change. It's like talking to the wind". In the end, they simply follow the government order.

The preceding narrative illustrates the collaborative and conflictive socio-spatial interactions involving malls, stallholders, and jeepney drivers as they grapple with street vendors. The mechanisms that malls and stallholders employ show their ability to utilise the formal and informal channels when these spaces benefit them. For their part, the drivers' sentiments indicate how they feel marginalized in the scramble for contested spaces. Seen from a structural standpoint, the various schemes reveal the unequal power relations in Baclaran. Leo's realization about the salaried vendors captures this reality: "When we knew about it [salaried vendors], we realized we're like getting tricked… It was difficult for us [as vendor organizers] … [Y]ou cannot organize vendors if they have different mindsets; if they take order from them [stallholders] to sell. For them [vendors], it becomes all about their share [from the sales]". If this is a concern for organizers, how then do vendors address it, along with other pressing issues, as they struggle for hawking spaces? The section that follows dwells on the street vendors and other grassroots stakeholders.

6.5. Grassroots Players

Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3 discussed the value of recognizing political society, which refers to the engagement spaces mostly created by those who are governed. Grassroots players often operate in political society. Some of them use the available spaces within formal governance structures. Others transcend the limits of legal norms to facilitate relations that enable them to earn a living. In Baclaran, these stakeholders comprise the street vendors and grassroots intermediaries. Each of them is presented in the succeeding sections.

6.5.1. Street Vendors: Their Precarious Conditions and Tenuous Ties

> If you don't allow street vendors to sell, it is tantamount to killing them. They sell to earn a living; their family members depend on vending. They get their food from vending. (Myra, a former street vendor)

The statement above captures the precarious claim of many urban poor on the right to livelihood (Evans, 2002a), a common sentiment among Baclaran vendors. Informal vendors began occupying Baclaran streets in the 1950s. Their number has started rising in the 1980s. “There were only few vendors before and there were no [semi-fixed] stalls”, vendor, Alexander, said. At that time, street hawkers were using carts, *bilao* (a native rounded container), and small pieces of cloth to display their wares. They were on the roads near the Baclaran Church. “As soon as the [Baclaran church] devotees came, vendors started occupying the surrounding areas”, church leader, Francis, recalled. Julie, an old vendor leader, shared how hawkers have multiplied over time, “It’s because before we were allowed by the city mayor, the Mayor of Pasay… It seemed related to politics. That’s how we have grown in number”.

Different estimates on the current number of Baclaran vendors abound. Local officials say there are 1000-3000. Vendor leaders peg it at 1500-2000. My own repeated calculations using a digital tally counter reveal over 1500 semi-fixed stalls and ambulant hawkers during ordinary days and almost 4000 on peak days (Wednesday, Saturday, Sunday) and during Bermonths[58] (September-December).

Figure 6-2: Vendors with semi-fixed stalls in front of shopping malls

Vendors put up semi-fixed kiosks (see Figure 6-2 above) or roam around four Baclaran road networks: Taft Avenue Extension, Harrison-Quirino Avenue, Redemptorist Road, and Roxas

[58] On ordinary days, vendors earn between PhP 100.00 (US $2.17) and PhP 500.00 (US $10.9). On peak days, their average income is over PhP 500.00 (US $10.9) a day; a while few of them earn around PhP 3,000.00 (US $65.22). The Bermonths season is examined in Chapter 7.

Boulevard Service Road. They sell clothes, shoes, housewares, toys, gadgets, street-food, fresh fruits and vegetables, among others (see Figure 6-3 below). As vendors occupy streets, they generate an urban environment that makes people think they are a homogenous group with common needs. Yet, as what has been observed in other contexts (Etemadi, 2004; Bhowmik, 2005; Yatmo, 2008; Crossa, 2009; Recio, 2010), Baclaran vendors are heterogeneous with diverse interests, issues, and relations. They have various ways of creating a sense of belonging.

Figure 6-3: Baclaran Street Products

Religious affiliation is a way by which vendors classify themselves: Christian and Muslim. Since Baclaran is a Christian-dominated urban district, Muslim hawkers'[59] growing presence leads to behavioural biases. As local official, Lian, expressed: "I don't want to generalize [about Muslims vendors], but some Muslims are messy. After they had eaten [something], they would simply litter anywhere". Barangay leader, Allen, echoed a similar view "… [T]he Muslim [vendors] have different beliefs and views... Some have gotten used to the city life but most find it hard to cope…" Sapitula (2013b) writes about the Christian-Muslim dynamics in Baclaran. He cites class and religious factors as vital elements in the 'hierarchized conviviality'[60] between Christians and Muslims in Baclaran. The quotes above from Christian local officials reflect this hierarchized conviviality. More importantly, the narratives, which

[59] Most Muslim traders in Baclaran are Maranaos, a Muslim ethnic group in Mindanao. They migrated to Metro Manila to seek better socio-economic prospects and escape violent *rido* encounters in their area. *Rido* is a family feud resulting in killings of relatives of involved parties. The influx of Muslim vendors appears to be a recent phenomenon since a mid-1990s study (Valladolid, 1996) indicated a small portion of hawkers who migrated from Muslim provinces. The Muslim traders have apparently increased across time.

[60] It refers to an urban social stratification which results from the processes of 'othering' identities and groups that do not conform to standards imposed by the dominant forces (Sapitula, 2013b).

associate disorder with rural migrants, frame structural inequalities as a question of culture (Hunt, 2009) and a spatial issue for everyday governance (Tucker, 2016).

In terms of mobility, two types of vendors occupy the Baclaran spaces. The first consists of ambulant vendors who use *bilao*, carts, steel panels, and plastic bags (see Figure 6-4 below), which they easily pack up when there is eviction. Dubbed as *'haging'* or *'sniper'*[61], these vendors have no organization. While some are constantly mobile, others occupy certain 'territories' they have marked using electric posts, building facades and street lines.

Figure 6-4: Ambulant hawkers in Baclaran



Figure 6-5: Vendors under the LRT1 Rail Track

[61] *Haging* or sniper is further examined in Chapter 7.

The second group comprises hawkers who have semi-fixed stalls[62]. They can be considered organized in that they have leaders who coordinate with local state officials. Equipped with informally-granted permit from the local government, many of their kiosks (see Figure 6-2 on page 128) are informally-built while some were installed as part of government livelihood programs. In some areas, the construction of semi-fixed stalls has left only about two-meter-wide space (see Figure 6-5 on page 130) for the pedestrians and slow-moving vehicles. The congested space is under the LRT Baclaran station.

Mobility is also linked to security of vending spaces[63]. The itinerant hawkers are less secure than those with temporary kiosks who have political ties. No less than the city mayor is their key ally. As Jason, a local government staff, narrated: "If there is a vendor who is a relative of a Barangay official; that official will go to the Mayor. Then, the Mayor will instruct us to allow [the vendor/s]. We cannot do anything. It's the instruction of the Mayor".

In some instances, local political leaders who helped the Mayor during elections play an important role[64]. "Political leaders at the barangay level gain confidence and political leverage because of their direct contact to the Mayor", Jason continued. But how do vendors capitalize on this leverage? Vendor leader, Julie, answered, "I list down all their [fellow vendors] names. Now, if the Mayor asks for it, [I could say] 'look, here it is; you can check if s/he is lives here based on their [voter] registration...' It is not really for the Mayor; but he has a coordinator".

For some vendors, this channel to the city mayor has become a 'protocol'. Catalina, a vendor leader, even said there is no need to coordinate with national government agencies: "No, because that means we will by-pass the local [officials]. They might get angry and stop us from occupying the streets. We need to go to them first. That's the protocol. The situation would be worse off for us if they get angry".

So, how exactly do vendor leaders get in touch with the city officials? Old vendor, Hannah, explained: "If the city hall needs to talk to us, then we [vendor leaders] get together. The

[62] A vendor typically owns one stall. The exceptions to this are the leaders and old vendors who have occupied the streets and sidewalks since the 1980s and acquired more than one stall over the years.
[63] In Section 7.3.1, Chapter 7, I discuss in detail how vendors occupy the streets.
[64] In Section 6.5.2.1 in this chapter, I present the role of local political leaders.

MTCT informs us about the meeting. Then the nine of us [leaders] will meet up and go there [to the city hall]". The meeting often takes place before an impending eviction.

> Before they [vendors] put up a stall [on the streets], they inform the barangay and our office. But the agreement is once there is a need to demolish [the stall]; they will have to remove it… even on a short notice. We inform the [vendor] leaders; then our staff will inform the stall [owners]… and their vendors. It is just a verbal [agreement]; we tell them 'yes, you may vend but you have to follow the rules'. (Jason)

As previously discussed, the MTCT authority to formulate verbal agreement on street use for vending and on what can be considered negotiated evictions[65] is not stipulated in the City Ordinance on hawking. The MTCT, therefore, shapes its own rules, and build relations with the vendors. For some stakeholders, this situation breeds more issues. Church leader, Francis, shared his concerns, "… we are not against vendors per se… We know that they need to earn a living. But, what about the [absence of] order? That's what we are against – the absence of order. Then, there is corruption. Who benefits from that? Who is able to maintain power?"

Hector, an academic who has worked with vendor organizations, offered an answer.

> "… those things happen because there are parties who want to maintain the situation… [T]he government is the main player who does that… Why? Isn't that a divide-and-rule [strategy]? They know that once the urban poor gets organized, they [erring state officials] will fall; so, their strategy is to disrupt the process. It's divide-and-rule [strategy]… [T]hey initiate and nurture it.

Belinda, a vendor organizer, recalled how a local government undermined Baclaran vendors' organizing efforts.

> "They [local government] did a divide-and-rule strategy. [In Baclaran], they appointed new leaders to be able to control the vending spaces. If you're an ordinary member, you would simply follow even if it's difficult. You must obey otherwise you would not have an income… One leader was asserting her leadership. She was still the president but they could not come up with decisions. The local government was disrupting the organizational process".

The foregoing account illustrates how vendors began occupying Baclaran streets, the fractional groupings among their ranks, and their insecure conditions[66]. Similar to how they have nurtured fragile alliances with malls and stallholders, the discussion depicts how some hawkers have built tenuous and unequal power relations with local officials. Two other

[65] Evictions are examined in Chapter 7.
[66] In the next chapter (Chapter 7), I examine the practices and strategies they have undertaken to cope with the precarious situation.

grassroots players help vendors grapple with Baclaran's precarious environment. They are examined in the following section.

6.5.2. Grassroots Intermediaries: Barriers to and Bridges of Change

In informality literature, Tucker (2016) has chronicled the role of political intermediaries known as *punteros* in Paraguayan border economy. In India, Routray (2014) has documented how the intermediaries, locally called *pradhans*, simultaneously embrace solidarity, patronage, and exploitation of the urban poor. In the Philippines, my previous studies (Recio, 2010; 2014; 2015) have shown how advocacy groups act as intermediaries in advancing the rights of street vendors.

Intermediaries serve as conduits between marginalized groups and the more powerful actors like state officials. They often link local struggles with the broader socio-political milieu (Kritsanaphan & Sajor, 2011) and enhance the urban poor's social capital (Routray, 2014). They can include academics, politicians, journalists, and NGOs (Evans, 2002b; Lee, 1998). In this thesis, intermediaries are confined to those who connect Baclaran vendors to power and governance structures. Dubbed as grassroots intermediaries, these agents, who are embedded in the larger socio-political structures, consist of local political leaders and vendor organizers. In the analysis below, I show how these intermediaries could undermine and/or introduce change in Baclaran's unequal socio-spatial relations.

6.5.2.1. *Local Political Leaders*

Local political leaders, also called political operators, are typically part of the electoral machinery of local government officials or politicians vying for state positions. They sometimes occupy appointive positions in city or barangay bureaucracy. Some act as volunteer Barangay Intelligence Officer and Barangay Intelligence Support who gather information on the electoral support of politicians in barangays. They help strengthen the latter's political base during election season. In exchange, some Barangay Intelligence Support ask their political patrons to allow some people they endorse to sell on the streets.

Jenny, a vendor and a Barangay Intelligence Support, admitted that she is able to identify individuals who can occupy sidewalks for vending. As Barangay Intelligence Support, she can facilitate the release of confiscated products after an eviction. "If someone's products got confiscated, we can get them back. They [vendors] just need to approach a Barangay Intelligence Officer who is part of our network".

Local official, Jason, acknowledged the presence of the channel created by local leaders and related it to the increasing number of Muslim vendors.

> Some of them got involved in politics. [They have become] barangay leaders, political leaders of the Mayor… So, that's the problem. It's because they use the political leverage. We are trying to be non-partisan in the [Ordinance] implementation. But because of some people within the city hall, we are less strict with the vendors because they are also our voters.

Jess, a political leader for local politicians, confirmed this arrangement.

> We got in touch with leaders of Muslim residents who got evicted from their settlements. We helped them register as barangay residents in Pasay. This assistance forged a relationship between political operators and Muslim leaders who have later on capitalized on their increasing population as an electoral leverage with politicians vying for government positions.

Armed with this political influence, the Muslim leaders have gained concessions from local officials such as an access to vending spaces for Muslim residents. The same strategy has occurred in Parañaque. As city official, Krisha, explained, "Since many vendors have been there for a long time, they got [their voter's] registration there. Their purpose is to have a link to the barangay, to the city [government].

Lastly, there have been instances when political leaders link up with vendors to undermine the latter's collective initiatives. As vendor organizer, Leo, shared,

> We were still coordinating with the [Parañaque] Mayor. But they were already doing something, [which was an] underground [move], involving other vendors. But their leaders were not vendors; they were political operators. They slowly disbanded [the vendors'] federation. They would say there will be clearing operation. During the clearing [operation], the political operator would intervene. [S/he would say], 'these [vendors] are [our] political allies. Do not disturb their area'. The vendors witnessed that and [they thought] these [political operators] have power. Some vendors began to cling [to the operators].

The insights above illustrate how local political leaders capitalize on their access to hierarchy of power by serving as intermediaries between the powerful and the marginalized. While they may have helped vendors gain access to streets, they also feed on the latter's insecure conditions. They operate in the 'realm of calculated self-interests' (Osella, 2014) by using the socio-political capital and benefits to satisfy certain wishes of their political bosses, respond to the urgent needs of the marginalized, and advance their own interests. This echoes Routray's (2014) observation on how some intermediaries employ skills and knowledge to gain power and respect in a neighbourhood. At other times, however, these

intermediaries, like Baclaran's local political operators, are denounced as money-makers and cunning manipulators.

6.5.2.2. *Vendor Organizers*

Besides local political leaders, the vendor organizers' role needs to be examined to understand the complexity of relationships among different groups and the nature of collective action in Baclaran. While political leaders are tied to state officials and politicians, vendor organizers are part of informal workers' groups and advocacy NGOs pushing for reform-oriented socio-economic agenda for hawkers.

Belinda, a vendor organizer and former head of NAPC-WISC, shared their approach.

> [Our approach] was issue-based organizing because we were focused on strengthening each sub-sector [within the informal economy]. We wanted them to articulate their own issues because they know better. We don't want to represent them. We would only facilitate their representation… We touched base with them… Then they [started] joining us [in WIS Council meetings] and even in rallies. [There were] 48 organizations, [which] we got registered at SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission] and DOLE so they could be [recognized] as workers' associations.

When series of evictions occurred, Belinda was at the forefront of mediating work. "They [Baclaran vendors] became more active [during the evictions]. We had media coverage… We were on the streets until 2:00 AM when there were demolitions… My approach then was to bring in the [national] agencies such as the DOLE, the PCUP, the DSWD [Department of Social Welfare and Development]". Besides linking up with NGAs, Belinda facilitated dialogues with city governments. Leo, another vendor organizer, backed Belinda's account.

> When we started, they [vendors] had different groups. They said they wanted to form a [vendors'] federation for the whole Baclaran area… We challenged them to continue forming the federation and we supported them in dealing with the barangay and city governments… [We focused] on what we call social dialogue, social insurance, social protection... security of workplace... There's nothing about politics.

Leo's point on politics refers to how they avoided confronting the political leaders in Baclaran. As he clarified, "What I did before, I told them 'whatever discussion you have with others, it's different [from our talks]. Let's concentrate on our agenda. I won't meddle in your negotiations with them". This avoidance stems from the entrenched patronage relations in the area. Maura, long-time vendor organizer, described how she experienced dealing with the political relations in Baclaran.

> It became a matter of life and death depending on the area. I remember, before in Pasay area, our group was being monitored… Some vendors even whispered to us, 'Maura, please take care, some eyes are watching you'. That's the situation".

Leo and Maura's concerns are linked to the divide-and-rule strategy of local political leaders and their bosses, as discussed in the sections above, which has led to the collapse of one vendors' federation. Still, as organizer, Leo, put it, "there is something to build on".

The internal dynamics in the vendor organizers' institutional affiliation contributed to the decline of reform-oriented collective action in Baclaran. As Belinda noted, "After our term [at NAPC-WIS Council], they [new leaders] had focused on other things they wanted to pursue". This change in priority reflects the wider sentiment within many Philippine labour unions, which focus on formal employees. Belinda and Mayeth, members of two of the country's largest trade union federations, have been struggling even within their own labour groups to justify their engagement with informal workers. In Belinda's words, "They [labour unions] support the informal sector but on a project-based arrangement".

The preceding discussion points out how vendor organizers serving as intermediaries engaged government units to push for vendors' welfare. They capitalized on existing formal spaces and create new paths for state engagement. Yet, the local power relations and the internal dynamics within their groups proved too much to sustain their efforts.

6.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have answered the thesis sub-question 1: who are the players that drive the formal systems and informal mechanisms, and their interface, in governing and appropriating vending spaces? In addressing the question, I have considered a key insight in Chapter 3 - the conversations on the players in governance should involve the standpoint of those who govern and those governed. I have thus examined four groups of actors involved in informality. The first two groups are government institutions clustered into national agencies and local units. The last two are non-state players at the local level - the NGOs and private sector actors and the grassroots players.

Five national agencies are involved in interventions concerning informal economy. They face several issues in performing their mandates: 1) the limited engagement with grassroots players; 2) institutional fragmentation; 3) the unresponsive tools and processes; 4) the dualist and developmentalist approach to informality; and 5) the complex local political dynamics. One thread that runs through these concerns is the importance of policy epistemology (Roy, 2005) and spatial positionality (Lemanski & Marx, 2015) of those

charged with addressing informality. As evident in the accounts above, national government officials have articulated broad interventions that not only perpetuate the formal-informal dichotomy as a solution to informality issues but are also inattentive to local contexts. As a result, the presence and power of NGAs, except for MMDA's past eviction operations, are hardly felt in Baclaran.

Meanwhile, the players at the local level are entangled in messy socio-spatial relations. The roles of city governments depict how the discretionary power of local executives has enabled the Mayors' personnel to dominate the appropriation of Baclaran streets. They employ legal instruments that are critical (Pasay) or supportive (Parañaque) of street vending. They define their own rules on street use and have taken advantage of vendors' vulnerable conditions. In addition, the analysis of local government players has unveiled a depoliticized planning approach to informal vending. Land use plans in both localities are notably inattentive to Baclaran vendors. This concern resonates with Webber's (1963, p. 54) point on the need for planners to avoid "some deep-seated doctrine that seeks order in simple mappable patterns, when it is really hiding in extremely complex social organization…" More importantly, such depoliticized approach puts premium on gentrification, a core dimension neoliberal agenda of attracting investments.

Beyond the government institutions, the accounts on NGOs and private sector players have shown their capacity to collaborate and contend with vendors. They can advance their sectoral interests at the expense of marginalized hawkers. Yet, the narratives of the less influential jeepney drivers show how they feel marginalized in the scramble for Baclaran spaces. These indicate that in Baclaran's hierarchical socio-spatial relations, those who have the economic and cultural capital still emerge as the more powerful actors.

The hierarchy is likewise seen in tenuous ties involving grassroots players. They build relations that generate engagement channels and/or employ the spaces afforded by state's formal rules. On the one hand, some organized vendors and local political leaders are entangled in fragile political ties with local officials. Their link to the Mayor's Office rests on one agenda: temporary access to streetscape. While this may appear particularistic for outsiders, it is the *raison d'être* for many vendors. On the other hand, the narratives by vendor organizers capture the potential of hawkers, when organizing assistance is sustained, to resist and break the cycle of uncertain relations. They formed a federation, joined rallies, and attended meetings with NGAs and LGUs. Alas, their collective action

encountered fierce resistance from political leaders and local officials. These powerful players undermined the vendors' attempt at formal governance engagement.

In sum, I have identified the actors involved in informality and analysed their roles and relations. I have also examined the different factors that have shaped and/or strained the interventions and relations, whether through institutional mandates or daily interactions, of those entangled in informality and street vending. In the subsequent chapter, I analyse how the state rules and everyday practices have influenced and/or evolved from the relationships of these players.

CHAPTER 7. APPROPRIATING CONTESTED VENDING SPACES: STATE RULES AND STREET NORMS

7.1. Introduction

The various players discussed in Chapter 6 have multiple and competing interests in Baclaran streetscapes. Two questions arise from the need to understand how these players get entangled in cooperation, co-optation, and contestation in defending their stakes on the streets. First, under what government rules do these players use streets and assert their claims? Second, what practices and norms do street vendors observe in relation to street use and informal vending? These queries represent the thesis sub-questions 2 and 3, respectively. In answering the questions, I argue in this chapter that the conflicting state rules and the varied socio-spatial practices represent how the formal-informal interface play out on the ground.

I arrange this chapter as follows. First, I analyse the conflicting state policies that govern street use and informal vending. The discussion of policies follows the thesis' framing of policy epistemologies, which was laid out in Chapter 2. These epistemologies comprise the hostile orientation, the tolerant atmosphere, and the accommodating environment. After this section, I explain the practices and norms that Baclaran hawkers have undertaken to appropriate streets for informal vending. These practices include the *haging* occupancy, the engagement with evictionist regulatory regime, the Bermonths routine, and the multiple finance-generating schemes. In the concluding section, I discuss how various state rules and street norms constitute a formal-informal interface.

7.2. State Rules Governing Street Use and Informal Vending

Using my notion of post-dualist lens, I analysed in Chapter 2 how state rules on informal vending in various global South cities constitute three policy epistemologies – the hostile orientation, the tolerant atmosphere, the accommodating environment. These epistemologies animate the Philippine legal instruments and political arrangements that govern street use and informal vending. As the succeeding sections will show, however, the nexus of structural dimensions and agency expressions shapes the development, content, and enforcement of state policies and political arrangements.

The Philippine legal system - a blend of Anglo-American common law, Spanish civil code,

and Malay customary laws[67] (Villanueva, 1990) - treats the country's 1987 Constitution as its fundamental law. International treaties[68] to which the state is a signatory and the legislative enactments are likewise regarded as legal instruments. Although Presidential Executive Orders and Proclamations, local ordinances, and decisions of government agencies are not strictly considered laws, they have the force and effect of the law (Santiago, 1983). In this chapter, therefore, aside from the Constitution and Republic Acts legislated by the Philippine Congress, executive orders, ordinances and other governmental resolutions are part of the policy discussion.

7.2.1. The Hostile Legal Orientation

As early as 1924, policy makers in Manila had already issued an ordinance prohibiting street vending (Illy, 1986). Current policies that are critical of informal vending underscore two salient arguments on street use. First, they treat streets as a public property where commercial activities are prohibited. Second, they consider streets as primarily a mobility channel for automobiles and pedestrians. These views are reflected in two Supreme Court (SC) decisions, one Republic Act, two agency resolutions, and two local ordinances.

In one SC ruling (General Register No. 93654, 6 May 1992), the court decided in favour of a resident-petitioner in Caloocan, a component city of Metro Manila, to have a *talipapa* (flea market) and the vendors removed from their vending space. The SC argues that the permit granted by the local chief executive is illegal since the street is a public property where commercial activities are prohibited. As a public property, streets should be used by all people. In another decision (General Register No. 97764, 10 August 1992), the SC sided with a police-general serving as Metropolitan Traffic Command Superintendent, who petitioned for the removal of street vendors in Baclaran, Parañaque City. Like its earlier decision, the SC claims that streets are not for commercial activities, an argument affirmed by the Philippine Civil Code, which regards streets as a public property that cannot be used by a few individuals or groups[69].

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[67] In the southern Philippines, there is a partial application of Islamic law to the Filipino Muslims (Villanueva, 1990).

[68] Although there may be provisions in some Philippine government-ratified international treaties that impact on informal workers (e.g. International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), some Philippine NGOs invoking these provisions have faced the enforceability issue. In the literature, Watts and Fitzpatrick (2017) point out the philosophical and practical limitations of rights-oriented international treaties. In the Philippines, Magallona (2010) discusses the legal issues surrounding the enforceability of similar international covenants. Given these discursive and practical issues, I deliberately did not include the international treaties in this chapter.

[69] Besides the Civil Code, the SC decisions looked at the old Local Government Code or LGC (Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 of 1983) and not into the 1991 LGC, which lays down important provisions on the use

The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), police, and local officials often cite the SC decisions in asserting that streets cannot be used for vending. Besides the SC ruling, Republic Act 7924 (known as the MMDA Charter), two MMDA resolutions (02-28 and 02-40) and two local ordinances in Metro Manila regard street vending as transport and traffic management concern. Section 3.b of the MMDA Charter, a provision on the agency's mandated duties, captures this logic.

> "[The scope of MMDA services shall involve] transport and traffic management which include the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods…" (Underscoring supplied)

The MMDA Legal Services Division has cited the underlined phrase as its basis for evicting street vendors (Recio, 2010). With this mandate, the MMDA issued in 2002 two resolutions pertaining to street use. Resolution No. 02-28 authorizes the MMDA and the local governments to clear the sidewalks, streets, and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions. The Resolution treats street vending as an obstruction. Meanwhile, MMDA Resolution No. 02-40 lays down the rules and procedures for disposing items confiscated during MMDA's clearing operations.

At the local level, the Pasay City local council enacted Ordinance No. 1890 (Series of 2000) that prohibits street hawking. It considers vending as an obstruction and provides measures on the confiscation of goods and penalty for those who will violate the Ordinance. In Caloocan, the City's New Traffic Management Code (Ordinance 0391, Series of 2005) endorses the preceding MMDA resolutions. Its Section 120 echoes the MMDA policy on street use.

> "The use of streets… and other public places in Caloocan City for commercial and personal purposes are hereby prohibited. Such prohibited acts include but not limited to the following: a. Vending or selling of foods, magazines… shoes and other footwear, and/or any other items…"

The foregoing legal provisions emphasize the importance of everyone's access to and unrestrained movement on streets as a mobility channel. The policies sound inspiring in their aim at promoting public order, efficient transport, and orderly physical space. From a

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of streets for vending and other socio-cultural activities. Section 7.1.3 in this chapter presents the 1991 LGC. By invoking the power of the Philippine Civil Code over the LGC, the two SC decisions emphasize the role of streets as a public property. The SC has thus framed the legal question as a property issue rather than an institutional jurisdiction question, which is relevant to decentralization as expounded on in Section 7.2.3.

structural standpoint, however, there is a class dimension to this bias for physical order. In the Philippine socio-political structure, the elite sees informal hawking as primarily having adverse effects on traffic and sanitation, and since the bureaucracy is part of the elite structure, this view is reinforced and transformed into public policy (Illy, 1986). Inevitably, the fixation with physical order reaffirms past Philippine laws, which narrowly equated planning with public works, infrastructure development (Santiago, 1983) and urban design (Endriga & Nierras, 1983).

Further, linking the provisions of the above-cited policies to the broader issues that afflict Philippine cities unmasks their dualist and decontextualized character. As poverty, unemployment, and intense urban migration issues continue to force poor people to embrace informality, violent encounters[70] between law-enforcing authorities and the struggling street vendors often define the policy implementation. The account below is a typical narrative.

> During the time of [former MMDA Chair] Bayani [Fernando], some people who probably had nothing to eat fought back [when there were evictions] … There was someone who died and some vendors got violently hit [by the authorities]. (Chris, street vendor since 1979)

Amid the violent encounters, interest aggregation (Illy, 1986) at the enforcement stage, as mentioned in Chapter 6, can distort policies depending on the power constellations of the actors involved. In MMDA case, it found itself confronting some powerful forces in Metro Manila who filed legal cases and successfully challenged the agency's authority over public spaces (Gomez, 2014)[71]. Paradoxically, it was the series of legal drawbacks at the hands of the wealthy private groups and individuals that prompted the MMDA to stop the violent evictions against vendors. This shows how the powerful players can influence both the content, as pointed above, and the enforcement of policies affecting informal vendors. In other instances, the policies get thwarted on the ground by a set of tolerant arrangements, which seek to accommodate vendors amid a hostile legal atmosphere.

[70] Violent encounters are further tackled in Section 7.3.2.

[71] Three separate legal cases involving a gated community's homeowner's association, a lawyer, and an advertising company obtained Supreme Court verdicts in 2000, 2005 and 2009, respectively. While the legal suits revolved around different issues - street closure, vehicular parking, and sidewalk clearing - the decisions emphasize the MMDA's lack of legislative and police power over Metro Manila's public spaces (Gomez, 2014).

7.2.2. The Tolerant Political Arrangements

In Chapter 3, I briefly mentioned how some local officials in the Philippines tolerate street hawking despite the presence of anti-vending policies. Previous studies have analysed the tolerant arrangements in various Philippine cities: Manila (Illy, 1986), Cebu (Etemadi, 2004), Baguio (Milgram, 2009), and Caloocan (Recio, 2010; Recio & Gomez, 2013). Although there is no written policy that the local governments in these cities have issued to tolerate vending, the attitude and the ensuing arrangements have effectively replaced the legal rules. In this section, I explain how three lessons emerging from these scholarly works resonate with the conditions in Baclaran.

One key message that past studies emphasize is the inherent link of informal vending to poverty and unemployment. Recognizing this link is perhaps the most critical factor that compels local officials to tolerate vending. As local official, Allen, reasoned out, "… some people say sidewalks are for people. Yes, that's right. But if you compare how sidewalks are used for walking with how [vendors] use them to feed their families, which one is more just? That's their livelihood. So, I indirectly tolerate vending on the sidewalks, not on the main streets". Andy, another local official, echoed this view: "We don't have any objection to [street] vendors because it [hawking] is their livelihood. They have families to support; they have financial loans. [We are okay with vending] as long as they maintain order and they don't obstruct [vehicular] traffic".

For Francis, a Church leader who criticizes the congestion generated by vending, poverty and unemployment serve as his rallying point to support informal hawkers: "There are really poor among vendors. It [vending] is their job. They send their kids to school by selling *sampaguita* flowers, foods, fruits, etc. Well, they can be allowed to vend on Wednesdays and Sundays".

Moving on to the second factor that generates a lenient approach, earlier findings have identified the power of building political leverage through organizing or networking initiatives. In Baclaran, political leverage is built through illicit financial transactions, electoral engagement, daily acts of 'goodwill' with barangay leaders, and fictive kinship ties with city-level politicians. In Chapter 6, I presented how illicit collection and electoral engagement occur in Baclaran. With respect to goodwill acts, vendor leader, Esperanza, explained how it works.

> If you want a trouble-free life [on the streets], you need to create a 'legal' conduit as a go-to channel. If you display arrogance to Barangay [officials], where would you go? [You need to] give them [officials] something [they can spend] on coffee even if they don't ask for it. That's how it is. Occasionally, [you should] visit them; give them something… You probably don't realize it but we kneel [before local officials] so we can sell.

Meanwhile, creating fictive kinship goes beyond doing occasional visits. The ties are considered deeper and are publicly recognized. This reflects in how old vendor, Catalina, views the reason for local officials' tolerant behaviour: "How can the officials reproach vendors when their leaders have contacts [within the city government]? In fact, veteran vendor leader, Julian, is a *kumpare*[72] of one official so it's impossible that they won't get the consent. Julian facilitates the process". Beyond individual brokering, community leader, Alexander, revealed how their networking is legitimized in public events: "When we celebrate special occasions, we invite government officials. For instance, when we install Sultans we invite governors, the President, the Vice President. When we proclaimed the Sultan of Pasay, senators, mayors and governors gathered together at Cuneta Astrodome to witness [the event]". A huge public gathering like this impresses upon politicians the power of Muslim votes. As political adviser, Billy, explained, "There are mediators from a big faction of Muslims who negotiate with the Mayor. Yes, they use [their number] as a voting bloc. [They would say], 'if you remove the vendors in Baclaran, the Mayor may lose [in the elections]'.

As a result, the tolerant atmosphere is seen in the creation of Pasay's Mayor Total Clean Team or MTCT, whose primary function as discussed in Chapter 6 is to police street vending. This MTCT role in regulating vending despite having a city ordinance prohibiting hawking illustrates how the political leverage has practically thwarted an official policy. In the neighbouring Paranaque, Barangay Baclaran's recognition of what local officials call 'legitimate' vendors, comprised of hawkers who have been occupying the streets for decades, represents a tolerant attitude.

If the first two lessons pertain to recognizing poverty and building political leverage, the last factor relates to what can be considered a socio-temporal dimension of a tolerant approach to informality – street vending during the Bermonths[73]. From a calculated consent, local

[72] *Kumpare* is a male sponsor or godparent in Filipino Catholic rituals like baptism, confirmation or marriage. It comes from the Spanish word *compadre*.

[73] Bermonths refers to the Christmas-New Year Season in the Philippines. It covers September to December, hence Bermonths, and the first half of January. In Section 7.2.3, I address this in more detail as part of key practices on the ground. The discussion here underscores its importance as an aspect of a tolerant atmosphere.

officials arguably exhibit total accommodation of vendors during Bermonths. Apart from the consumerist rush, the Bermonths period signifies a season of giving and compassion.

This rhetoric becomes a convenient excuse for local officials, especially when coupled with messages treating vendors as their less-fortunate fellows, to justify what they call as the 'open season for vendors'. As city planner, Kisha, recalled, "Before, the MMDA was really strict in policing vendors [in Baclaran]. But there came a point when vendors appealed to our Mayor during Christmas season. So, the Mayor talked to the MMDA. He said, 'let's allow them since it's Christmas time so our vendors can earn [some money]". This influence of socio-cultural values on policy-makers' behaviour echoes Illy's (1986, p. 75) observation that regulation enforcement in Manila's vending policies is shaped by "the extent to which social values permeate the implementation process and dilute the degree of compliance". As socio-cultural values blend with economic vulnerability, the hostile legal environment and the consumerist rush during Christmas season, the Bermonths season appears to represent a socio-spatial ordering that recognizes vending as a legitimate employment. In the next section, some local policies even legally acknowledge vending during Christmas season. Yet, as Section 7.2.3 will demonstrate, the vendors' access to streets is just one aspect of their routine during the Bermonths.

7.2.3. The Accommodating Policy Environment: Contexts and Constraints

Policies supportive of informal hawkers and their use of streets for vending promote three themes: a) the state responsibility to ensure full employment of its citizens, b) the right of grassroots organizations to participate in different aspects and levels of governance, and c) the authority of local governments to allow street use for vending and other socio-economic activities. With respect to employment agenda, the 1987 Philippine Constitution requires the government to address the condition of the Filipino poor, which arguably include informal economic workers. The Article XIII, Section 1 provides

> "The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect the right of all the people to human dignity, **reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good**. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments". (Emphasis supplied)

Section 9 in the same article orders the government to promote adequate employment opportunities, urban land reform, housing and basic services for under-privileged citizens in urban centres. Meanwhile, Section 16 stipulates the right of the people and their

organizations to participate in all levels of socio-political and economic decision-making. These Constitutional provisions are upheld in subsequent national laws. The country's 1991 Local Government Code or LGC (Section 16) mandates local governments to promote economic prosperity, social justice, and employment of all citizens. Sections 106 and 107 enable people's organizations and non-government organizations to get involved in local development councils through local special bodies.

In 1997, the enactment of Republic Act 8425, known as the Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Law, paved way for the legal definition of workers in the informal sector. The law defines workers in the informal sector as "poor individuals who operate businesses that are very small in scale and are not registered with any national government agency, and the workers in such enterprises who sell their services in exchange for subsistence level wages or other forms of compensation". The law demands the creation of workers in the informal sector council as one of the basic sectoral councils in the National Anti-Poverty Commission, the coordinating and advisory agency for the implementation of the country's social reform agenda. Street vendors are counted as a subsector within the workers in the informal sector council.

Aside from creating a council for informal workers within the National Anti-Poverty Commission, another state agency, the National Economic Development Authority, has officially recognized informal economic workers through its Social Development Committee Resolution No. 2, Series of 2003. This resolution approved the Philippine Program for the Informal Sector, which seeks to institutionalize programs and policies for informal economic workers by putting up Informal Sector Office in local governments. The program identifies street hawkers as a beneficiary. In its success indicators, the program demands a "marked improvement in the delivery of programs and services…such as those in licensing and application for business/**hawking permits**" (Emphasis added).

These national policies have gained some support at the local level. In Paraňaque City, the Mayor issued in 2002 Executive Order (EO) 02-04, which created a Task Force to protect the city's informal workers and to initiate programs that respond to their needs. The following year, the city's Legislative Council passed Ordinance No 826 (Series of 2003) as EO 02-04's legislative version. In Mandaluyong City, the Mayor issued EO 002 (Series of 2002), which formed the Local Informal Sector Office in the city. Like Paraňaque's Task Force, this

office is charged with implementing Local Action Plan to advance the welfare of Mandaluyong's informal economic workers.

Beyond legal provisions that seek to address employment and recognition of informal economic workers, several policies authorize street use for vending. For one, the Local Government Code's Section 21 (a) clarifies the powers of local governments on closure and opening of local roads within their jurisdictions.

> (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, that in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.

In paragraph (d) Section 21, the Local Government Code empowers local governments to temporarily close and regulate local roads for vending:

> (d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance, temporarily close and regulate the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place where shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or shopping areas may be established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public.

These provisions get expanded in EO 452, an order that former President Fidel Ramos issued in 1997. EO 452 outlines national guidelines to "ensure the security of registered vendors in the workplace". The EO demands the creation of an Inter-Agency Council on the Security of Registered Vendors, which is tasked to formulate and implement policies and programs to ensure vendors' security in the workplace. It requires each city and municipality nationwide to establish a registration and permit distribution system to protect vendors' rights and the consumers' welfare.

Moreover, EO 452 demands vendors' participation in identifying viable workplaces.

> "**The city or municipality, in consultation with vendors, the affected community and other sectors or groups, shall identify and designate viable workplaces, and design a system of assigning spaces to registered vendors**. Workplaces include markets, vacant areas within the vicinity of markets and other vacant public spaces which may be designated as allowable vending sites." (Section 4, Emphasis provided)

Besides creating an opportunity for vendors' participation in local planning, an agenda that other abovementioned policies also uphold, EO 452 can be an important tool to spatially integrate vending activities into local urban landscape. Alas, the provisions of EO 452 have not been realized up until now.

Despite the inability of the national government to enforce EO 452, some local governments have enacted local ordinances that support street use for vending. In Parañaque, street vending near Baclaran Church is legally recognized through a series of Ordinances - No. 03-13, Series of 2003; No. 13-10, Series of 2013; No. 13-12, Series of 2013; No. 13-16, Series of 2013. These ordinances empower the city government to allow the use of city streets in Baclaran as flea markets (*tiangge*) and/or vending areas under certain conditions. The Ordinance No. 13-10 creates the Baclaran Flea Market Committee, which is tasked to undertake the following: a) determine the qualified stallholders; b) determine the schedule for vending activities; c) determine the design of the vending stalls; d) adjudicate problems arising from the occupancy of vending stalls or *tiangge* spaces.

Outside Metro Manila, Naga City passed Ordinance No. 92-026, which specifies the city government's own definition of street vendors and requires the latter to register and acquire permit from the Mayor's office. Vendors are provided with identification card that contains full name and complete address, place where they may sell, classification of the products they sell and prescribed vending place and time.

The preceding discussion shows how national and local policies acknowledge informal economic workers as participants in governance and planning processes. For instance, RA 8425 is essential as it legally recognizes informal sector and street vendors. It identifies the agencies that should implement programs for the informal workers. However, based on the experiences of some leaders representing the informal economic workers, there are challenges in implementing these policies. In my earlier work (Recio, 2010), I identified four institutional issues afflicting the implementation of the policies discussed above. First, the assigned agencies do not fully understand what specific programs should be implemented and how they can be effectively carried out. Second, the competency of some local government officials and employees is deficient when it comes to fulfilling their institutional mandate. This echoes Shatkin's (2000) concern over how local governments struggle in a decentralized system due to resource constraints such as personnel and funding, problems that have historically beset Philippine local governments (Santiago & Magavern, 1971). Third, while some government officials are supportive of the SRA programs, there is a lack of sustained interventions especially when former champions of the programs have left the government sector. Fourth, the supportive policies coexist with laws that prohibit street use for informal vending. The conflicting policies have generated institutional ambivalence in

policy enforcement. For instance, one Metro Manila vendor leader narrated how some Barangays used to pass ordinances allowing the vendors to sell within their jurisdiction. But when the MMDA evicted the vendors invoking the Supreme Court decisions discussed in Section 7.1.1, most barangay officials got intimidated and stopped giving permit to street vendors. As a result, barangay policies on street vending have become arbitrary.

Beyond the institutional concerns, some broader contextual issues have undermined the enforcement of the well-meaning policies. In this regard, it helps to situate the enactment of the policies presented above in the wider political and historical contexts. All the aforementioned laws were legislated or issued during the heyday of what some Filipino political analysts call the EDSA Republic[74], which is characterized by elite-dominated political system, acute inequality, and neoliberal-oriented socio-economic policies coinciding with democratization and decentralization projects. The 1987 Constitution, a product of the EDSA uprising against the Marcos regime, enshrines the rhetoric of participatory democracy, decentralization, and popular empowerment. As the preceding discussion has shown, the subsequent national policies – the Local Government Code, RA 8425, EO 452 – and various local ordinances espouse these democratic principles.

When seen from a historical trajectory of Philippine economic policies, the efforts to advance these ideals coincided with the promotion of neoliberalism, which was a globally ascendant ideology when EDSA revolt occurred (Shatkin, 2000; Bello, 2017). As a result, while democratization and decentralization became vital aspirations in the aftermath of the struggle against the authoritarian and highly-centralized Marcos regime, these also played an important tool for the government to adopt an urban development framework that epitomizes the World Bank's new policy agenda. An important element of this new agenda pertains to decentralised urban poverty alleviation and localized provision of services amid the aggressive drive to attract private and foreign investments (Porio, 2016; Shatkin, 2004; Viloria, 1990). This move dovetailed with how the aestheticized and depoliticized reading of urban informality's self-help dimension became popular among international policy-makers and got incorporated into neoliberal doctrine of minimal state (van Ballegooijen & Rocco, 2013).

[74] Bello (2017), in particular, has called the post-Marcos Philippine democratic government as EDSA Republic, which is an offshoot of the series of peaceful protests that toppled in 1986 the dictator Ferdinand Marcos, Sr. The anti-Marcos protests took place on Metro Manila's main thoroughfare – the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue or EDSA.

It is no wonder then that while the policy narrative of the national government revolves around participatory democracy and decentralization, much of the responsibility is passed on to local governments. The provisions in the Local Government Code, EO 452, and the NEDA's informal sector program exemplify the transfer of burden to LGUs through decentralization policy. Decentralization, however, is filled with complex issues. As argued in Chapters 5 and 6, elite families have entrenched themselves in local governance processes utilizing the formal and informal structures of power. In Chapter 6, I analysed how local government units – barangay and city – have been able to play with state policies, enforce their own rules, and preserve unjust relations with street vendors. Thus, while the discussion above has captured how some LGUs have enacted ordinances to support informal economic workers, they represent the exception among many local governments in the country. Many LGUs also face the dilemma of addressing informal workers' needs amid the drive to attract investors by gentrifying contested urban spaces.

In sum, although it is crucial to recognize the accommodating atmosphere that some policies provide, the preceding discussion has presented the importance of linking these legal tools to the larger issues of neo-liberal policies, poverty alleviation, and decentralization. Understanding these broader connections, along with institutional issues, affords a nuanced discussion of the factors that undermine the purportedly supportive policy instruments. These participatory legal tools would have been a key channel to promote inclusive urban governance[75] as an aspect of decentralization. As it is, the well-intentioned laws enacted to support informal workers like vendors became a tool to enforce a neoliberal agenda of abandoning major state responsibilities using the rhetoric of democratization and decentralization.

Decentralization is particularly problematic in a context where local governments have proven co-opted by entrenched powerful families (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Porio, 2002; 2012) and mired in resource constraints. Enforcement of policies supportive of informal workers thus becomes discretionary for many local governments. These issues partly explain why national government agencies find it hard to deal with local politics as they confront institutional fragmentation and inadequate tools and processes, issues which were discussed in Chapter 6. So, how do these interlocking problems manifest on the ground? This is tackled next.

[75] In Section 8.3.4 of Chapter 8, I discuss the need for inclusive urban governance.

7.3. Street Norms in Appropriating Contested Vending Spaces

In this section, I focus on the socio-spatial practices and norms that vendors have undertaken and/or institutionalized to gain access to and control over the contested vending spaces in Baclaran. These include the *haging* occupancy, the engagement with evictionist regulatory regime, the Bermonths routine, and the multiple finance-generating schemes.

7.3.1. The *Haging* Occupancy

While doing an interview with organized vendor, Rowena, an ambulant hawker suddenly passed by in front of her stall, which prompted Rowena to say: 'Oh, he is one of the *haging*'. Intrigued by this vernacular label, I asked what she meant by *haging*.

> *Haging*, because they are on their own. They survive by getting along with us who are veteran [vendors] here. We just allow them if they don't block the path [to our space] … But they are stubborn. When there is an order from above to vacate the space, we leave. But the *haging* are persistent; they still sell". (Rowena)

A few meters away from Rowena's stall, in another part of the vending area, other hawkers call *haging* 'sniper'. "They are the sniper, those who occupy whatever vacant spaces are available. If there is eviction, they pack up their products and run", explained Barangay official, Andy. While *haging*[76] or sniper contextually represents the unorganized itinerant vendors in Baclaran, even the leaders of organized vendors started out as *haging*. As vendor leader, Chris, recalled, "… this was not my vending space before. I was near the [Baclaran] Church, on the left side. We were always on the run. There was constant risk of getting caught". In other words, *haging* exemplifies the way hawkers have occupied Baclaran spaces: calculating, dodging, negotiating, persisting, resisting, and segregating. The succeeding paragraphs examine this *haging* occupancy – a multifaceted access to and control over Baclaran's contested spaces.

Haging occupancy involves several mechanisms by which vendors have been able to appropriate the streets. First, family members participate in securing and managing vending spaces, a phenomenon similarly seen elsewhere in the global South (Swider, 2015; Batreau & Bonnet, 2016). Relatives serve as helpers and receive daily salary ranging from PhP 150 (US$ 3.26) to PhP 300 (US$ 46.52) with free food and lodging. Some vendors support schooling for their younger relatives who help them in the stall. Old vendor, Julie, is one of

[76] A local dictionary defines *haging* as words or things that are not clearly heard (Almario, 2010). Arguably, this definition resonates with the precarious condition of Baclaran vendors.

them: “I support my grandchildren and my nieces… She [niece] had no job. No one could send her to school. I told her ‘help me here; I’ll support your schooling’.

When opportunities change and their earnings increase, vendors ask their relatives to manage the original *pwesto*[77] while they establish command over new spaces. If they succeed in gaining new grounds, other family members will run the separate vending spaces using their own financial capital. Some old vendors have thus obtained more than one vending space. One of them has secured seven *pwesto*, six of which were acquired for her children.

Baclaran residents are familiar with this arrangement. As church leader, Francis, narrated, “… they control the spaces like their own territories. You cannot simply join their network. The old vendors are being replaced by their children. They do not give up their spaces”. This option to operate within and through thick personal networks is common in situations of poverty and marginalization (Watson, 2003). Old vendor, Esperanza, gave a poignant reason: “If you’re the first who occupied a space, you need to protect it. There have been arrests and evictions; but you’re still there. For me, nobody can own that space. But you cannot simply give it to others. You have endured a lot just to protect it. You would really fight to death for it.” This earned sense of entitlement relates to the second aspect of *haging* – tenure duration.

As vendors occupy the streets, their long presence, termed here as tenure duration, strengthens the claim to vending spaces. In their own work, Swider (2015) and Tucker (2016) call this earned sense of entitlement as *de facto* right and acquired rights, respectively. In Baclaran, tenure duration helps old vendors gain a degree of recognition. As narrated in Chapter 6, one barangay distinguishes between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegal’ vendors where the former refers to the old hawkers who started vending in Baclaran in the 1980s. Tenure duration also counts in asserting leadership role. Referring to how they chose their leaders, female vendor Sheila said: “Because they were the first to occupy the streets here; they have stayed the longest”. This respect matters in initiating collective action.

The third *haging* aspect pertains to vendors’ self-governance efforts. In one section of Baclaran, hawkers consider themselves as organized and recognize nine old vendors as

[77] *Pwesto* is a Filipino term for vending space, which may be in the form of a semi-fixed stall, a mobile wooden cart or any improvised container of goods.

their leaders. They observe certain responsibilities in managing their spaces. Table 7.1 below summarises the delineation of duties, which revolves around daily access to and management of vending spaces. There is no mechanism aimed at long-term plan or more secure occupancy. The readiness to follow 'self-demolition' order and to re-occupy spaces after evictions reveals the organized vendors' provisional access to streets. In this sense, they are no different from unorganized ambulant hawkers.

Table 7.1: Vendors' Responsibilities in Managing Spaces

Vendor Leaders' Responsibilities	*Individual Vendors' Responsibilities*
▪ Ensure that their member-vendors are within their assigned spaces; ▪ Ensure that areas occupied by their members are clean and orderly; ▪ Resolve conflicts among members; ▪ When conflicts remain unaddressed after their intervention, refer the concerned parties to barangay officials; ▪ Enforce the City Hall order to voluntarily demolish ('self-demolition') vending stalls; ▪ Participate in vendor-related meetings convened by the City Hall or other offices; ▪ Ensure that the money needed for *'pakikisama'* is regularly collected.	▪ Maintain cleanliness in their vending spaces; ▪ Sell or rent out their pwesto or stalls; ▪ Identify and procure the products from chosen supplier/s; ▪ Enter contracts with individual lenders; ▪ (If eligible) Join the development cooperative in the area; ▪ Participate or develop a self-help financial scheme (locally called *paluwagan*); ▪ Manage their hired vendors; ▪ Protect their stalls from any incursions ▪ Re-occupy their spaces after evictions; ▪ Contribute to regular financial collection.

Source: Based on interviews with vendors and their leaders

Despite vendors' efforts to self-govern, the previous paragraph depicts the shaky foundation of vendors' collective action, which hinges on access to vending spaces. This raises *haging* occupancy's fourth dimension – tenuous political ties. Section 6.2 (Chapter 6) and Section 7.1.2 in this Chapter have illustrated how vendors are entangled in different layers and forms of political ties - illicit financial collection as part of *pakikisama* (getting along or being congenial), occasional visits to barangay officials, and fictive kinship. These have enabled them to gain access to streets and allow relatives and new entrants to occupy vacant spaces. One critical point that requires emphasis in relation to *haging* occupancy is how building political ties has normalized illicit fees, locally dubbed as *lagay*.

> Our leaders take care of the [illicit] collection. That's how it is here on the streets. Collection is part of their responsibility. (Nelly)

> [Illicit] collection has been there since the time when my parents-in-law [were still on the streets]. We are aware of it. We just get along since we are able to earn a living. It is not a problem. (Oliver)

From the statements above, it appears that vendors have taken illicit fees, which are by no means legally sanctioned, as part of their normal transaction costs. But how do vendors ensure that the collection reaches the corresponding parties? Old vendor leader, Hannah, has a direct answer: “Our continued presence in Baclaran is proof that the money goes to the respective people”. This mutual understanding is not unique to Baclaran. In Kolkata, India, vendors have the same illicit arrangement with state officials (Bose & Mishra, 2013).

Apart from tenuous ties to local officials, vendors - especially the unorganized ambulant ones - nurture a good relationship with formal stallholders. When hawkers have already established their presence on the streets, stallholders negotiate with them to maximize the use of *pwesto* and avoid misunderstanding. As presented in Chapter 6, despite these collaborative arrangements, conflicts still occur. The tensions stem from the stallholders’ sense of entitlement as they pay formal fees; they feel aggrieved when vendors block off the entrance of their stalls.

Tensions intensify when new players arrive in Baclaran. As Hannah shared, “We have become too crowded here. When [local governments] in Divisoria and Quiapo [in Manila] had a crackdown on street vendors, they [evicted hawkers] moved here”. Besides hawkers from other informal vending districts in Metro Manila, migrants from Mindanao provinces go to Baclaran. “Every December, many Muslim migrants are here… They are just here for the entire December. By January, they go back to their provinces [in Mindanao]”, Maricel, a Muslim vendor, said. These new occupants can be considered as transient migrants since they go back to their provinces after the peak season. Such provisional and transience occupation of porous spaces in Baclaran represent *haging* occupancy’s fifth dimension.

While transience characterizes many migrants, not everyone returns to their places. A lot of them stay in Baclaran as stall-helpers. Others stake their own claim to streets as ambulant hawkers. They roam around the streets and display their goods using improvised containers. The strategy of these itinerant vendors epitomizes *haging* occupancy’s last attribute – mobility. Vendor Eugene shared how mobility has worked for him: “I don’t have any association. Here, what matters is how you endure the problems [on the streets] … They [local officials] are unable to collect fees from us [since] we come and go”. Because they are constantly on the move, they draw little attention from authorities and can use the streets without coordinating with any stakeholders. Mobility allows Baclaran hawkers to avoid fines,

something similarly observed in Bangkok (Batreau & Bonnet, 2016), and/or elude police confrontation, as in the case of Mexico City's nomadic vendors dubbed as *toreros* (Crossa, 2009). More importantly, mobility enables them to thrive on the streets by evading the state's watchful gaze. Thus, as Crossa (2009) puts it, mobility becomes a practice of power. In Baclaran, this is seen in how ambulant hawkers who have no organization or political affiliation are able to persistently occupy the streets amid the exclusionary socio-spatial relations.

To sum up, *haging* occupancy captures the tenacious and resilient presence of vendors. They rely on family members, tenure duration, self-governance schemes, and tenuous ties to consistently appropriate the streets. Those unable to secure a strong grip on Baclaran spaces resort to transient and mobile strategies. Indeed, these mechanisms hardly suit a neat description of socio-spatial control. This is inevitable in a contested environment where players simultaneously collaborate and compete to maintain their access to coveted spaces. *Haging* occupancy thus demonstrates the uneven distribution of economic precarity (Tucker, 2016) and spatio-political uncertainty where hierarchy and marginalization persist even among those already on the fringes of society. In this unequal and uncertain setting, how do vendors cope with the ever-present threat of eviction?

7.3.2. Engagement with Evictionist Regulatory Regime

In characterizing urban poverty, Wratten (1995) sees state intervention as a source of urban poor's vulnerability. They "experience the state in negative ways – as an oppressive bureaucracy which attempts to regulate their activities without understanding their needs" (Wratten, 1995, p. 4). In street vending, this adverse state engagement manifests in the constant threat and experience of eviction (Brown & Rakodi, 2006; Lata & Walters, 2016; UN Habitat, 2009), which deprives hawkers of access to economic spaces.

In this section, I argue that the interplay of broader socio-economic problems, local political dynamics, contending state policies, and continuing grassroots agency has produced a regulatory environment where eviction plays a central role. Dubbed as evictionist regulatory regime (ERR), ERR deploys eviction as a legitimate state apparatus to impose order. As ERR's primary target, vendors typically resist eviction. Over time, however, they have learned to deal with it. The subsequent paragraphs problematize how vendors have faced three eviction episodes and reveal how eviction goes beyond promoting physical order.

In the early 1980s, old Baclaran vendors recall how they used to play a cat-and-mouse game with the police who would drive them away. Since there were fewer vendors and the sidewalks were still spacious they could easily walk to a safe place. Besides the 1980s' experience, vendors remember three other eviction episodes that have affected their activities. Table 7.2 below reflects these episodes and the key attributes that the vendors associate with them.

Table 7.2: Eviction Episodes in Baclaran

Eviction Episodes	Lead Agency	Period	Characteristics	Vendors' Responses
DOTC-led operations under Secretary Oscar Orbos	DOTC and Police Department	January-December 1990	• Random clearing operations; • Unselective.	▪ Run from the police
MMDA-led operations under Chair Bayani Fernando (BF)	MMDA	2005-2009	• Random clearing operations; • Unselective • Sometimes covered by the media; • Violent	▪ Run from the police; ▪ Resist eviction; ▪ Organize vendors; ▪ Negotiate with the MMDA; ▪ Negotiate with national and local governments.
Post-BF operations	MMDA; Police; Local governments	2010-present	• Negotiated; • Sometimes random; often announced prior to clearing operations; • Selective.	▪ Run from the police; ▪ Organize vendors; ▪ Negotiate with local governments; ▪ Voluntarily demolish the semi-fixed stalls.

Source: Based on interviews with vendors and government officials

The table above shows how the characteristics of evictions and the hawkers' responses have evolved across the three episodes. Vendors refer to two periods when they talk about forced evictions that the government initiated to remove all street obstructions. The first one occurred in 1990 when Oscar Orbos was the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communication or DOTC (now called Department of Transport or DOTr). At that time vendors had to play hide-and-seek with the police and DOTC personnel, who pursued random evictions.

After that period, the vendors encountered another series of forced evictions when Bayani Fernando[78] headed the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) from 2002 to 2009. The MMDA's street clean-up aimed at managing the traffic and promoting public

[78] Fernando was a Mayor of Marikina, Metro Manila's component city, where he enforced strict polices to promote clean and orderly streets.

safety. As MMDA official, Peter, explained, “Vendors are unruly. Let’s admit it… How many people have [their valuable possessions] snatched [out of their hands]? How many have been molested on foot bridges because of the presence of vendors?” Peter’s argument follows Kelling and Coles' (1996) “fixing broken windows” theory of law and order which, as discussed in Chapter 3, claims that “small, highly-visible forms of urban disorder” (Bromley, 2000, p. 12) result in proliferation of blight spots and crime activities. Thus, the MMDA-led eviction also sought to solve criminal activities associated with the presence of hawkers. Yet, “…during that period [MMDA clearing operations], criminal incidents like pickpocketing and burglary escalated as more people were unable to earn a living”, shared Barangay official, Allen. Ironically, the intent to stop crime in one area led to offenses elsewhere.

During Fernando’s reign, evictions became violent. One hawker leader depicted how the situation looked like.

> It was totally free of vendors [during Bayani’s time]. We were always on the run as the MMDA truck was on standby looking for people to arrest. My fellow vendor leader, Chris, got arrested. He didn’t get back his cart full of school supplies worth PhP 50, 0000 (US $ 1000). It was terrible. If you would attempt to get hold of just a piece of notebook, they would take it from you. It was like a war zone. We were like engaged in a war.
>
> Some Muslim [vendors] fought against the MMDA [personnel]. Even Muslim women got involved in the confrontations… Then the Mayor thought they had to coordinate with the MMDA to address the conflict because some people already got killed. (Hannah)

The preceding account shows the conflictive nature of eviction. Another character of conflict blends well with the ERR - its ability to generate new conditions and arrangements. As Nicholls and Uitermark (2016, p. 6) contend, "a conflict is more than a collision of pre-given actors, views, and interests. Conflicts constitute actors and create new conditions of possibility, driving forward changes in the physicality of cities, how they are perceived, and how they are governed”. When linked to informality, Crossa (2009) narrates how exclusionary policies against Mexican street vendors do not necessarily lead to fragmentation of social networks. Instead, the networks transform over time as excluded groups recast and reclaim their right to the city and create representational spaces of resistance (Crossa, 2009).

In a similar vein, while evictions demonstrate the clash of interests and exercise of authority, they also generate new forms of socio-spatial relations. As hawkers got more indebted to money-lenders for failing to sell, they began talking to each other about their conditions.

They negotiated with the MMDA and other national government agencies. Some leaders engaged in political organizing to promote social protection. Others joined political rallies of organizations that promised to help them deal with the MMDA clearing operations. Most of them, however, established ties with local political leaders and city officials. Two accounts from vendor leaders illustrate the changing arrangements.

> Many things happened [after the violent evictions]. Before, when you were caught bribing state officials, you would be arrested. So, we did not do it as we were afraid. Now, we have learned how to act, how we can show our appreciation to state officials [who allow us to vend]. We have realized that this is how we can survive… You need to follow to avoid troubles. Otherwise, it is very difficult. (Esperanza)

> We return to our respective spaces [after evictions] … They [MTCT operators] are here every day; they monitor us… I tell my members, 'why do you get angry when you are scolded? Isn't it better that the Mayor allows us to vend? Before, it was very hard for us. We often got arrested; no one could sell here… It's better now that the Mayor is nice to us'. (Julie)

The descriptions above show how MMDA's violent evictions have altered vendors' coping mechanisms. This has become apparent in the subsequent series of evictions.

The third eviction episode represents the current situation. While the MMDA still monitors the streets, local governments enforce evictions. In Pasay, the Mayor's Total Clean Team (MTCT) regulates the vendors. When there are big national and international events (e.g. the Philippines' hosting of the 2015 APEC Leaders' Meeting), the MTCT convenes the vendor leaders and instructs them to vacate the streets. The leaders then ask their members to voluntarily demolish their stalls and put them back up once there is a resumption order from the city hall.

Despite the agreement between some vendor leaders and the city government, as discussed in Section 7.2.1, ambulant peddlers, who are not part of the discussions, still roam around the area to earn a living. This tenacious presence of ambulant vendors explains why a persistent coping mechanism is to run from the police. As Table 7.2 on page 156 shows, this has consistently figured in the three episodes. To date, the unorganized ambulant vendors who feel incapable of building political ties resort to hide-and-seek strategy to deal with evictions. Indeed, vendors' responses depend on their capacity to organize and engage in negotiations with government officials.

Figure 7-1: Vendors fix up their wares to ensure they are within the designated line

Moreover, there are instances when negotiation is not an option. In both cities, eviction is a norm right after elections, especially when a new set of officials takes control of the local government. “During the turnover of power, eviction is a normal event to show that new people are now in power… It is for the vendors to acknowledge the new regime”, local official, Allen, said. But why the need to resort to eviction? Allen was quick: “It’s for corruption… for collection”. As local officials employ eviction to introduce regime change, ERR acts as a political tool to extract illicit fees from hawkers.

Lastly, government authorities conduct clearing operations upon the request of irritated stallholders. “They usually call up and send us a formal letter requesting for clearing [operations] against vendors”, shared Barangay official, Andy. These operations usually target the unorganized ambulant vendors who have no political connection to local officials. This unveils how eviction is tied to property ownership and relations, as discussed in Section 7.1.1. This concerns the character of streets as public property and their proximity to privately-owned spaces.

When tackling property issues, Krueckeberg (1995, p. 307) stresses that properties are more than objects or possessions but “a set of relationships between the owner of something and everyone else’s claim to that same thing”. That is, one person’s right to use or profit from a property maybe at the expense of someone’s or everyone else’s claim about the

same thing (Krueckeberg, 1995). Thus, eviction needs to be examined within the framework of property hierarchy and political relations (van der Walt, 2009). This framing is critical to understanding the vendors' struggle in contested streetscapes. Since the access to vending spaces entails relational rights (Porter, 2011), deprivation of such equally indicates relational issues, particularly property relations in the age of neoliberal globalization. In the scramble for urban space, Harvey (2008) has emphasized how global capitalism tends to elevate property rights as a central concern and relegate other rights to a secondary status. These secondary rights might involve urban poor's right to work (Tucker, 2016).

Viewed in this light, the ERR becomes an expression of property relations – an assertion of private property owners' control and state authority over streets versus informal vendors' access to economic spaces. Alas, in a political environment where state officials are entangled in multiple relations – from legal contracts to patronage ties - this property relation turns into a question of the structures of power. Those who are more powerful get to determine when eviction is needed, how it will be carried out, and who will be affected. Eviction, therefore, is never a neutral legal enforcement process flowing from abstract principles (Brown, 2017b; van der Walt, 2009). It goes beyond promoting order and becomes an expression of property relations, power structures, and hierarchy of rights.

Thus far, it is clear how the ERR involves key aspects, which have shaped the conduct and consequences of evictions. First, the ERR emerges from the state's desire to enforce order and promote public safety. It was seen in how the DOTC and the MMDA, agencies charged with transport and public order, had initially led the eviction drives. Second, its conflictive dimension has generated new relations and arrangements. Vendors' varied responses and ensuing relations with local officials have resulted from this ERR dimension. Third, the ERR has become a political tool for locally ascendant players to assert authority over contested spaces. Fourth, the ERR is an expression of property and power relations where private stallholders' right to commercial shops and the state's authority over public property trump the hawkers' access to their livelihood spaces.

As the conduct and consequences of evictions evolve, the vendors' responses have equally changed. They have learned how to engage with the ERR. These are reflected in three eviction episodes. As vulnerable actors facing constant eviction threats, their engagement with the ERR is embedded in the larger struggle for access to contested spaces. This

engagement contributes to the overlapping and fluid governing relations, which are discussed in Chapter 8.

7.3.3. The Bermonths Routine: A Socio-Spatio-Temporal Nexus of Informality

Street vending literature yields mixed empirical insights on how temporal factors impact on hawking practices. In China, tighter regulation occurs on national events like the Spring Festival (Flock & Breitung, 2016). In Mexico, the authority grants temporary permits during *romerías* (peregrinations) or special occasions like Christmas, Easter, and Mexican Independence (Crossa, 2009). While these are crucial accounts, they mainly focus on how seasonal events affect the state-vendor regulatory arrangement. In what follows, I problematize how a period known locally as Bermonths, which spans from September to December (often until the first half of January), entails denser interactions and complex financial transactions (both licit and illicit). The Bermonths routine, I argue, constitutes an interplay of socio-spatio-temporal factors, which generate three concerns: congestion, consent, and conflict. Each of them is explained below.

Every year, Baclaran vendors look forward to Bermonths, their peak earning season. “Every December we expect to earn over half of our financial capital”, vendor Nora told, adding that, “…we can invite our relatives to put up a stall beside our vending space and tell them to remit us a certain amount”. Thus, Baclaran becomes very congested as hawkers multiply to serve up buyers they expect to shop for Christmas and New Year celebrations.

My repeated site visits (February 2015 to February 2016) produced a snapshot dataset on the volumes of vendors at various time periods. While the peak and lean seasons differed depending on the goods being sold, the generated dataset sustains the interview results on the importance of Bermonths. The graph (see Table 7.3 on page 162) illustrates the number of hawkers in four periods in 2015. It shows that the Bermonths quarter (4^{th} quarter) has the highest volume of vendors. Ambulant hawkers’ number reached almost four times of the average volume in the first three quarters. As mentioned in Section 7.2.1 above, many of these itinerant vendors come from other informal hawking districts in Metro Manila and some provinces in Mindanao. They coordinate with vendor leaders and occupy the areas with relatively wider streets. After the Bermonths, most of these transient migrant vendors return to their respective provinces.

Table 7.3: Volumes of Vendors across Different Periods[79]



	1st Quarter	2nd Quarter	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter
Semi-fixed	997	892	1360	1500
Ambulant	698	614	465	2321
Total	1695	1506	1825	3821

Source: Author's data collected during fieldwork

Meanwhile,

Figure 7-2, on page 163, depicts the typical spatial scenarios on Baclaran streets during December. The pictures were taken at Redemptorist Road (left) and beneath the LRT-Baclaran Station on Taft Avenue Extension (right). In some areas, vendors occupy the entire stretch of the roads which are closed off to vehicular traffic.

[79] The figures were generated using a digital tally counter. The number of vendors varied throughout the year. The day and time also affected the volume of vendors. Wednesdays, Saturdays and Sundays are peak days for vending. Vendors with semi-fixed stalls stay at their occupied areas throughout the day when there is no eviction; while ambulant vendors troop to the streets from late afternoon until mid-evening. Thus, while the days for counting varied (Feb 19 – Thursday; May 20 – Wednesday; Sept 15 – Tuesday; Dec 24 – Thursday; Jan 17 – Sunday), the timing of counting for all the dates was done from late afternoon (4:30pm) until mid-evening (8:45pm). The graph's data on the lowest number of vendors, which was in May 2015, validates the interview data. Both vendors and barangay officials attributed this to the minimal sales during April, May, and June. Although some vendors enjoy higher profit by selling school supplies in time for the school opening every June, most claimed that this quarter is a lean season since customers spend on tuition expenses. It is also during this rainy season when fewer people go to Baclaran due to the intermittent weather.

Figure 7-2 Busy Bermonths - Baclaran Vendors Interacting with Customers

Besides the appeal of high return, the consent from local governments has made Bermonths an ideal season for vendors. For state officials, the Bermonths period is an occasion to allow vendors to occupy the streets out of humanitarian considerations. Thus, eviction never occurs during this period. *Bigay bangketa* (free sidewalk) is how hawkers call this seasonal consent[80]. In Parañaque, as discussed in Chapter 6 and Section 7.1.3 above, the city government even passed several ordinances to legally allow street use for Baclaran flea markets (*tiangge*) under certain conditions from October 15 to January 6 annually. The Bermonths period, therefore, comes with social and institutional acceptance of informal vending.

Beneath this seemingly supportive atmosphere lies an array of conflictive relations among different players. In one section of Baclaran, a group of stallholders remember Bermonths as a time when they got fed up and banded together. As mentioned above, it has been a yearly routine of Parañaque City government to allow selected vendors to put up stalls on Baclaran streets. Two ordinances (No. 03-13, S-2003 and No. 13-10, S-2013) support this move. In 2013, Parañaque Mayor Edwin Olivarez issued vending permits to chosen vendors. They gained access to spaces at the centre of the Redemptorist Road, which was

[80] Apart from the Bermonths, some vendors revealed that local officials tolerate vending a few weeks before regular elections, which happen every three years.

closed off to vehicular traffic. Since the hawkers paid for the vending area, they maximized the use of spaces by putting up high stalls. This earned the ire of formal stallholders whose shop facades were clogged by the improvised stalls. Stallholders complained about their meagre income due to vendors. Some even incurred losses that year. The formal stallholders then reportedly filed a legal case against the City Mayor.

The legal case is a common tale among stallholders. However, the Parañaque Municipal and Regional Trial Courts' written response to my formal query about the case denies that a legal complaint was filed against the local chief executive. With this information, an assessment of one local leader, Allen, offered an explanation to what happened. "The supposed legal case against the Mayor was a hoax… He [Mayor] simply used it to decide against his political leaders/operators who allowed the December 2013 incident to happen… [H]e could then turn down the request of his allies without losing their support". In December 2014, while the Mayor did not authorize the setting up of improvised stalls at the middle of the road, it was still full of ambulant vendors.

Aside from the stallholders, even some street vendors complained about Bermonths. "There were too many vendors [last December 2015]; so, the income was not that good. [It was] unlike before [when] there were only few hawkers", vendor Hannah expressed. Besides declining sales and the increasing number of vendors, hawker, Maricel, cited another concern "Sometimes, there is traffic congestion".

For some vendor leaders, the low sales and traffic jams are minor worries. They are more concerned with keeping their end of the bargain, which arises from the Bermonths' character as a 'season of giving'. This means the collection of cash gifts for government authorities. On top of the regular '*pakikisama*' money, vendor leaders ask their members to give an additional amount to officials who help them sustain their access to the streets. "During Christmas [season], we need to get along with many people. When it's [December] 24 or 25, there's like a queue… They would say, 'Julie, where is our 'Christmas gift?' Then they would hand in an envelope… The police, the MMDA… even those who are not assigned here in Baclaran", vendor leader, Julie, shared.

This is a serious issue for some vendor leaders whose members fail to remit a share. City government employee, Lian, has often observed this concern.

> Not all vendors give a share [to the collection]. You would pity some [vendor] leaders as they must shell out additional amount from their own income to make up for the shares of their members… Some of them want to give up their role [as a leader]. They also understand their members who are unable to pitch in due to the low income.

The preceding account examines the Bermonths routine beyond its seasonal appeal when the vending sales are at peak and state tolerance forbids eviction. The narratives show how the influx of vendors and buyers generates intense competition over congested spaces. In addition, the arrangements around illicit fee collection negate the humanitarian rhetoric of local officials. Thus, amid congestion and calculated consent, conflictive interactions among various players persist. The vendors appear to have accepted these contradictory elements of Bermonths. Similar to *haging* occupancy and the ERR engagement, the Bermonths routine has become part of their precarious and resilient conditions. In the next section, this resilience manifests in the way vendors deal with financial constraints.

7.3.4. Multiple Finance-generating Mechanisms

In its 2015 State of Asia Pacific Cities Report, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN-ESCAP) points out how informal status, irregular income, and uncertain conditions have prevented informal entrepreneurs from gaining access to formal credit institutions. Instead, informal workers depend on relatives, friends, product suppliers, and local moneylenders (UN Habitat & UN ESCAP, 2015). In this section, I examine how Baclaran hawkers resort to multiple finance-generating mechanisms, which echo and expand the restraints and recourses that the UN-ESCAP has identified. As the paragraphs below will show, these mechanisms are intimately linked to the practices and issues presented above.

In the context of economic distress and socio-spatial uncertainty, Baclaran vendors engage in several arrangements to gain financial capital and/or grow their small enterprises. Some ambulant hawkers who want to avoid shelling out cash capital resort to *hango* (harvest) system. *Hango* is a consignment agreement between hawkers and their suppliers where the former can pay for the corresponding amount of the goods after a day of vending. As fruit juice vendor, Frederic, shared, “One good thing about vending in Baclaran is the *hango* system. [Under *hango*], we can sell without necessarily thinking of financial capital. In the morning, we obtain our goods from the suppliers and pay them in the evening”.

For vendors who need capital, which ranges from PhP 3,000 (US$ 64.00) to as high as PhP 300,000 (US$ 6400) depending on the products, five options are possible. Section 6.4.1 in Chapter 6 and Section 7.2.1 above already mentioned the first two, which pertain to the credit window from the Baclaran cooperative and family assistance, respectively. Unfortunately, these mechanisms have their limitations. The credit cooperative, as explained in Section 6.4.1, only assists those with semi-fixed stalls who have been registered as associate members. As ambulant hawker, Nora, expressed, "The Cooperative only reaches out to those who have stalls because they are easily monitored…" Meanwhile, family assistance, besides being exclusive to relatives or friends, relies on the economic capacity of the lending individuals.

The third mechanism is *paluwagan*, a mutual-savings scheme. During the peak season (Bermonths), when most vendors earn more than the usual income, *paluwagan* is a way to put aside some extra profits they can use during emergency situations and lean months. The daily share ranges from PhP 50 (US$1) to PhP 1000 (US$20). Some vendors initiate *paluwagan* even after the peak season. "For us, it's all-year-round because it augments our capital", vendor, Nelly, noted. Others are cautious to join *paluwagan* due to eviction and poor sales.

> When there are evictions, we often stop the *paluwagan*. (Sheila)

> During the lean season, we don't join any *paluwagan* as we are unable to put aside any savings… Even the person who keeps the money does not want to initiate since s/he must shoulder the contribution of some members if it is someone's turn to collect the money. (Maricel)

This concern has prompted some hawkers to give *paluwagan* a new name.

> We don't call it *paluwagan* (to ease); [rather] it is *pasikipan* (to burden) because when you are unable to contribute you would get nagged and hear foul words... Most of those who join have money… Some vendors simply give P50 (US$ 1) daily… Others shell out PhP 500 (US$ 10) to PhP1000 (US$ 20) … So, as the contribution increases it becomes *pasikipan*... where the small vendors are disadvantaged. (Nora)

The fourth recourse for the financially-strapped is to get in touch with local lenders and loan sharks. The usual interest rate is 20% each month and the repayment period ranges from three to four months depending on the agreement between the lender and the borrower. For some hawkers, the high interest rate and the daily payment exacerbate their financial woes. "When we are unable to vend, like now when the streets are flooded, we cannot pay the loan sharks. That's a major problem for us. Sometimes, we don't even have an income to buy rice", vendor, Rosie, shared. Despite this, many vendors still cling on to loan sharks.

> Poor sales force us to borrow from the loan sharks. Otherwise, we will run out of stocks. We can't vend if we don't borrow. (Sheila)

> I always tell [the loan sharks] to visit me every day so I could pay. I don't renege on my debts from 5-6 lenders (loan sharks) because they have helped me raise my children. (Esperanza)

Amid the absence of formal micro-credit institutions and the limited reach of the Baclaran cooperative, the statements above show how the presence of loan sharks, notwithstanding the usurious arrangements, has helped vendors survive the precarity of street life. Local creditors have devised specific loan arrangements to cope with the uncertain condition of vendors.

> The loan sharks ask the vendors to have a guarantor if they know that the borrower has unstable income… [Guarantor] is usually a person who has been a long-time borrower of the loan sharks. If the borrower is unable to pay the debt, the guarantor has to shoulder it. (Nora)

Besides asking for guarantors, the loan sharks take advantage of the peak earning season (Bermonths).

> During Christmas season, there is what we call *balikan* (quick return), where the [loan sharks] lend out PhP 100, 000 (US$ 2000) payable within December. The interest [rate] varies depending on the agreement. But, [vendors] usually are able to return the full amount within a month or before December ends. (Catalina)

In other words, instead of waiting for the usual three to four months, *balikan* allows the loan sharks to recover their money plus the 20% interest in a shorter time. In turn, vendors are able to procure additional stocks in preparation for the expected influx of customers. Yet, the availability of credit windows at times leads to multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness.

> After their first loan, with interest of course, some vendors would ask for additional amount. That's added interest. When poor sales hit them, they would be unable to repay the full amount in due time. So, they would get indebted… There are also cases where [vendors] would borrow from another creditor to pay for the previous loan from another lender… So, it becomes a double burden. They hardly realize that they get over-indebted because the interest rates keep rising. (Mary Jane)

Worse, the debt obligation gets saddled by evictions. "During Bayani's time [as MMDA Chair], we could not sell [due to evictions] … and there was no food to eat. It was harder if you're selling shoes as you need to pay daily [to creditors]. If you miss a day, you need to double your payment the next day", vendor, Nora, recalled.

In the face of over-indebtedness, some vendors are compelled to give up their primary asset. As Nancy explained, “When they [vendors] now have two debt obligations. They would look for a third lender until they are forced to give up their vending space because many [loan sharks] run after them”. Barangay official, Brando, claimed that what Nancy shared is a common problem.

> The usual complaint we receive has to do with loans - vendors who have not paid their loans… This morning I was listening to a complaint involving PhP 200 000 (US$ 4000) loan. The problem is the borrower has already run away. S/he just abandoned her/his vending space. We found out s/he owes money to nine lenders. These lenders all want to use her/his space to vend.

This recourse to use their claimed vending spaces represents the hawkers’ fifth mechanism to generate money and/or pay their debts: vendors sell or rent out their claimed spaces. Barangay official, Allen, confirmed this arrangement: “Yes, they are able to ‘sell’ and rent out the streets and sidewalks. We know that these things happen but we could not stop them since the agreement is mostly verbal”.

The common rental agreement period ranges from one to two years. Depending on the size and location of the vending space, the fee ranges from PhP 40,000 (US$ 702) to PhP 300,000 (US$ 6,383). Even though Allen noted that their Barangay refuses to honour any sale or rental arrangement, in other barangays the agreement becomes valid when the two parties sign on a written agreement in front of vendor leaders and barangay officials. Some local officials are even asked to sign on the document.

> They [involved parties] must agree – the renter or buyer, the seller, and the lender. The [vendor] leader is just a witness so when vendors are able to repay, they can reclaim [the vending spaces] … It couldn’t be based on verbal [agreement] alone. There is a legal [procedure]. It goes through the barangay. Barangay [official] must sign it [agreement]. The [vendor] leader acts as a witness. It’s difficult [if there’s no witness] since we’re talking about their livelihood. (Esperanza).

The roles of barangay officials in ‘legitimating’ hawkers’ agreements echoes Marx’s (2009) account of how local councillors in three South African cities act as witnesses to land transactions in informal settlements. In additions, the ability of vendors to sell and rent out their claimed spaces signals recoding of spaces (Oriard, 2015) which involves reconfiguration of public use and other social relations it entails. Yet, I argue that the Baclaran situation deviates from how Oriard (2015) views hawkers’ commodification of public space in Tepito (Mexico) for the sake of maximising the profit of street businesses. Baclaran hawkers do not occupy or claim a space simply to subject it to market’s speculative

logic or buy time to increase its value. Rather, my conversations with Baclaran vendors indicate that they only sell or rent out their spaces in situation of economic distress.

To summarise, the preceding account has shown the multiple finance-generating mechanisms that street vendors employ to cope with economic constraints. These mechanisms include the *hango* consignment scheme, membership with a cooperative, family assistance, *paluwagan* mutual-savings, getting loans from local lenders, and selling and renting out of claimed vending spaces. Aside from the issues that come with each scheme, the foregoing discussion has demonstrated how the mechanisms are linked to the previously examined issues such as precarious street presence, evictions, and seasonal sales. Finally, while formal micro-credit institutions are never felt in the area, the findings reveal how barangay officials get involved in legitimating informal arrangements among vendors, lenders, and renters or buyers of claimed vending spaces. How then does this street-level entanglement of formal players and informal mechanisms contribute to the thesis' broader discourse on the formal-informal interface? The remainder of this chapter turns to this question.

7.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have addressed the thesis sub-questions 2 and 3: Under what government rules do the players, discussed in Chapter 6, use streets and assert their claims? What practices and norms do street vendors observe in relation to street use and informal vending? In problematizing the first question, I have employed the thesis' framing of policy epistemologies, which follows the notion of post-dualist lens laid out in Chapter 2. These epistemologies comprise the hostile orientation, the tolerant atmosphere, and the accommodating environment.

I have shown how the hostile policies treat streets as a public property which should primarily function as a mobility channel for automobiles and pedestrians. Commercial activities like vending are thus prohibited. With respect to tolerant political atmosphere, I have illustrated how the interplay of economic issues (poverty and unemployment), cultural values (Christmas season appeal) and agency expressions (building political ties) underpin the lenient arrangements. Intersecting with the hostile policies and tolerant arrangements is a set of laws and programs that vendors can use in advancing their welfare. Yet, in the analysis I have unveiled the constraints of the accommodating policies by linking them to the broader issues of neoliberal-oriented policies and decentralization problems. As it is, the

well-intentioned laws became a tool for the national government to abandon some of its responsibilities using the rhetoric of democratization and decentralization. Enforcement of policies supportive of informal workers thus becomes discretionary for many local governments, which have proven co-opted by entrenched powerful families and mired in resource constraints.

Thus far, these analytical insights unpack how the formal-informal interface, as presented in Chapter 3, operates in the realm of policy-making and enforcement. The different factors influencing the tolerant arrangement and the accommodating policies exemplify the complex interaction of 'formal' procedures and 'informal' norms. To an extent, the factors shaping the policy epistemologies also resonate with issues around informal economy and legal pluralism (Brown, 2017c) as they emanate from political relations, power structures and the complex institutional setting. Compounding this policy environment are routinized practices that hawkers have undertaken to constantly appropriate the streets for vending.

In response to the second question, I have examined four practices – the *haging* occupancy, the engagement with the evictionist regulatory regime, the Bermonths routine, and the multiple finance-generating mechanisms. I have employed the notion of *haging* occupancy to capture the vendors' precarious and resilient access to hawking spaces. Under *haging* occupancy, hawkers rely on family members, tenure duration, self-governance schemes, and tenuous ties to constantly appropriate the streets. Those unable to secure a strong grip on Baclaran spaces resort to transient and mobile strategies. Indeed, these are concrete manifestations of agency amid the uncertain policy environment and unequal socio-spatial power relations.

The hierarchical relations are also seen in how vendors deal with evictions. Examining three major eviction episodes, I have coined the evictionist regulatory regime or ERR to describe the state-vendor regulatory relationship, which primarily revolves around eviction. Compelled by the lack of alternative employment and persistent poverty, vendors have engaged with the ERR's multi-faceted dimensions. They have devised various strategies – participation in formal dialogues and rallies, building of political ties with local officials, and tenacious street presence. As shown in the analytical discussion above, the ERR arises from the interplay of broader socio-economic problems, local political dynamics, the contending state policies, and the continuing grassroots agency.

Meanwhile, in the discussion of the Bermonths routine I have tackled how vendors remain vulnerable even if state authorities tolerate informal hawking. Competition over congested spaces and illicit fee collection amplify the contradictory elements of the seasonal norms. These issues on congestion and illicit fee similarly manifest in vendors' various finance-generating mechanisms. I have highlighted the problems that constrain vendors as they initiate *paluwagan* mutual-savings, borrow from local lenders, and sell or rent out claimed vending spaces. As I have demonstrated, these constraints are intimately linked to vendors' struggle for economic security and engagement with the policy environment.

In sum, I have demonstrated in this chapter how the policies and practices on street use and informal vending are embedded in the larger socio-economic contexts (presented in Chapter 5) and the complex socio-spatial relations of various players (examined in Chapter 6). I have thus presented how the entanglement of state rules and street norms represents the formal-informal interface with uneven effects on different stakeholders. In the following chapter, I broaden the analysis of this entanglement by dwelling on the governing logics that shape the roles and relations (presented in Chapter 6) and the policies and practices, which are presented here.

CHAPTER 8. UNPACKING THE FORMAL-INFORMAL INTERFACE: GOVERNING RELATIONS AND PLANNING IMPLICATIONS

8.1. Introduction

In Chapter 5, I examined the broader structural factors and agency expressions within which Baclaran's socio-spatial evolution is embedded. Manifestations of the interrelatedness of such factors become apparent in Chapters 6 and 7 where the multiple players' relations and state rules-street norms nexus are analysed, respectively. In this chapter, I stitch together some key arguments in the three previous chapters by answering the thesis sub-questions 4 and 5: What governing relations influence the formal-informal interface in Baclaran's informal vending and street use? What are the implications of the formal-informal interface for urban planning processes, particularly in the context of appropriating and governing contested vending spaces? In addressing these two questions, I first tackle each governing relation and examine how it plays out in Baclaran. In the discussion, I refer to the conceptual findings presented in the literature review chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) and empirical results in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. In the second part of the chapter, I analyse the implications of the formal-informal interface for urban planning processes. In the last section, I sum up the key themes covered in the chapter.

8.2. Governing Relations in Contested Vending Spaces

By governing relations, I refer to the broader systemic arrangements and micro socio-spatial modes of engagements that lie beneath the rules, interactions, norms, and actions in Baclaran. The analysis of empirical findings has unveiled a mosaic of four governing relations that shapes the formal-informal interface in Baclaran's contested vending spaces. These include 1) the disjunctive urban governance; 2) the strong kinship ties; 3) the clientelist political relations; and 4) the grassroots democratic entanglements. In examining each of these, I recognize the multilayered and overlapping processes and outcomes arising from the entwined relations. As they get entangled, the interactions and the accompanying tensions manifest in the previously presented roles and relations of multiple players, state policies, and street norms. Thus, I occasionally refer to some accounts presented in the earlier chapters to emphasize certain points.

8.2.1. Disjunctive Urban Governance

In the previous two chapters (Chapters 6 and 7), I problematized the relations between the local state officials and grassroots actors in Baclaran. In this section, I build on Minnery's

(2007) notion of urban governance and Healey's (1997, 2007b) conception of planning-governance nexus, which are both analytically consistent with the thesis' post-dualist lens, in examining how the ruptures in local governance processes contribute to the formal-informal interface or how the formal regulatory framework is implicated in urban informality. I refer to the interplay of these ruptures as disjunctive urban governance. In developing the idea of disjunctive urban governance, I draw inspiration from Caldeira and Holston's work on disjunctive democracies in which they contend that historically-specific factors and trajectories of existing democracies are always a "mix of progressive and regressive elements, uneven, unbalanced and heterogeneous" (Caldeira & Holston, 1999, p. 692). Thus, I refuse to view the disjunctive governance practices as signs of incomplete process towards attaining an ideal type of governance and democracy, often based on global North ideas (Tucker, 2016). Rather, I situate the disjunctions within the context-specific governance agenda, economic conditions, and socio-spatial power relations.

Three points of disjunction emerge as critical in unpacking the governing relations in Baclaran. The first concerns the conflicting rationalities (Watson, 2003) between the local governments' planning agenda and Baclaran stakeholders' aspirations. On the one hand, the Comprehensive Land Use Plans in Pasay and Parañaque embrace a city-image that promotes an orderly and 'world-class' urban space. This depoliticized planning approach, as argued in Chapter 6, follows a neoliberal economic thrust and promotes gentrification with little regard to local socio-economic needs of the marginalized groups. Barangay official Allen's remark captures the disjunction: "What would you rather have – a beautiful city, an orderly place? But, what the hell has happened to your residents? They have become hold-uppers, thieves. The agenda to have an orderly place is hard due to the complex conditions…" Even local planning staff, Krisha, admitted the presence of this complexity. "I think it's really hard to remove the vendors [from the streets]. Their market is there; they really fight for it".

On the other hand, other Baclaran stakeholders have different views on how vending should be managed. The statements below represent their views.

> My only prayer to God… is to have financial capital and a stable vending space so we don't have to constantly run… We would provide space to pedestrians but we should not be evicted. (Nora, female ambulant vendor)

> The best thing to do is to simply regulate them [vendors]. If you're going to relocate them to far sites, they would just return like what happened to others who were transferred to remote areas. (Lito, barangay official)

> I would rather see vendors selling on the streets than stealing something from other people… If I were to implement a plan, I would stop the vehicular traffic on the area; the commuters can just walk [around Baclaran] …" (Brando, local official)
>
> My personal view on that [managing vending] is let's just close off this area [Baclaran LRT] to vehicular flow. Then, install additional security mechanisms since Baclaran is known for snatching incidents. Let's also regulate and legalize [vending]. When you legalize it, they [vendors] will pay taxes. (Moises, mall manager)

The sentiments above reveal the players' various interests and policy positions on informal vending. They depict the everyday aspirations of vendors and the long-term proposals of barangay leaders and mall operators. So, do their ideas inform local governance processes? This draws attention to another disjunctive dimension.

The second disjunction pertains to the presence of formal participatory legal provisions in urban governance alongside the informal multi-scaled structures of power. As expounded on in Chapters 6 and 7, the Philippine Local Government Code and other national laws provide spaces for involvement of street vendors and other grassroots actors in local governance. Yet, as the previous two chapters have also pointed out, these 'participatory' mechanisms have hardly promoted grassroots engagement in city-level formal governance processes that concern Baclaran vending issues. Local planning academic, Louie, cited a reason why participation has failed to take root.

> The problem is it's not a habitual practice… or there's no consistency and not necessarily because they [local officials] don't want people to participate but because it is also tedious. So, costly [and] tedious… [The] local government should spend a little more budget then assign some people to be responsible for participation exercises.

The experience of Melissa, local government staff, confirms Louie's assessment about the need to invest in participatory engagements.

> We don't want a messy process, so we tried to engage [with some vendors] … I tried to talk to them. I conducted FGDs and meetings for several weeks. I was thinking we could organize some groups and put up a cooperative that can help in their financial sustainability. But after three weeks of consultations, no one was attending the meeting. There's a lot of problems. So, my official told me 'let's just leave them aside if they don't want to listen to us'. Of course, we also have other things to do.

In the context of resource constraint and a local economic growth-oriented planning approach, the lack of sustained engagement with vendors indicates that even though democratic legal codes exist their civil component remains severely impaired (Caldeira & Holston, 1999). In Baclaran, this civil component represents the mechanisms that can

enable hawkers to exercise their rights and enhance their capacity to form associations that engage in local governance processes. In lieu of formal engagement spaces, informal channels drive the relations of street vendors with the city mayors and their personnel. As argued in Chapters 6 and 7, these channels ironically deploy legal instruments and enable the city mayors' staff to enforce hierarchical and devious schemes against the hawkers.

The paradox in the previous paragraph resonates with the third disjunction: how the Philippine government's democratization-decentralization project intersects with the local governance processes dominated by elite families. As discussed in Chapter 7, the Philippine Constitution and several other laws (e.g. Local Government Code of 1991, Republic Act 8425) promote democratization and decentralization agenda. For instance, the Local Government Code's Section 106 provides venue for people's organizations to participate in governance through local special bodies and sectoral representation. When linked to the problem of deep-rooted elite families, locally known as political dynasties, it is easy to understand how this participatory instrument is barely realized. Political dynasty refers to having "members of the same family occupying elected positions either in sequence for the same position, or simultaneously across different positions" (Mendoza, Beja Jr, Venida, & Yap, 2013, p. 1). In the Philippines, poverty entrenches political dynasties as powerful families feed on poor people's vulnerability to patronage relations and manipulation to sell their votes (Mendoza et al., 2013).

So, how does political dynasty manifest in Baclaran? In Parañaque, the Mayor and the Congressman are brothers with their father (a former Mayor) serving as Chair of one barangay and another sibling sits as a Barangay Council Member (see Figure 8-1 on page 176). In Pasay, the Mayor and the Congresswoman[81] are siblings with two relatives occupying seats at the City Council. These officials also rely on a civic group that carries their last name: Calixto Forever Movement. Run by their relatives, the group was created in the late 1980s when their father was the Pasay's appointed local executive. Some vendors admitted they were able to get semi-fixed stalls since they are members of Calixto Forever Movement. Besides the city-level dynasty, in at least three Baclaran barangays, the current Chairs are children or relatives of former officials.

[81] The congressional district-city mayor combination in both cities produces the most potent dynastic permutation as it blends the local executive power with the access to national resources (de Dios, 2007).

Figure 8-1: One family holds four government positions in Parañaque

Such entrenched 'political dynasty' is part of the wider socio-spatial context where political operators broker the relationships between local officials and hawkers and where vendor organizers attempt to introduce reform-oriented engagement. In explaining how local powerful families in two Metro Manila cities are able to consolidate their control over local politics, Porio (2012) has used the 'networked governance' lens. Under the networked governance, elite families have controlled the structures of power by mobilising the strategies and discourses of decentralisation-democratization through engagement with marginalised groups, consultation with the private sector, and selective network-building with local bureaucracy and civil society players (Porio, 2012). In Baclaran, the city hall-vendor relationship primarily rests on deploying legal instruments - both critical (Pasay) and supportive (Parañaque) of street vending – and the local bureaucracy in strengthening the informal structures of power. This somehow indicates how the institutional milieu (DiGaetano & Strom, 2003) operates in the context of unequal power relations. To a great extent, this also reflects how the elite players utilize the multiple faces, forms, and spaces of power (Lukes, 2005; Gaventa, 2011) to advance their interests and co-opt, if not thwart, any potential resistance from street vendors. In Chapters 6 and 7, I discussed how this is manifested in the spatial hierarchy in policy enforcement, the evictionist regulatory regime, and illicit financial collection. As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, these practices are also rooted in a disjunctive urban governance.

8.2.2. Strong Kinship Ties

As shown above, powerful families are well-entrenched in local governance. But the influence of family relations extends beyond formal state institutions. McCoy (1993a) has even noted how single families have dominated Philippine labour unions, Christian denominations, and a Communist party. In this section, I analyse how kinship ties shape the governing relations among vendors, their leaders, and local state officials. The succeeding paragraphs explain how these occur in Baclaran.

As briefly mentioned in Chapter 7, family members assist hawkers in daily vending activities. In this setup, the working family members typically live with the host relatives who in turn provide modest daily wage and free meals. While helpers have no form of social insurance, in some cases the host relatives send their young helpers to school. This mutual dependency deepens as vendors struggle to protect their insecure work spaces. Often, old hawkers who have a sense of entitlement derived from tenure duration (as explained in Chapter 7) pick their family members as the rightful 'heir' to their livelihood source. When they see vacant spots near their areas, vendors ask their relatives to occupy the spaces.

Apart from its role in the management and control of vending spaces, the kinship bond is a critical aspect of the broader migration phenomenon. For migrants who moved to the cities searching for better economic opportunities, relatives provide the much-needed support in a new environment. Hannah, an old vendor who arrived in Metro Manila in the 1980s, shared how she started out.

> Before I moved here [current vending space], I had been assisting my cousin in selling fruits... I asked her to help me acquire my own [vending] cart… Then she said, 'If you want, I could give you one cart'. But, I was still her seller… I was just earning PhP 50.00 (US $ 1) a day… When I was able to save up, my cousin said, 'You could have your own [vending] cart. I'll provide you with mangoes [to sell]. You just have to pay for the capital'. So, I paid for everything. I spent PhP 500 (US$ 10) at that time to have my own cart.

Hannah's account is a typical story among Baclaran vendors. As similarly observed in other global South cities (Flock & Breitung, 2016; Lyons & Snoxell, 2005), family ties help migrants build and nurture social capital, which allows them to survive in big cities and enter petty trading activities. Since enhancing social capital entails engaging with other players, family-based ties also impinge on political relations.

This is exhibited in two ways. In terms of grassroots association, the nature of collective action revolves around recognized leaders whose followers are mostly their own relatives. The structure of many vendor groups veers away from the usual organizational arrangements of grassroots organizations in the Philippines. Their leaders are not chosen through elections. Those who first occupied Baclaran streets act as heads in their zones. Most vendor leaders began their hawking activities in Baclaran in the early 1980s.

Moreover, blood relations are a significant factor in the succession of leadership. Vendors recounted at least two instances where relatives succeeded leadership posts of old leaders who had passed away. When a veteran woman leader died, her nephew took charge as the new head. In another case, after the death of a male leader the members acknowledged his sister as their new official.

Another expression of kinship-oriented political relation is seen in the way vendor leaders establish and strengthen their connections with political players. They use their number as a leverage with politicians or incumbent local government officials who periodically seek political support during elections. Here, vendors mobilize their 'kinship network'[82] (McCoy, 1993a) in which they form a broader working coalition of allies bonded by blood, rituals, and fictive familial associations. As tackled in Section 7.1.2 in Chapter 7, this strategy results in a political atmosphere where local officials tolerate street vending.

To maintain their political clout, the leaders ensure that their relatives or members who are vendors get registered as official voters of Pasay or Parañaque. They also meet with local officials. During the meeting, the vendor leaders invite their members and some political organizers to remind the officials of the votes they could gain once they allow their members to occupy the streets. Vendor leader, Chris, recounted how he once met with an official.

> I have nephews who were sleeping on sidewalks... They used to rent a place. When the new barangay officials evicted them from their vending spaces… they couldn't afford to rent [a place] … I helped them out… I asked the new Barangay Chair to allow them to return to their [vending] spaces. He asked how many of them are voters … I said, 'there are 18 [voters] and I have them registered in your barangay'.

Moreover, while vendors use their family ties as a political clout, they often remain loyal to their kinship bonds. As vendor organizer, Maura, recalled, "Vendors are always very close

[82] Although McCoy (1993a) uses it to describe a strategy of elite families to strengthen their political alliances, I argue that even grassroots players like vendors employ kinship network to engage with powerful forces.

to each other because they belong to a clan… So, they tend to be parochial… They could engage in [political] organizing but at the end of the day, they still stick to one another". This was evident in a Muslim community in Baclaran where vendors who are related to each other once vied for the barangay-level government post. Despite this, the kinship ties seem to be more important than the political contestation. The statement of Alexander, a community leader, succinctly captures the nature of kinship relations vis-à-vis the electoral contest.

> No, there is no ill feeling. We are still together. It's just politics. Your relative is a family member. Your fellow Muslim is a brother. Politics will soon pass.

To sum up, kinship ties are enmeshed in relations involving 1) the management and control of vending spaces, 2) the urban migration and informal vending, and 3) the political leverage with local officials. In the first two aspects, vendors arguably tap into their claimed spaces of power (Gaventa, 2011), which have enabled them to use contested territories and accommodate their migrant relatives. Their political leverage, meanwhile, has allowed them to maximize the invited spaces of power (Gaventa, 2011) where statistical warm bodies count. This echoes Chatterjee's (2004) insight on how the vendors as part of the 'governed' seek ways to engage the state. In the next section, another way of engaging with state officials is examined.

8.2.3. Clientelist Political Relations

In the face of disjunctive urban governance and strong kinship ties, clientelism[83] or patronage relation also influences how some vendors relate to local officials, particularly at the city level. Clientelism refers to the "structuring of political power through networks of informal dyadic relations that link individuals of unequal power in relationships of exchange… [where] power is vested in the top individual (the boss, sovereign, or head of clan) ..." (Brachet-Marquez, 1992, pp. 93-94). The street vending literature has extensively examined clientelism as a common engagement channel between state officials and hawkers amid hostile policies (Crossa, 2009), corrupt bureaucracy (Donovan, 2008), economic distress, and strong grassroots agency (Cross, 1998; Oriard, 2015; Weng & Kim, 2016).

In the Philippines, social scientists have analysed how clientelism has influenced the country's political system (Landé, 1965; Neher, 1985; Quimpo, 2005; Teehankee, 2013). In

[83] The subsequent sections use clientelist politics and patronage relations interchangeably.

the context of urbanization, clientelism is characterized as a particularistic, non-programmatic, and non-ideological system of exchange (Nowak & Snyder, 1970). As urban areas experience changes and growth, clientelism relies on political machine, which employs short-term material inducements to secure cooperation (Quimpo, 2005). Against this backdrop, the discussion below examines how clientelism compounds the governing relations in Baclaran as it intersects with the disjunctive urban governance and strong kinship ties.

As I have implicitly shown in the previous chapters, clientelism manifests in several ways. First, the way many hawkers control vending spaces without any clear-cut guidelines except for their personal or political connections to local officials reveals a thread of clientelist arrangements. As seen in Chapters 6 and 7, old vendors who have gained a reputation as local leaders maintain a degree of patronage relations with city government authorities. This sense of entitlement has enabled them to allocate certain spaces to their relatives[84], friends or individuals who approach them with referrals from certain local political patrons. Yet, this arrangement lacks tenure security, as urban poor leader, Anselma, has argued below.

> The question remains: Is that stable? Is there a long-term [agreement]? As I see it, their association won't progress since there is no assurance of tenure… They only gain a semblance of stability because Mayor Calixto is still in power. But, there is no assurance… Even if they talk to the Mayor [about long-term plans], he might simply say, 'Until I'm the Mayor, you'll be on the streets'. But, it's now Mayor's last term [in office]… So, they are like a wild vine on an unstable wall, which can fall off anytime.

Besides tenure issue, clientelism affects the daily lives of vendors through the illicit financial collection. Vendors pay to their leaders who in turn remit their daily collection to assigned collectors by local government authorities. The accounts in Chapter 7 (under *haging* occupancy and Bermonths) described how vendors have accepted illicit fees as part of their uncertain presence on the streets.

The electoral arrangement between vendor leaders and local authorities also shows how clientelism is embedded in the exercise of democratic rights. As explained in the previous section, vendor leaders who act as the political patriarchs of their families and vendor groups ensure that their relatives or members get registered as official voters of Pasay or

[84] In clientelism literature, familial relations are often linked to patronage ties. As the previous section (8.3) has shown, kinship bonds are embedded in clientelist relations. Yet, I separate them to emphasize how kinship ties help vendors utilize their claimed spaces of power (Gaventa, 2011) by managing contested vending spaces and handling migration concerns.

Parañaque. Inevitably, local officials consider the vendors as a force to reckon with if they wish to win in elections. As local official, Allen, expressed,

> Due to political considerations, they [local officials] ignore the [presence] of vendors on the streets. Even those who enacted the [anti-vending] ordinance ignore their presence… Why don't they directly confront the vendors? Because, [if they do that] they [vendors] won't vote for you in the next elections.

In addition, Baclaran's election-oriented clientelism capitalizes on political machine (Nowak & Snyder, 1970; Quimpo, 2005) which finds expression in vendors' role as Barangay Intelligence Officer and Barangay Intelligence Support of some local officials. As explained in Chapter 6, these two positions are part of the political machinery of their respective bosses during the 45-day campaign period and on the Election Day itself. Barangay Intelligence Officer and Barangay Intelligence Support, in return, can ask their bosses to allow the individuals they endorse to sell on the streets.

So, how did the clientelist arrangements develop and what have sustained the tight relations? While the overlapping issues associated with disjunctive urban governance and kinship ties have somehow contributed to clientelism in Baclaran, two other regulation-oriented factors have deepened the patronage relations of vendors and government authorities.

The first factor is the hostile legal environment. UN-Habitat (2016) has paid attention to how the failure of rigid and ineffective legislation to reflect reality and recognize the inventiveness of informal workers can force citizens into corruption to gain access to basic services. In Pasay, a local ordinance declares street vending as illegal. In Parañaque, although there are ordinances that allow vending on certain streets at a given period in a year, these do not grant the hawkers with long-term legal identity. Due to the unfriendly policies, vendors who rely on vending for economic survival, or consider it as a viable business, resort to backdoor channels and patronage connections to earn tolerance from the local authorities. The unfavourable laws thus serve as hawkers' Damocles sword that local officials use to threaten them. While the daily illicit financial collection and informal channels persist, local officials can anytime evict hawkers by invoking the anti-vending legal instruments.

The local government's usual recourse to eviction is part of the second factor that compels the vendors to cling on to patronage relation - the state's ability to resort to violence. As presented in the evictionist regulatory regime (Section 7.2.2 in Chapter 7), the series of

violent clearing operations have prompted the street vendors to build informal ties with the city mayor. One salient case pertains to how the violent evictions[85] disrupted an organizing initiative of a vendors' group. Prior to the MMDA-led evictions, some vendor leaders in one section (Pasay area) were beginning to form an organization of Muslim and Christian hawkers.

> We were forming an association before… We had regular financial contribution, which we pooled together… It's a Muslim-Christian [group]. We even had an office… But it became hard when we had to endure evictions. I didn't even know where to sell… So, when the MMDA came in, we got very fragmented. (Julie, vendor leader)

The association also had some degree of structure; there was a set of officers and regular meetings of members. There were negotiations between vendors and local government units. In a sense, these vendors were pursuing collective action for long-term organizational development. Unfortunately, the series of clearing operations deprived the vendors of the space to make a living and sustain the organizing work. This led to the slow demise of their association[86].

Because of their eviction experience, hawkers began establishing relations with local government officials and political operators. This has enabled the local officials to engage street hawkers using a set particularistic agenda like the access to streets, electoral support, and illicit fees. Subsequently, a closer relation, albeit one that anchors on clientelism, has persisted. To an extent, this state capacity to resort to violence echoes the power of coercion in promoting clientelism (Quimpo, 2005). Put another way, the local officials (and their political leaders) deploy the public visible face of power (Lukes, 2005) to compel vendors to embrace clientelism - a hidden face/form of power (Lukes, 2015; Gaventa, 2011) – where they can perpetuate the unjust relations.

Intersecting with the entrenched clientelism, strong kinship ties, and disjunctive urban governance is a set of grassroots practices that has similarly influenced the governing relations in Baclaran. The next section examines this theme.

[85] These evictions occurred during Bayani Fernando's reign as Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) Chair from 2002 to 2009.

[86] At that time, other hawkers in Metro Manila also suffered from the MMDA's violent clearing operations. The Katipunan ng Maraming Tinig ng mga Manggagawang Impormal or KATINIG KA (Coalition of the Many Voices of Informal Workers), a nationwide coalition of informal workers with a large following from street vendors in Metro Manila, endured a significant setback in its organizing efforts. KATINIG KA failed to sustain its organizing efforts since the streets are not only vendors' livelihood spaces; these also serve as an important terrain for political work and organizational building.

8.2.4. Grassroots Democratic Entanglements

The diverse relations and practices, discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, reveal how Baclaran hawkers have resorted to collective action to confront poverty and hostile state rules. Yet, alongside these grassroots responses, an array of parochial intents and collective action barriers exists. It is thus conceptually and empirically inappropriate to call vendors' collective schemes as purely resistance strategies. It amounts to romanticizing, if not misrepresenting, their complex political and socio-spatial practices. I therefore situate the multiple expressions of vendors' agency as part of what I call grassroots democratic entanglements, which possess progressive and regressive democratic elements and even conflicting motives or routines.

Grassroots democratic entanglements are grounded in two strands of scholarly literature, which both adhere to the structurationist and institutionalist framing of the thesis' post-dualist lens. One is the literature on grassroots agency - presented in Chapter 3 – in which one running thread underscores the contingent and context-oriented nature of grassroots initiatives. I specifically draw from Honwana's (2008) strategic and tactical agencies, Kaufman's (1997) grassroots democracy, Chatterjee's (2004) politics of the governed, Kerkvliet's (2009) everyday politics, Musoni's (2010) adaptive resistance, and Bayat's (2013) non-movement of the dispossessed.

The other stream of thought stems from Quimpo's (2005) contested democracy, discussed in Chapter 5, and Caldeira and Holston's (1999) disjunctive democracy (as discussed in Section 8.2.1 above). While Quimpo has emphasized the importance of grassroots struggle in Philippine history, Caldeira and Holston have pointed out how actually-existing democracies in the global South are diverse, uneven, and contain contradictory elements. Grassroots democratic entanglements thus look at how grassroots actions could constitute resistance and coping strategies while being attentive to factors that impede collective action in a democratic context. These are explained below.

8.2.4.1. *Vendors' Responses to Structural Conditions and Socio-spatial Relations*

In explaining people's responses to political and economic realities, Katz (2004) makes a nuanced distinction between reworking, resilience and resistance. Although these three are interwoven, she argues that *reworking* refers to practices that alter the conditions to generate more workable lives while *resilience* pertains to pragmatic acts that enable people to survive amid difficult circumstances. Katz (2004, p. 251) then distinguishes *resistance* as

those actions “that draw on and produce a critical consciousness to confront and redress… conditions of oppression and exploitation at various scales…” This careful distinction resonates with the different accounts of grassroots agency by the authors mentioned above and elaborated in Chapter 3.

In Baclaran, the vendors’ grassroots practices straddle between these acts of reworking, resilience and resistance. For instance, Baclaran vendors’ engagement in tenuous clientelist relations to earn a living arguably constitutes a form of reworking to alleviate their impoverished conditions amid a hostile legal environment. Undeniably, as poor people struggle to survive in the context of acute poverty and inequality, their activities may emerge simultaneously formal, informal, legal and illegal (van Schendel & Abraham, 2005). Thus, even Baclaran vendors’ approach to cling on to unjust relations may publicly seem docile and submissive, but this can form hubs of dissent and insubordination (Rabinowitz, 2014; Scott, 1979; 1985) in the context of exclusionary socio-spatial relations.

Meanwhile, the hawkers’ *haging* occupancy, the engagement with evictionist regulatory regime, the Bermonths routine (discussed in Chapter 7), and their shared interests to use the streets enable them to form passive networks (Bayat, 1997). These acts appear to be a form of resilience. On a more strategic level, the narratives by vendor organizers in Chapter 6 capture the potential of hawkers, when organizing assistance is sustained, to resist and break the cycle of patronage relations. Their intentions and actions went beyond the mere acts of reworking and resilience. They formed a federation, joined rallies, and attended meetings with national government agencies and local governments. To an extent, these practices represent an act of resistance, which evolved from organizing work and conscious political decision to do something that can change their conditions. Alas, their collective action encountered fierce opposition from political leaders and state officials. These powerful players succeeded in undermining the vendors’ attempt at addressing their issues through participation in formal governance structures. Still, as organizer, Leo, puts it, “there is something to build on”.

In other words, it is hard to view the continuing presence of Baclaran vendors as a mere outcome of disjunctive urban governance, kinship ties, and patronage networks. Vendors have endured evictions, resisted legal rules, transformed Baclaran’s spatial form, and have grown in number despite the lack of government support. Seen from a broader standpoint, their presence unsettles the essentialist categories of work and urban spaces (Milgram,

2009) and constitutes resistance to state's hegemonic power (Etzold, 2013). Indeed, acknowledging the various forms of grassroots agency and responses – whether they are reworking, resilience, or resistance – also underscore the intricate interworking of the changing structures of power (Abu-Lughod, 1990). Yet, while the accounts in Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate how the hawkers' practices constitute different forms of agency and responses to structural conditions, there are barriers to collective action. These constraints are tackled in the subsequent sections.

8.2.4.2. *The Uncertainty of Outcome from Democratic Processes*

Amid the prevailing patronage relations, one issue that hinders collective action is the uncertainty of the outcome from democratic processes. In one section of Baclaran, some long-time vendor leaders are afraid to lose control over their 'territories'. Street-level bureaucrat, Lian, explained how some leaders refuse to tackle their lack of tenure security.

> They [vendor leaders] never talk about the long-term plans because they think once it becomes legal and there is [formal] permit, some vendors will lose their spaces. So, vendors who have contacts in the city hall will directly get in touch with them to get a space. Now, the current [claimed] space 'owners' won't allow it since they have protected it for a long time. They won't allow that because if there's a permit, [external] organizers will come in and they [leader] will be by-passed.

Carlo, a vendor and barangay official, also shared how fellow hawkers responded to his idea of strategic organizing.

> We were planning to organize the vendors since the local government allows us to use the streets. We wanted to make it an orderly space to attract more people… But, the problem is their [vendor] leaders. Some of them thought that we're proposing this idea because we want to replace them. They have a different interpretation.

The insights above indicate how vendor leaders protect their interests by avoiding possible changes that long-term organizing might bring. In the face of economic constraint and political uncertainty, their fear is not entirely misplaced. In another research (Recio, 2015), I emphasize how vendors in *Intramuros* (Manila) got involved in a series of democratic negotiations and entered into formal agreements but were unable to secure the implementation of the crafted official covenant. In Baclaran, the prevailing patronage ties, seen in Section 8.3, generates anxiety of leaders over how other players who have stronger ties to state officials might displace them and eventually control their vending spaces. Thus, although they engage in certain forms of collective action (e.g. managing and protecting vending spaces), the vendor leaders' relationships with local authorities still anchor on clientelism. As similarly observed in Argentinean popular politics, this interface of grassroots

collective action and clientelism is not necessarily divergent (Auyero, Lapegna, & Poma, 2009). It is embedded in the spectrum of poor people's routine and non-routine problem-solving strategies.

8.2.4.3. *Grassroots Fragmentation*

The reluctance of vendor leaders to develop long-term agenda is also linked to the second collective action barrier – fragmentation. Two things account for the persistent fragmentation among Baclaran hawkers. First, the presence of socio-cultural tensions, what Sapitula (2013b) calls hierarchized conviviality, between the Muslim and Christian vendors creates an atmosphere of othering. Many Christian hawkers have expressed biases against Muslim vendors whom they describe as 'troublemakers', 'untidy', and difficult to deal with. Even the relationship between the Christian and Muslim vendor leaders appears tenuous in that they do not regularly interact to discuss group concerns. They only meet when the city government calls for a meeting to talk about evictions.

The other reason relates to how the hawkers suffered from the divide-and-rule strategy of local officials. As narrated in Section 6.5.2.1 (Chapter 6), local officials used political operators and enforced evictions to form a separate vendors' group. The independent hawkers' federation eventually disintegrated due to this scheme. Worse, this has made vendors cautious to build or join an organization. As vendor organizer, Belinda, recalled,

> There was an instance when I talked to them [Baclaran vendors]. They no longer want to join an association. Do you know why? They are being threatened by the enforcers, by local officials… They now have collectors for protection money. That's the reason why they are not on 'legal' spaces. They are being threatened to be evicted from their *pwesto* (vending spaces).

As vendors get discouraged from forming groups, the need for allies that could assist in rebuilding organizational ties becomes critical. Yet, as the section below will show, the NGO assistance is also a serious concern.

8.2.4.4. *The Unsustained NGO Assistance for Transformative Political Organizing*

Many NGOs in the Philippines have played crucial roles in sharing political views and organizing experience to urban poor communities (Shatkin, 2007). Some NGOs have also acted as policy champions and helped strengthen the capacity of vendors' organizations (Recio, 2014). In Baclaran, however, the NGOs are mainly involved in providing financial support through loans and facilitating religious practices. As a result, the NGO involvement in organizing mainly stemmed from individual organizers who belong to external groups.

In the past, there were two major attempts at engaging vendors in political organizing. The first was initiated by community organizers from left-leaning groups. Their efforts did not gain traction as they resorted to the usual leftist method of organizing individuals, which embraces broader causes like class inequality and capitalism, among others. As local organizer, Jess, recalled, “Their approach was to link vending issues to ‘isms’ – capitalism, imperialism, feudalism… It did not work because the hawkers are more concerned with everyday problems of economic survival”. National government staff, Noriel, echoed the same sentiment on grassroots organizing: “When it comes to the nature of urban poor’s [engagement] in development work, their basic concerns really are the everyday meals, a house to live in”.

The other organizing intervention came from leaders of informal workers’ associations who were part of the government’s National Anti-Poverty Commission Workers in the Informal Sector Council. This attempt at vendor organizing, which gained a momentum from 2003-2005, focused on social protection agenda. As narrated in Chapter 6, the organizers helped form a federation of around 40 small groups in Parañaque area. Baclaran hawkers got involved in national and local social dialogues, mass demonstrations and training sessions to enhance their organizational skills.

After more than two years of guiding the federation in Baclaran, the enthusiasm of vendors to take part in activities started to fizzle out. The organizers and some barangay officials attributed this to the aftermath of the 2004 local elections, when the city officials resorted to divide-and-rule strategy. As the new mayor’s political operators began recognizing new vendor leaders who gained the blessing of the City Hall in occupying street spaces, the federation got disintegrated. In 2005, the organizers had occasionally visited Baclaran vendors. In these instances, they found out that the hawkers’ federation was practically dissolved after the death of its founding president. Aside from random visits, the initial organizing initiatives were not sustained. The unsustained NGO interventions have partly led to the patronage-oriented illicit fees and kinship-oriented access to vending spaces.

In sum, I have presented in the foregoing discussion how the vendors’ practices constitute various agency expressions in response to structural issues of poverty and rigid state rules. Here, it is clear how the structure-agency nexus operates in vendors’ struggle for economic survival. I have shown how certain actions and issues inhibit vendors’ collective action in

Baclaran. In situating these factors as part of the grassroots democratic entanglements, I posit that the different expressions of vendors' agency are embedded in practices that contain progressive and regressive democratic elements. This is inevitable in an environment where Baclaran hawkers strive to keep their claimed spaces of power (Gaventa, 2011) alongside efforts to tap into the invited and hidden channels and the invited spaces of power. It echoes Ong's (2011) observation on the difficulty of determining whether some actors and practices are on the side of power or on the side of resistance.

8.3. The Implications of the Formal-Informal Interface for Urban Planning

In this section, I explain how the foregoing discussion and the analyses in the earlier chapters affect urban planning. The analysis of empirical data has revealed four critical implications, which can inform planners in understanding the links between the formal-informal interface and planning processes. These are 1) the post-dualist approach to informality; 2) the agglomeration of land uses; 3) the gentrification, informality and globalization; and 4) the need for inclusive urban governance. Each is tackled below.

8.3.1. Planning and the Post-Dualist Approach to Informality

In the previous chapters and the earlier sections in this chapter, I delved into how informality issues and planning processes are embedded in complex situations and overlapping relations. Messy realities like these challenge conventional planning models that may prove unable to capture the conditions on the ground. This points to the need for a more responsive conceptual framework, which may better explain how realities have evolved over time. Here, it is crucial to revisit why the thesis' post-dualist lens provides a nuanced analytical vantage point for urban planners.

As explained in Chapter 3, the post-dualist lens emerges from three strands of academic thought: it follows the enmeshed reading of informality issues, builds on the discourses on structure-agency nexus, particularly Giddens' (1984) structuration theory, and it is linked to planning by adhering to relational and institutionalist standpoint. In brief, the post-dualist lens argues that structural dimensions and agency expressions underpin the interlocking formal and informal economic practices in urban spaces. It frames planning as a governance practice which manages co-existence in shared spaces and relations in collective action (Healey, 1997, 2007b). Planning processes are thus seen as rooted in contrasting interests, transactions, costs, rules, norms and broader social contexts in an urban area. It is then

critical to consider the trajectories of these processes as multi-faceted and socially constructed, which may be questioned and challenged (Healey, 2007a).

Employing the post dualist lens has two practical implications. First, it moves away from the usual dualist standpoint, which has calcified rigid categories and mystified the intricate relations that underpin the 'formal' and 'informal' economic activities. In unpacking these relations, the post-dualist lens amplifies the need to go beyond the developmentalist roots of state interventions and depoliticized local planning approach to informality. In concrete terms, this entails undertaking state interventions beyond the poverty dimensions of street vending and using planning approaches that engage with the socio-political nature of informality. Second, the post-dualist lens resonates with responsive approaches to informality issues. It would enable policy-makers to accommodate an 'urban reform-oriented planning' model (de Souza, 2006) in which planners examine spaces based on the broader social situations and public interest goals. This also implies being open to Bhowmik's (2010) view of public spaces like Baclaran as 'natural markets'[87] where hawkers offer goods to the public. When examined out of context, many people may argue that this will aggravate bottleneck issues. Amid acute poverty, however, policy-makers will need to incorporate the 'natural markets' lens in crafting inclusive[88] laws and land use plans. In India, the 'natural market' approach has been enshrined in the country's Street Vendors Act of 2014. This Law empowers Town Vending Committees to identify natural markets where sellers and buyers have traditionally congregated for the sale and purchase of products or services.

In Baclaran case, employing the urban planning and management approaches explained above can enable planners to situate the spatial (e.g. integration into physical plans) and socio-temporal (e.g. anticipation of Bermonths' impacts) aspects of street vending in broader contexts. This entails being attentive to the socio-economic issues and the layered spatio-political relations manifested in both formal and informal structures of power. Such an approach is relevant to the Philippine context where land use plans simply mark off urban spaces based on their functional utility and relationship to local economic growth goals.

[87] For Bhowmik (2010, p. 13), natural markets "spring up in places where the consumers find them useful. Hence there will be street vendors outside railway stations and bus depots. People returning from a tiring day at work would rather purchase their necessities from these vendors rather than make a detour and go to the market situated a few kilometres away".

[88] This is further elaborated in Section 8.2.5 below.

8.3.2. The Agglomeration of Land Uses

Mixed land uses are a common feature of plans and spatial patterns in the global South. In Baclaran and its adjoining areas, these patterns play an important role for street vendors. In terms of supply chain, for instance, the warehouses of wholesalers and stallholders in shopping malls serve as the vendors' product sources.

Moreover, since many street hawkers live in the nearby residential areas, it is easy for their family members to assist or replace the working relatives when the latter need some rest. The proximity of their houses to the stalls is vital as vendors do not have to spend additional expenses for transportation to get home and ask for help from their relatives. Kaye, a city official, explained how it happened in Pasay. "They [vendors] were not originally from Pasay. They just decided to settle in our communities because they have gotten used to it; they ended up looking for dwelling spaces nearby". It is also common to see relatives of vendors sleeping at or playing (in the case of children) around their hawking spaces. This indicates how vending areas have become an extension of the dwelling spaces of some hawkers.

In addition, some smaller interior streets, which are not used for vending, serve as 'parking' space for the carts of vendors. One inner street, which sits in the middle of a Muslim community in Baclaran, is an important retreat area and storage space for Muslim hawkers. I call these spaces as secondary streets in relation to vending activity. Since the busier roads - the primary streets - are already crowded with vehicles, pedestrians, formal stalls and vendors, the secondary streets are crucial in supporting the vibrant interaction of different users in the primary roads. Besides serving as 'storage' areas, they function as 'buffer spaces' where vendors readily run to whenever there is eviction.

Besides its economic and settlement functions, Baclaran's transport node function in Metro Manila (as explained in Chapter 5) attracts many commuters and street vendors' patrons. Religious activities – primarily seen in the thousands of Baclaran Church's pilgrims – similarly contribute to the agglomeration of land uses. Aside from Baclaran Church, the mosques in the area are important for Muslim street hawkers. They are not only sites for worship but a place where they interact with community and vendor leaders.

As a result, the land use patterns comprise four intersecting functions: a) commercial activities; b) settlement spaces; c) transport nodes; and d) socio-cultural functions. Street hawkers have capitalized on these 'natural markets' (Bhowmik, 2010), which are enhanced

by the agglomeration of land uses. Vendors have made Baclaran as part of their daily lives, socio-cultural environment, economic space, and spatio-political arrangements. Baclaran's situation thus demonstrates that urban agglomeration[89] involves an interface between what is often demarcated as 'formal' and 'informal' economic transactions. It illustrates how informal vending is never insulated from the socio-spatial patterns in the area. It is embedded in Baclaran's overlapping land uses.

8.3.3. Gentrification, Informality, and Globalization

As discussed above, Baclaran's informal vending is linked to the broader land use patterns. In this section, I argue that gentrification, which has received favourable attention from planners as a solution to informality (evident in Chapter 6), is implicated in informality and neoliberal globalization[90]. This is seen in a Baclaran section, which is administratively part of Parañaque.

Parañaque has its own reclaimed area that is part of the Bay City project - an agglomeration of recreational, residential and office spaces - as presented in Chapter 5. Dubbed as 'the Entertainment City', this urban gentrification in the neo-liberal age (Ortega, 2016) boasts of world class hotels and gambling establishments. Before the construction of these structures, a Muslim community inhabited a portion of the Entertainment City's previously vacant area, which is right across the Baclaran Church (Watanabe, 2008). As more Muslim residents arrived, the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) - the state agency tasked to develop the reclaimed area - declared their land occupation as illegal. In 2007, after a Regional Trial Court issued a ruling that favours the PRA, the government undertook series of demolitions against the community. In 2013, a private company who bought the land successfully dismantled the dwelling units and a mosque in the area.

Local political operators and ward leaders then organized the dislocated Muslims who moved to nearby Parañaque and Pasay communities. "We got in touch with Muslim leaders and helped them register as barangay residents in Pasay", narrated Jess, an organizer for local politicians. This assistance forged a relationship between political organizers and Muslim leaders who have later on capitalized on their increasing population as an electoral leverage with politicians vying for government positions. Armed with this political influence,

[89] Scott and Storper (2015) define agglomeration as a mechanism of sharing, matching and learning. "Sharing is about the dense local inter-linkages within production systems… Matching refers to the process of pairing people and jobs... Learning is the dense formal and informal information flows…" (Scott & Storper, 2015, p. 6).
[90] Authors like Crossa (2009), Ortega (2016), among others, echo similar observation in their own work.

the Muslim leaders have gained concessions, including an access to vending spaces for Muslim residents, from local government officials. Recently, Parañaque's Mayor announced his plan to house Baclaran vendors in a flea market (Ramirez, 2017). This effort appears to regulate or prevent 'informalization' of carefully planned urban mega-projects (Shatkin, 2008).

The foregoing account depicts an ironic land use pattern in global South cities – the entwined relationship between gentrification and informality. While government officials see gentrification as a solution to informality (evident in Chapter 6); the displaced urban poor embrace informality as a coping mechanism against the onslaught of gentrification. This affirms how powerful groups are implicated in deepening impoverishment (Lawson, 2012) and how state interventions (e.g. land use plans) may entrench informality (Roy, 2005; Yiftachel, 2006). At the same time, the account shows how the gentrification-informality nexus occurs amid the pervasive government drive to embrace neoliberal globalization.

As discussed in Chapter 5, as global South states aim to modernize and globalize cities, they often restrict urban informal livelihoods (Elyachar, 2005). In Baclaran, the narrative above reveals how the interplay of global neoliberal trends and urban informality involves the private investment-driven change in land values and a mega urban project. For some scholars, this entails privatization of planning (Shatkin, 2008) and gentrification against informality (Ortega, 2016). The bias against informal livelihoods is likewise seen in how the government, in its effort to project Manila as a global city, has repeatedly evicted Baclaran vendors (tackled in Chapter 7) when there are international visitors and/or events such as the one narrated in the beginning of Chapter 1.

These issues affirm the importance of situating the formal-informal interface in the discourse on 'worlding cities' (Roy & Ong, 2011). Worlding refers to "diverse spatializing practices that mix and match different components that go into building an emergent system" (Ong, 2011, p. 12). Recognizing heterogeneous practices that fail to fit into the neat categories of class, political, or cultural categories, worlding seeks to "remap relationships of power at different scales and localities" (Ong, 2011, p. 12). In this sense, planners are urged to be attentive to how land use designs patterned after neoliberal globalization may actually reinforce informal practices or create spaces that they intend to wipe out. Understanding how external forces such as neoliberal globalization ideas intersect with local coping mechanisms and resistance

strategies – as a worlding practice - may inform planners and decision-makers how to devise a more inclusive urban governance.

8.3.4. The Need for Inclusive Urban Governance

In the last three previous chapters, I have shown how the planning-governance nexus and the formal-informal interface should be seen as situated in the co-existence of various activities and socio-political relations in shared and contested spaces. The issues and tensions associated with these complex interactions are further compounded by the persistent inequality in the use and ordering of Baclaran spaces. The prevailing socio-spatial and political environment in Baclaran marginalizes the rights of poor informal vendors. The dominant legal instruments privilege the property rights of formal commercial stalls. Statutory plans hinge on neoliberal-inspired goal of strengthening local growth machines and gentrifying public spaces where urban informal vending takes place. Evictions and financial insecurity constantly threaten the vendors' livelihood sources and socio-economic networks. Grassroots collective actions get thwarted by strong patronage relations and dominant elite families in local governments. These hierarchical and exclusionary urban conditions can lead to a path-dependent trajectory of inequality that is hard, if not impossible, to change in the long run (McGranahan et al., 2016).

These grim realities are a far cry from the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goal # 11 - make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable – and its broader slogan for development - *'no one will be left behind'*. Amid the wide gap between an ideal urban scenario and the current situation in Baclaran, it is crucial for planners to heed ideas that question the exclusionary policies and practices in many global South cities. Lefebvre's (1968) right to the city is one of such ideas. It resonates with evolving approaches on human rights-centred development (Diokno, 2004), inclusive urbanization (McGranahan et al., 2016) and inclusive legal order (Brown, 2017b), among others.

McGranahan et al.'s (2016) contention on the need to go beyond the World Bank's (2013a) conception of inclusion in cities is critical. Questioning the World Bank's identity-oriented definition of disadvantage, they adhere to empowering and equitable urban inclusion that addresses overt discrimination and structurally-produced disadvantages (McGranahan et al., 2016). Their multi-tiered inclusion mechanisms can thus inform what inclusive urban governance will look like. For them, the three levels of inclusion involve the following:

a. Removing discriminatory exclusions, such as denying migrants the right to settle

> in the city (space), buy property (markets), send their children to school or access health care (services);
>
> b. Ensuring that prevailing institutions (market regulation, service provision; space use) incorporate the voices and reflect the needs of disadvantaged groups; and
>
> c. Ensuring that the human rights of disadvantaged groups are fully met through, among other means, markets, services and access to spaces. (McGranahan et al., 2016, p. 17)

When linked to informality, an inclusive urban governance entails striking a balance between addressing the persistent informality - which is riddled with unequal and exclusionary relations as shown in the previous chapters – and integrating informal livelihoods into existing formal systems. There has to be an adequate attention to the needs, rights, and aspirations of the informal workers like vendors. In Baclaran, an inclusive and rights-based framework for urban work is vital to recognize "the legitimacy of urban informal economies, the scope for collective management of urban resources and the social value of public space as a site for urban livelihoods" (Brown, 2017b, p. 244). This resonates with ideas around natural market (Bhowmik, 2010) approach to street vending and the urban reform-oriented land use planning (de Souza, 2006), as mentioned in Section 8.3.1 above.

More concretely, Brown's (2017a, pp. 80-81) proposal to consider the 'street as a place of work' and a 'common-pool resource' that should "be managed for shared benefits to accrue, with defined 'bundles' of rights…" is a key step in addressing the vulnerable conditions of Baclaran hawkers. This view is an important approach in designing inclusive and rights-based interventions. As Brown (2017a, 90) puts it,

> "… [U]rban public space as a 'common-pool resource' can provide a new framework of collective rights in the public domain, which would include a variety of rights – to work, to move through and to enjoy public space… The challenge is how to manage the resulting congestion and 'tragedy of the commons' that may occur. For street traders, the bundles of rights might include access to and beneficial use, but with conditions requiring contributions to collective management of the resource."

This approach to urban public space as a common-pool resource can guide planners and policy-makers in addressing the disjunctive nature of local governance in both Pasay and Parañaque cities. It can inform the local officials in developing an urban governance agenda that responds to the complex formal-informal interface in an inclusive manner. In pursuing an inclusive agenda, it is useful to revisit how the urban governance literatures (Chapter 3) stress the need to be attentive to both collaborations and conflicts in governance processes (Healey, 1997; Minnery, 2007). It is equally crucial to pay attention to the different forms and

faces of power (Lukes, 2005; Gaventa, 2011), the relations they generate, and the various strategies that marginalised players employ (Chatterjee, 2004). There is also a concern over how various people can reach a consensus in planning, a process susceptible to issues that come with 'conflicting rationalities' (Watson, 2003) and "a realm that is infused with private and sectional interests" (Mattila, 2016, p. 360). Even McGranahan et al. (2016) acknowledge that state authorities, often 'prone to elite capture', "are unlikely to plan for inclusive urbanization without pressure from below" (p.24). As evident in Baclaran, socio-spatial ordering of contested vending spaces is rooted in the complex and unequal power relations among different players. Some local government officials, politicians, and planners will inevitably support the existing exclusionary power relations. An inclusive urban governance should therefore involve different stakeholders in the processes of shaping policies and planning trajectories affecting informal hawkers. In Baclaran, partnerships between government agencies as well as NGOs, vendor groups and social movements at the local and national levels can result in more accountable and democratic processes as some national government offices have oversight functions over LGUs. Thus, while informal networks are key to the survival of vendors in exclusionary power relations, an inclusive urban governance should focus on how even the informal and unequal structures of power could be better brought to public control and made more legitimate (Healey, 1997; 2007b).

Lastly, an inclusive urban governance entails reorienting planning education towards a more context-sensitive approach to informal livelihoods like street vending. A planning education, which is more attuned to 'global South-East' realities (Yiftachel, 2006; Watson, 2012), can challenge and transform the depoliticized attitude of local planners towards the complex socio-spatial relations, which underpin the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces. In sum, inclusive urban governance anchors on four components: 1) the emphasis on the needs and rights of the marginalised players like street vendors; 2) the attention to conflictive and unequal power relations; 3) the recognition of the role of sustained collective action by vendor groups, social movements, and NGOs; and 4) the promotion of context-sensitive planning education.

8.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have answered the thesis sub-questions 4 and 5: What relational logics and entrenched arrangements influence the governing processes and interactions of the different players? What are the implications of the formal-informal interface for urban planning processes, particularly in the context of governing and appropriating contested

vending spaces? These questions pertain to the last two governance dimensions - governing relations and planning implications – I laid out in Chapter 3.

With respect to the governing relations, I have identified four overlapping relations: a) the disjunctive urban governance, b) the strong kinship ties, c) the clientelist political relations, and d) the grassroots democratic entanglements. By explaining the causes and implications of each relation, I have demonstrated how institutional issues (disjunctive governance), socio-cultural and political ties (kinship bonds and clientelism), and grassroots agency (grassroots democratic entanglements) intersect and generate the complex formal-informal interface in governing contested vending spaces. In unpacking the interplay of the four entwined relations, I have shown how the governing relations are rooted in the structure-agency nexus and the multiple forms and spaces of power. Besides issues linked to power, I have explored the importance of linking informality to conceptual and empirical questions about democracy.

For the last governance dimension, I have presented four implications of the formal-informal interface for urban planning: a) the post-dualist approach to informality; b) the agglomeration of land uses; c) gentrification, informality and globalization; and 4) the need for inclusive urban governance. In discussing each theme, I have argued how and why the thesis' post-dualist lens is a sound analytical approach in examining the formal-informal interface. My analysis has further explained how the socio-spatial patterns and their interactions (land use, gentrification and informality) are linked to broader planning issues (e.g. globalization). Finally, I have underscored how planners can better deal with the complex formal-informal interface through inclusive urban governance.

CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION

Street vending is a precarious urban livelihood. Many vendors suffer from harassment and evictions resulting from hostile state policies. Hannah's plea, as narrated in the introductory chapter, exemplifies the plight of informal vendors in many global South cities. Driven by the need to survive, hawkers have devised informal mechanisms – from grassroots practices to national and international collaborative initiatives - to deal with various types of state regulation. I have referred to this interplay of state interventions and informal practices as the formal-informal interface. The governing relations that produce and evolve from the formal-informal interface are the key problematic of this thesis. I have thus problematized the question "How can the interface of formal systems and informal mechanisms to govern and appropriate contested vending spaces be explained?" In answering this query, I argue that the formal-informal interface can be explained by using a post-dualist lens in examining five governance dimensions – players, policies, practices, governing relations, and planning implications – that shape the socio-spatial interactions in contested vending spaces. Post-dualist lens, as developed in this thesis, is a conceptual analytical framework that moves beyond the dichotomous view of informality. It serves as a reflexive lens in unpacking the conceptual prisms and policy approaches that have influenced how the formal systems and urban informality are understood. Thus, the thesis contributes to the theoretical discussion on urban informality and planning by employing the post-dualist lens in analysing state policies, planning interventions, street vendors' practices, and how their interplay affects how local governments work and deal with informal vending. Using the post-dualist lens also opens up spaces for policy recommendations that are attentive to the issues surrounding the formal-informal interface in insecure urban employment.

9.1. Key Findings and their Implications for Theorizing and Policy-making

The dominant literature on urban informality espouses a dualist view of informal livelihoods like street vending (informal work as separate from formal economic activities). While this dualist view has influenced much scholarly and policy framing, a number of scholars have pointed out its constraints in responding to the complex socio-spatial relations in urban informality. For instance, the dualist view highlights the dichotomy between formal measures (government policies and programs) and the informal economic activities, which are seen as beyond the ambit of state control. Yet, the conceptual debates and empirical accounts on street vending have shown how state institutions are implicated in informality. With its focus on the formal-informal dichotomy, the dualist view has generated a hostile policy

attitude towards informal workers like street vendors. As a result, the unsupportive policy environment has deepened the vendors' insecure conditions as seen in Hannah's account. Given these limitations of the dualist view (as elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3), examining the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces demands a conceptual analytical framework that goes beyond the binary understanding of urban informality. My notion of post-dualist lens has sought to address this issue.

The post-dualist lens builds on three strands of academic literature (discussed in Chapters 2 and 3): a) the enmeshed reading of informality, b) the structuration theory, and c) the relational-institutionalist framing of planning. Drawing from these ideas, the post-dualist lens contends that examining the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces requires attention to structural dimensions of informality (e.g. state policies and programs) and agency expressions of informal workers (e.g. vendors' collective action and individual initiatives). It views planning and governance processes as relational in that they are situated within the evolving, complex, socio-spatial interactions in urban areas. In addressing the main research question, I have deployed the post-dualist lens as the thesis' conceptual analytical framework and contribution to the theoretical discussion on informality and planning.

In employing the post-dualist lens, five themes - dubbed as governance dimensions - comprise the analytical threads that address the thesis' main research question: players, policies, practices, governing relations, and planning implications. Players refer to the stakeholders – government agencies and officials, unorganized and organized street vendors, non-government organizations, and private sector players – who are directly and/or indirectly involved in informality, street use, and informal vending (Chapter 6). Policies pertain to state laws and programs that affect street use and informal vending. Practices are the different mechanisms that street vendors have undertaken to govern and/or appropriate contested vending spaces (Chapter 7). Governing relations refer to systemic arrangements and micro socio-spatial modes of engagements that lie beneath the rules, interactions, norms, and actions in contested vending spaces. Planning implications pay attention to how the formal-informal interface influences and is affected by urban planning (Chapter 8). These governance dimensions were examined using Baclaran vending district in Metro Manila as the case study area.

Based on the Baclaran context, I have explained the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, while this research is informed by my own conceptual and contextual perspectives, the way of seeing is also contingent on the social contexts of the stakeholders - government officials, street vendors and other players - who participated in the research as informants. Thus, I acknowledge that different stakeholders can offer an explanation of the formal-informal interface based on their respective socio-spatial positionality, ideologies and values, conceptual tools, institutional affiliations, and social contexts. As stated in Chapter 1, this is consistent with the thesis critical realist ontological position. In the realm of governance and planning, however, the diverse conceptions and interventions around the interface may result in 'conflicting rationalities' (Watson, 2003) where concerned parties have disparate notions of ideal living environments and diverging justifications of their practices in shared and/or contested urban spaces. One way to overcome the issues that come with conflicting rationalities and/or sectoral views of the interface is to employ the thesis' post-dualist lens. Besides being a reflexive analytical tool, the post-dualist lens provides a space for an inclusive urban governance framework (see a longer discussion in Chapter 8) where contending players can articulate their problems and deliberate on potential solutions to issues arising from the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces.

When informal vendors occupy streets and sidewalks, it is the ensuing 'chaos' or congestion that usually catches the public attention. But the observed spatial patterns emerge from how different stakeholders get entangled in street use and informal vending. Understanding this concern partly explains how the formal-informal interface operates in contested vending spaces. In interrogating the players involved in informality and street vending (discussed in Chapter 6 to address the sub-question 1), it is necessary to understand why and how state agencies are implicated in urban informality. This state involvement resonates with earlier scholarly arguments on the need to analyse the state role in informal economy (Roy, 2005; Yiftachel, 2006; Xue & Huang, 2015). When linked to policy-making and planning, many policy recommendations identify formalization as a key approach to informal economy (ILO, 2014; Tucker, 2016). Yet, the analysis on the constraints that the Philippine government offices face - limited grassroots engagement, institutional fragmentation, unresponsive processes, elite capture, depoliticized planning - indicates that formalization is unlikely to work in this kind of institutional environment. The institutional issues also underscore how individual agents of the state (the technocrats, employees, and street-level bureaucrats), their preferences, and worldviews can entrench the dualist approach to policy enforcement.

Formalization advocates also need to contend with how decentralization plays a critical role in unequal power relations. Although it is seen as a key agenda in urban governance and local empowerment (McGranahan et al., 2016; Porio, 2012; 2016), decentralization is an insufficient measure to empower marginalized informal workers in the context of strong discretionary power of local executives, entrenched elite capture of local governments, and depoliticized planning approach. Thus, there is a need to examine how the multi-layered forms and spaces of power (Gaventa, 2011; Lukes, 2005) may inhibit or enable vendors to persist in an exclusionary socio-spatial environment. In Baclaran, the analytical insights affirm previous empirical accounts (Piliavsky, 2014; Routray, 2014) on how local intermediaries - political operators and vendor organizers - could either sustain or undermine vendors' collective action for democratic political organizing and engagement with policy-making.

As an instrument to control and manage public spaces, state policies shape the socio-spatial interactions of those involved in informal vending. The analysis of government laws and programs (discussed in Chapter 7 in response to the sub-question 2) illustrates how legal tools have evolved from the interplay of historical trajectories (Brown, 2017b), economic paradigms, and socio-political realities (Fernandes, 2017), which are often hostile to informal livelihoods of the urban poor (Illy, 1986). This shows how legal instruments can elicit responses from the urban poor which deepen informality. It equally stresses the need for scholars to examine the implications of past and contemporary socio-political arrangements and urban patterns in specific contexts. In Baclaran, these factors are crucial to situate the street vending phenomenon in the broader governing relations and unequal power structures that shape urban informality.

The unequal power structures manifest in the practices and norms that street vendors have developed to engage and/or avoid state authorities (discussed in Chapter 7 to answer the sub-question 3). From street occupation to financial capital generation, informal hawkers have devised strategies to cope with state control and/or institutional neglect of their situation. Baclaran vendors' *haging* occupancy, engagement with evictionist regulatory regime, Bermonths routine, and multiple finance-generating schemes depict the different forms of grassroots agency and calculated responses to evolving socio-spatial relations. These practices also illustrate that layers of marginalization exist even among those on the periphery of power. This analytical insight amplifies the need to recognize how informal ties

and norms can open up spaces for some vendors; but, in the same breath, they can push aside groups with less access to the power structures.

In examining the governing relations (presented in Chapter 8 in response to the sub-question 4), four intertwined themes have emerged as critical: the disjunctive urban governance, the strong kinship ties, the clientelist politics, and the grassroots democratic entanglements. The analysis on the causes and consequences of each governing relation shows how understanding their links will help state officials, planners, and street vendors determine how the various interests get legitimized, co-opted, contested, marginalized and embedded in their daily socio-spatial practices and interactions. Put another way, these interwoven relations are more than institutional or political affiliations; they shape and alter urban spatial patterns. Acknowledging how the entwined governing relations transform or produce space (Lefebvre, 1991; Oriard, 2015) can therefore inform policy ideas around the right to the city, democracy, social justice, and inclusionary agenda. For instance, the findings indicate how legal recognition of the rights of vendors to public spaces, as the UNDP (2008) and ILO (2014) push for, is necessary but insufficient to solve their uncertain situation. Rather, it should be coupled with efforts that will end the abusive clientelist relations between the hawkers and local authorities/political leaders. Although some of these informal channels enable vendors to survive in an exclusionary environment, the dominant players feed into the hawkers' vulnerable situation to maintain unjust power relations. To confront this system, it is crucial to create an atmosphere that sustains democratic and accountable grassroots organizing involving vendors. It also requires revisiting how existing legal frameworks that are meant to empower the poor have mainly advanced the neoliberal economic agenda and entrenched elite families in local governance at the expense of the marginalized groups.

This issue on local governance relates to the last dimension: implications of the formal-informal interface for planning (discussed in Chapter 8 to answer the sub-question 5). Urban planning is often viewed as a 'neutral', technical, and rational exercise aimed at improving the conditions of cities. It intends to generate 'order' by removing 'disorder' or eradicating things and practices labelled as unpleasant. Yet, the processes of producing order always operate within existing power relations where the dominant players define what constitutes disorder (Pratt, 2006). Similar to many global South cities, planners in Baclaran embrace a neo-liberal 'world-class' city vision. As state officials and planners promote order to make the areas around Baclaran attractive to local and foreign investors, informal hawkers are

seen as an urban blight that ought to be removed from the public space. The precarious conditions of Baclaran vendors are therefore embedded in planning issues like gentrification, agglomeration of land uses, and the neoliberal globalization.

Although some planning interventions discriminate against informal livelihoods, leaving the socio-spatial arrangements to informal channels might also deepen the clientelist and unjust power relations. As a practice involved in managing co-existence in shared or contested spaces, planning is necessary to create an enabling atmosphere with clear governance structures where the marginalized players like vendors can articulate their issues and demands. Thus, the ideas of inclusive urbanisation (McGranahan et al., 2016) and inclusive legal order (Brown, 2017a) can serve as a framework for inclusive urban governance where planning addresses the vulnerable conditions of Baclaran vendors (Chapter 8). As explained in Chapter 8, however, there is a concern over how various players can reach a consensus in planning in the midst of issues arising from 'conflicting rationalities' (Watson, 2003), 'sectional interests' (Mattila, 2016), and 'elite capture' (MacGranahan, 2016). The Baclaran context shows how these issues operate on the ground.

To encourage, if not compel, the powerful local officials and planners to embrace an inclusionary approach, a sustained and democratic collective action pursued by strong vendor organisations in partnership with social movements[91] and civil society groups should be a critical component of an inclusive urban governance. The complexity of grassroots democratic entanglements (Chapter 8) illustrates how development NGOs and the broader social movements can help in sustaining Baclaran vendors' collective action for democratic political organising. This resonates with the notion of 'inclusion from below' (McGranahan et al., 2016, 24) where social movements play a central role "in negotiating the production and distribution of urban resources, and in the process creating opportunities for participatory models of governance". In other words, an inclusive urban governance is not simply an institutional or administrative arrangement enforced and/or adhered to by government officials. It is an arena where contending interests meet and a terrain of political struggle for the marginalised vendors. As mentioned in Chapter 8, in Baclaran, partnerships between government agencies as well as NGOs, vendor groups and social movements at the local and national levels can result in more accountable and democratic processes as some

[91] While McGranahan et al. (2016) emphasize the role of social movements in shaping inclusionary processes and outcomes, de Souza (2006) sees their potential as 'critical urban planning agents' when they not only criticize state-led planning but also actively implement solutions independent of the state agencies.

national government offices have oversight functions over local governments. In this way, inclusive urban governance can facilitate processes where the informal and unequal structures of power could be better brought to public control and made more legitimate (Healey, 1997; 2007b) and responsive to the needs of marginalized groups.

The inclusive governance agenda should strike a balance between addressing the persistent informality and integrating informal work into existing formal systems. Here, Brown's (2017a) proposal to consider streets as places of work and a 'common-pool resource' offers a promising framework that regards "the public domain of cities as part of the urban land resource to which collective property rights may pertain" (p. 89). Building on these inclusive governance and common-pool resource ideas, five interrelated recommendations can inform planning and policy-making in Baclaran and other global South informal vending sites with similar issues. The recommendations below seek to address the insecure conditions of Hannah and her fellow Baclaran vendors. The proposals also hope to make government's responses to informal livelihoods more sensitive to the vendors' needs and self-help initiatives.

9.2. Policy Recommendations

As stated in the introduction, I acknowledge that different stakeholders – state officials, vendors, NGOs, stallholders, church leaders, among others - can explain in different ways what the formal-informal interface means to them. This recognition adheres to the thesis ontological position and enables the various players to inform policy-making by offering their views on the roots, processes, and outcomes of the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces. In this manner, proposed policy recommendations and planning interventions will emanate from multiple accounts of the perceived and felt problems concerning Baclaran street vending. Yet, governance and planning processes are filled with conflicting motives and unequal power relations where the interests of the marginalised are often ignored. Prevailing institutions (e.g. service provision, space use) should, therefore, incorporate the voices and reflect the needs of disadvantaged groups to promote inclusive urbanization (McGranahan et al., 2016). In this regard, the five recommendations identified below build on the perspectives of different stakeholders and recognize the issues of the vulnerable players.

The first proposal is an intervention at the national level where a Magna Carta for Workers in the Informal Economy has been filed at the Philippine Senate and the House of

Representatives. Since the government is currently deliberating on the proposed legislation with various lobby groups, it is critical to conduct a series of policy dialogues on how Brown's (2017a) notion of public space as a common-pool resource and Bhowmik's (2010) idea of 'natural markets' can inform the provisions on informal vending. The discussions can then tease out policy-enforcement mechanisms arising from Brown's and Bhowmik's ideas and/or from context-specific issues in Baclaran and other urban informal vending sites in the Philippines.

The second policy recommendation pertains to the formation of an inter-agency committee of national government offices - MMDA, PCUP, NEDA, BWSC, NAPC, among others - and local government units. This recommendation stems from the need to have an enabling institutional environment for inclusive governance. The inter-agency committee can address the institutional issues (identified in Chapter 6) faced by the government agencies. The committee can likewise harmonize all the government interventions involving informal workers like street vendors.

The third proposal is the establishment of the local multi-stakeholder committee. It aims to foster an inclusive governance at the local (city and barangay) level and to ensure that Brown's (2017a) notion of common-pool resource will be supported by local stakeholders. The local committee should consist of representatives of Baclaran vendors, local government officials from Pasay and Parañaque cities, Church leaders, Cooperative officials, mall operators, stallholders, and NGOs advocating for the rights of informal workers. Similar to India's Town Vending Committee (mentioned in Chapter 8), this multi-sectoral committee should attend to issues in Baclaran vending district. This committee is a critical arena for the envisioned inclusive urban governance where civil society groups and vendor organizations will have to sustain their lobbying efforts and organising work to overcome an inevitably fierce resistance from powerful local government officials and detached urban planners. Through the committee, civil society groups and Baclaran vendors can identify specific recommendations that planning offices in Pasay and Parañaque should consider in developing local land use plans. One key step is to design a time-sharing of space (Brown, 2017a) to ensure that street use for vending will not result in congestion and 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin, 1968). This time-sharing design can also democratize the access to and control of the coveted spaces in Baclaran.

The meaningful representation and active involvement of Baclaran vendors is a critical factor in the formation and operation of the local committee. Without the significant participation of vendors, the local committee may be used by the more powerful groups to advance their interests or maintain the existing unequal socio-spatial relations. This then brings up the need to enhance the capacity of vendors to engage with other players, which can be addressed by the next proposal.

The fourth recommendation seeks to strengthen grassroots collective action: sustained organizing work and networking at the local and national levels. This proposed intervention is directed at non-government organizations advocating for street vendors' rights. It is crucial to link up the Baclaran vendor groups with national organizations so the latter can assist the local groups in confronting the entrenched clientelist networks at the local level. Organizing work should also involve regular capacity-building activities on organizational development and urban planning processes, among others. Training sessions on these themes can improve the confidence of Baclaran vendors in articulating their needs and taking part in local governance. Being attentive to organizational dynamics should enable vendor leaders to reach out to unorganized hawkers whose lack of affiliation leads to a more vulnerable condition. This can address the issue of hierarchical relations within those on the margins of power.

The fifth policy proposal concerns an analysis of the issues faced by Baclaran vendors. This situational analysis should be integrated into official planning documents. It should form a section of the socio-ecological profile of Pasay's and Parañaque's Comprehensive Land Use Plans. Drawing on the post-dualist lens, the situational analysis should determine how the conditions and needs of informal vendors are linked to and affected by the formal policy direction and planning trajectories of the two cities and the national government. In this manner, future planning interventions can address the gaps between the rigid formal policies and the evolving realities of Baclaran vendors.

9.3. Research Limitations, Topics for Future Studies, and Reflective Insights

Besides the knowledge contribution and policy recommendations, I acknowledge two limitations of this research, which can also be a take-off point for future research undertaking. The first has to do with the gendered dimensions of urban informal vending in Baclaran. As noted in Chapter 4, although biological sexual identity has been a major criterion in the selection of respondents to get the differing views of men and women, the

analysis did not dwell on deeper gendered (particularly women-oriented) issues pertaining to Baclaran street vending. While the gendered issues of informality were not really the focus of this thesis, future research may build on this theme. Urban informal economy is a highly gendered sector (Brown & McGranahan, 2016) and women's concerns need attention as they constitute a significant number in street trading (Brown, 2006a). One emphasis can be on how women and men may have been differently affected by the policies, practices, and the unequal power relations arising from the formal-informal interface. Their access to public spaces can be examined in connection to the dominant social relations (Pratt, 2006) and the gendered dimensions of informal livelihoods (Brown & Rakodi, 2006). Some questions can tap into the findings of this research: 'What are the factors that shape the differences between female and male vendors' access to financial resources?' 'How does the proximity of vending spaces to residential areas strengthen and/or inhibit women's ability to take part in informal vending?', 'How does women's participation in street vending contribute to grassroots collective action?'

The second limitation of the thesis concerns the inadequate discussion of urban migration as a vital component of informality (Musoni, 2010; Swider, 2015), particularly street vending in Baclaran. Urban migration is also an important planning concern, which represents poor people's agency to confront their impoverished condition in the rural areas (Perez, 2015). It is equally linked to structural factors such as when state policies encourage socio-economic interventions in certain urban centres (Pernia et al., 1983). In the Philippines, eight out of ten Filipinos will be living in cities and urban agglomerations by 2030 (Tirona, 2013). If statistical trends continue, over one third of the migrants will move to Metro Manila and its neighbouring regions (Perez, 2015). Future studies can thus dwell on whether, and to what extent, the socio-spatial patterns in Baclaran are involved in the nexus between migration, street vending, and urban informality in the Philippines.

Researching urban informality is a challenging endeavour. Its complexity is rooted in conceptual ambiguities and empirical nuances. During the fieldwork, after I explained my research to local official, Mila, she talked to her staff and quipped, "Look, he is a PhD researcher studying our street hawkers. Their problems are so complex. Isn't he crazy to do a research on Baclaran vendors?" Indeed, the issues surrounding informality and street vending are tricky and filled with contradictions. Many state officials still consider hawking as an aberration to the neat and orderly vision of city plans. Yet, global statistics indicate that informality will continue to shape urban socio-spatial patterns in the future. It is therefore

crucial to always commune with the messy realities of informality and to ‘stay with the trouble’ (Haraway, 2016). In studying the formal-informal interface, I have undertaken an academic engagement with intricate issues and entangled relations. I hope the thesis findings can inform policy-makers and planners in addressing an enduring dilemma that local official, Allen, articulated in our conversation.

> What would you rather have – a beautiful city, an orderly place? But, what the hell has happened to your residents? They have become hold uppers, thieves… Then the homeless children have increased; you would pity them [because] they don’t have food and source of income.

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APPENDICES

A. Guide Questions for Interviews with Government Officials

Some notes before an interview or a focus group discussion begins.

a. After the introduction protocol, the researcher will explain to the participant/s the objectives and nature of the research.
b. He will then present the participant consent form and participant information sheet for the participants to review and sign before the actual interview or focus group begins.
c. Once the participant/s has signed the consent form, the researcher will ask her/him if it is okay to digitally record the conversation.
d. The researcher will also briefly explain the general flow of the discussion.

Questions

1. Please tell me about your current role in this organization. Please tell me about your responsibilities in this role.
2. Can you share your opinion about street vending, pedicab driving and other similar activities in the city?
3. Please explain the mandate/responsibilities of your office with regard to street vending?
4. Can you discuss the government policies/programs that have to do with street vending? Do you think they are working? Please explain.
5. In some areas, there are activities or rules that different groups/individuals observe. However, these practices/rules are not necessarily part of government laws or programs. We can probably call these as ‘internal protocols’ within or among groups involved in street vending. Do you know if there are these kinds of practices/protocols related to street vending? Can you share some examples?
6. In dealing with street hawkers or in implementing government policies on street vending, do you also have ‘internal protocols’? If so, can you share something about these and how do these affect the policies on vending (e.g. are they helpful?)?
7. I am sorry to ask a question that might be obvious for you, but sometimes it is difficult to understand how the government structure works, especially for people like me who are not familiar with the government hierarchy and programs. Can you explain how government policies/programs deal with ‘internal protocols’ that you just mentioned?

8. What can you say about the presence of these government policies alongside the 'internal protocols' on street vending?
9. Aside from your office, can you identify other organizations or offices that are involved in government policies/programs that have to do with street vending? Please elaborate more on their roles and activities (e.g. permit application, clearing operation, etc.).
10. Can you also tell me about the organizations or offices that are involved in internal protocols on street vending? Can you describe their roles and activities (e.g. selling of goods, monitoring/policing the spaces)?
11. In many instances, the different groups/offices interact with each other. Can you say something about rules and/or internal protocols that these organizations observe in
    - Building partnerships or collaborations?
    - Dealing with conflicts and tensions?
    - Addressing accountability issues (e.g. erring members, corrupt practices)?
12. Based on your experience, what are the patterns and/or changes with respect to the government policies and/or internal protocols related to street vending? Can you share your thoughts about these patterns and/or changes?
13. In your opinion, what are the implications of the simultaneous presence of government policies and 'internal protocols' to the following:
    - What your office/organization has been doing?
    - Use of public spaces (streets, sidewalks, parks, etc.)?
    - Urban planning/governance?

B. Guide Questions for Interviews with Leaders of Vendor Organizations

1. How long have you been a street vendor? What is your position in your organization? What have been the advantages of being in this position? What have been the challenges of being in this position?
2. Please explain the brief history of your organization and what it currently does. How many members do you have?
3. What is your opinion about street vending as a job? Can you share its advantages and disadvantages?
4. Please tell me about government policies/programs that have to do with street vending? Can you share your opinion about these policies and programs?
5. In some areas, there are activities or rules that different groups/individuals observe. However, these practices/rules are not necessarily part of government laws or programs. We can probably call these as 'internal protocols' within or among groups

involved in street vending. Do you know if there are these kinds of practices/protocols related to street vending? Can you cite some examples?

6. Can you explain how government policies/programs deal with 'internal protocols' that you just mentioned?
7. What can you say about the presence of these government policies alongside the 'internal protocols' on street vending?
8. Let's talk more about the development or implementation of these government policies/programs on street vending? Does your organization have any role in the development and/or implementation of these policies/programs? To what extent has your role been able to influence the development and/or implementation of the policies/programs?
9. Now let's talk about the role of your organization in the development and/or implementation of the 'internal protocols'. Can you say something about it? What are the advantages and disadvantages of these 'protocols'?
10. You mentioned the advantages and disadvantages of the protocol. What then are the protocols that should be kept? Abolished? Institutionalized? What could be the best compromise for all stakeholders?
11. Aside from your organization, can you identify other groups or offices that are involved in government policies/programs that have to do with street vending? Please elaborate more on their roles and activities (e.g. permit application, clearing operation, etc.).
12. Can you also tell me about the organizations or offices that are involved in internal protocols on street vending? Please describe their roles and activities (e.g. selling of goods, monitoring/policing the spaces)?
13. In many instances, the different groups/offices interact with each other. Can you say something about rules and/or internal protocols that these groups observe in
    - Building partnerships or collaborations?
    - Dealing with conflicts and tensions?
    - Addressing issues of erring members or corrupt practices?
14. As one of the groups involved in street vending, please share your opinion on the implications of the simultaneous presence of the government policies and 'internal protocols' on street vending to the following
    - the relations of different stakeholders?
    - the use of public spaces (e.g. streets, sidewalks, etc.)?
15. Do you have other things you would like to share in connection to the topics and issues we discussed? Please feel free to explain.

C. Guide Questions for FGDs with Vendors

1. To begin with our discussion, please share something about yourself: your age, residence, educational attainment, number of years as a street vendor.
2. Please share your opinion about street vending in relation to
   - Livelihood?
   - Everyday activities or routines?
   - Use of public spaces (streets, sidewalks, etc.)?
3. Let's discuss the issues you face as street vendors and how you have been responding to these issues individually and/or as a group?
4. Please share your opinion/s about government policies/programs on street vending.
5. In some areas, there are activities or rules that different groups/individuals observe. However, these practices/rules are not necessarily part of government laws or programs. Sometimes they contradict government policies. We can probably call these as 'internal protocols' within or among groups involved in street vending. Do you know if there are these kinds of practices/protocols related to street vending? Can you cite some examples?
6. What can you say about the simultaneous presence of these government policies and the 'internal protocols' on street vending?
7. Now let's talk about your role/s in the development and/or implementation of the 'internal protocols'. Can you say something about it? What are the advantages and disadvantages of these 'protocols'?
8. You mentioned the advantages and disadvantages of the protocol. What then are the protocols that should be kept? Abolished? Institutionalized? What could be the best compromise for all stakeholders?
9. Aside from your organization, can you identify other groups or offices that are involved in government policies/programs that have to do with street vending? Please elaborate more on their roles and activities (e.g. permit application, clearing operation, etc.).
10. Can you also tell me about the organizations or offices that are involved in internal protocols on street vending? Please describe their roles and activities (e.g. selling of goods, monitoring/policing the spaces)?
11. In many instances, the different groups/offices interact with each other. Can you share something about the rules and/or internal protocols that these organizations observe in
    - Building partnerships or collaborations?
    - Dealing with conflicts and tensions?

- Addressing issues of erring members or corrupt practices?

12. As one of those involved in street vending, please share your opinion on the implications of the simultaneous presence of the government policies and ‘internal protocols’ on street vending to the following
    - the relations of different stakeholders?
    - the use of public spaces (e.g. streets, sidewalks, etc.)?
13. What other important street vending issues/practices do you want to share in this discussion?

D. Research Participants

I replaced the names of research participants with pseudonyms to protect their privacy. Although I used the information collected from interviews and FGDs involving 102 people, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, the list below only contains the pseudonyms of interviewees and FGD participants that I quoted in the thesis.

Baclaran Vendors

Alexander	A Muslim community leader who has a semi-fixed vending stall. He used to be a formal employee in a neighbouring city. He started working as a vendor in Baclaran in 1988.
Carlo	A Muslim official in one barangay in Baclaran who engages in street vending. He has been living in Baclaran since 1998.
Catalina	An old female Christian vendor who has been vending in Baclaran since the late 1980s. She owns a small grocery store at home.
Chris	An old male vendor who sells garment goods. He is a recognized leader of one group of vendors who come from one region in the countryside. He has been engaged in vending activities since 1979.
Esperanza	A veteran vendor leader has been in Baclaran since 1983. She is a recognized head of Christian vendors.
Eugene	A male ambulant vendor who used to work in a big local car manufacturing company since he was a child. He resorted to vending when he got laid off after the company shut down its operation. He has been an ambulant vendor in Baclaran since 1998.
Hannah	An old female street vendor who has been engaged in vending for over 30 years. She started vending in Baclaran in 1986. She migrated to Metro Manila from a province to earn a living. Her husband and adult children, who have their own families, are also engaged in street vending.
Jenny	A female Muslim vendor who has a semi-fixed stall. She sells shoes and garment products.
Julie	A female vendor leader who sells school supplies and house wares. She has been a street vendor for more than two decades. She lives with her family in a barangay near her vending stall. Some of her relatives, who help her as salespersons, live with her family.

Maricel	A young female Muslim ambulant vendor. She started vending in Baclaran in 2006. She currently sells mobile phone accessories and slippers.
Mary Jane	A female Christian vendor who used to be a saleslady for a vending stall. She now manages her own semi-fixed stall selling shoes. She has been engaged in vending for more than 10 years now.
Nelly	A female Muslim vendor who has a semi-fixed stall. She has a recognized fellow Muslim leader. She sells shoes and garment products.
Nora	A young female Muslim vendor who has been in Baclaran for more than 10 years. She started vending in 2000. She shares the stalls with her mother and sells garment products. She migrated to Barangay Baclaran from another Muslim community in Metropolitan Manila.
Oliver	A male ambulant vendor who lives in a neighbouring city. He goes to Baclaran every day to sell clothes. He has been engaged in vending activities for 28 years now. He started vending in Baclaran in 1988.
Rosie	A female ambulant vendor who is married to a Muslim. She started vending Baclaran in 2006. Before transferring to Baclaran, she was working in Divisoria, which is considered the biggest retail trading district in the Philippines.
Rowena	A woman vendor who sells bottled water, juice drinks, and school supplies. She migrated to Metro Manila to earn a living. She has been a vendor for 30 years now. She started vending in Baclaran in 1986.
Sheila	A female Muslim vendor who has a semi-fixed stall. She has a recognized fellow Muslim leader. She sells garment products.

Private Sector Groups and NGOs

Alejo	A jeepney driver whose final destination and terminal is in Baclaran. He has been a driver for more than two decades.
Billy	A property owner in Baclaran who leases out two buildings for commercial purposes. He has lived in Baclaran since his childhood and has witnessed the evolution of the area.
Boyeth	A jeepney driver whose final destination and terminal is in Baclaran. He has been a driver for more than two decades.
Francis	An official of a religious congregation in Baclaran.
Mike	A Christian resident of one Barangay in Baclaran. He was born and grew up in the community.
Moises	An assistant property manager of one shopping mall in Baclaran. He used to work with a private secondary educational institution.
Myra	A young female owner of formal vending stall in Baclaran. She is married with one child. She finished a college education but decided to engage in selling garment products as her past jobs was contractual lasting for six months.
Nancy	A female owner of a formal stall in Baclaran. She runs the stall selling school bags, travel luggage and other knapsacks. She has three full-time employees – hear oldest daughter and two adult male workers. She used to be a street vendor before being able to rent her own formal commercial space.
Nelson	A leader of an NGO in Baclaran who lives in a community near Baclaran vending spaces.

Government Officials

Allen	He is one of the heads of the peace and order committee of one barangay in Baclaran where he is also a resident. He has been a staff of the barangay government since the early 1990s.
Andy	An official of one barangay in Baclaran. He has been in this position since 2013.
Belen	A member of the National Anti-Poverty Commission Workers in the Informal Sector Council. She has worked with grassroots women engaged in home-based work.
Bernardo	A property manager and an official of a Barangay in Baclaran.
Brando	A leader of one Barangay in Baclaran. Some parts of his barangay are a site for private stalls and street vendors.
Cynthia	An official of a national government agency in-charge of workers in the informal sector. She has been in this position for more than three years.
Danny	An official of one Barangay in Baclaran. He has a leader of his barangay for more than 5 years. Many of his barangay residents and relatives are engaged in street vending.
Gina	An official of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. She has been with this government agency for more than 10 years.
Glenda	A staff of a national government agency in-charge of workers in the informal sector.
Jason	An official of the city government who is in-charge of street vendors. He has held his current position for more than two years. He lives in a barangay near Baclaran.
Kaye	An official of the Pasay City Planning and Development Office.
Krisha	A division head of Parañaque City's Planning and Development Office. She has been with this office for more than 10 years. She is married to a former resident of Baclaran.
Leni	A staff of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process. She is from a province in Mindanao where the government conflict with Muslim rebels is happening.
Melissa	A technical staff of the Pasay City Planning and Development Office. She has experienced running a program for street vendors in Pasay. She has been a staff of the Pasay City Government since 1991.

Miguel	A senior staff of the Philippine government's National Economic Development Authority. He is part of the Social Development Unit and represents his office in the inter-agency committee that tackles urban-related issues.
Mila	An official of one Barangay in Baclaran. She has worked with other local government units as a consultant.
Noriel	A technical staff of the Chairperson of the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor. He has been in this position for more than two years.
Peter	An official of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. He has been with this government agency for more than 10 years.

Academics and Development Workers

Anselma	A veteran community organizer in Pasay City who is familiar with the Baclaran vending situation. She has assisted urban poor communities in their struggle for land tenure.
Belinda	A seasoned organizer of workers in the informal economy. She initiated organizing project in Baclaran. She used to head the National Anti-Poverty Commission – Workers in the Informal Sector Council.
Fredo	A retired professor of the University of the Philippines Diliman. He has written books and technical guidelines on planning and local land use processes, among others.
Hector	A Professor Emeritus of one university in the Philippines. He has written books on community organizing in the country.
Jess	An experienced organizer of urban poor communities in Metropolitan Manila. He has assisted many poor communities in their struggle for land tenure. He is currently part of the advisory committee of one official in Pasay City.
Leo	A leader of informal workers who initiated organizing project in Baclaran. He is familiar with the conditions and issues being faced by Baclaran vendors.
Manuel	An Associate Professor at a state university in the Philippines. He specializes in issues of institutional processes and planning.

Maura	A seasoned organizer of workers in the informal economy. She used to head a nationwide coalition of associations of informal workers and vendors. She was also part of the National Anti-Poverty Commission – Workers in the Informal Sector Council.
Mayeth	A social worker and a veteran organizer of street vendors in Metropolitan Manila. She is part of a socialist national organization in the Philippines.

E. Ethics Approval Letter

THE UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND

Institutional Human Research Ethics Approval

Project Title:	Who Governs the 'Ungovernable'? Examining the Modes of Governance in Urban Informality
Chief Investigator:	Mr Redento B. Recio
Supervisor:	Dr Iderlina Mateo-Babiano, Dr Sonia Roitman
Co-Investigator(s):	None
School(s):	GPEM
Approval Number:	2015000420
Granting Agency/Degree:	GPEM
Duration:	31st December 2017

Comments/Conditions:

Note: if this approval is for amendments to an already approved protocol for which a UQ Clinical Trials Protection/Insurance Form was originally submitted, then the researchers must directly notify the UQ Insurance Office of any changes to that Form and Participant Information Sheets & Consent Forms as a result of the amendments, before action.

Name of responsible Committee:
Behavioural & Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee
This project complies with the provisions contained in the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research* and complies with the regulations governing experimentation on humans.

Name of Ethics Committee representative:
Associate Professor John McLean
Chairperson
Behavioural & Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee

Signature _____ Date 20/4/2015